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Abstract
This research examined the lived experiences of an Afghan Muslim male
participant group. This study explored their immigration from a Southwest-Asian, highly
non-secular society to a Western-style, liberal, secular nation-state. Further, this research
was an examination of Muslim male identity as an attribute that is closely related to lived
experiences, environment and cultural assimilation. Also, this study looked closely at the
meanings that this Afghan Muslim male immigrant group attached to identity, as well as
exploring their unique narratives during pre-immigration and post-immigration periods.
This qualitative research study used narrative methods to unearth the lived experiences of
five Afghan Muslim male citizens. These participants immigrated to the U.S. while
serving as interpreters and translators for the coalition forces during the Afghanistan War
between 2003 and 2012. Several researchers have examined Muslim immigration from
Eastern to Western nations, focusing on their adaptation, assimilation, and developmental
patterns. The research objective of this study was slightly different and important to
social science in that it focused on how a select group of Afghan Muslim males
conceptualized their own sense of identity and how their notion of identity was shaped
and influenced by their own pre- and post-migration experiences. To this end, the
discoveries in this study revealed that the nature of the identities for many in this study
may be deemed more blended and in some instances renegotiated, holding onto parts of
their core native identities while embracing aspects of the cultural, ethnic, and social
elements of their new host land that fit within their own individual frame of reference.

viii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
At the beginning of the war in Afghanistan (2003), the need for exceptional
Afghan language interpreters and translators quickly emerged. In Afghanistan, the United
States and its allies are involved in a complex modern war. Unlike the conditions or
environments of a war in the traditional or conventional sense (e.g., WWI, WWII, or the
Korean War), the Afghan war is termed a “counter-insurgency operation” (COIN).
According to Celeski (2005), in COIN war environments, operations and the lines of
troops are less defined—combat operations are more fluid and rapidly change. Military
scholars report that the key to success in the COIN environment is deliberate military
engagement at all levels within civilian communities and direct interface with local and
national leaders and the populace (Kelly, 2007). The nature of this relationship is a
partnership with local forces that enables and creates stable, secure, and safe communities
for the local population. Put differently, the goal of counter-insurgency operations is to
change the “hearts and minds” of the population, and developing trust among the
participants is critical to its objectives (Celeski, 2005).
To satisfy COIN requirements, those “trusted” Afghan nationals who spoke fluent
English—as well as their native Dari, Farsi, Pashtun, or other indigenous Afghan
languages—were deemed vital to the war’s effort. According to Kelly (2007), this meant
interpreters and translators would be needed at every level of engagement: in villages, in
communities, in districts, in the provinces, in regions, and at the national levels of
government. Soon, thousands of men and some women were recruited for the war. In an
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April 14, 2013 New York Times (Asia Pacific) article, Azam Ahmed (2013) underscores
that the danger is real for anyone working in support of or alongside the coalition forces.
The Taliban also forbid any kind of collaboration with the government and
particularly with the foreign troops, including that of an economic nature.
Since contracting for ISAF or for Western aid agencies is one of the main
sources of employment in Afghanistan, the ban has a major impact on the
ability of households to earn a livelihood. Not surprisingly, most Afghans
ignore it, at their risk and peril. Executions of contractors do occur. Usually
the Taliban follow a procedure, which includes warning the collaborationists
that they are going to be punished if they persist. (Country of Origin
Information Centre, 2011)
Ahmed (2013) made clear that the danger is especially real for the estimated
8,000 interpreters and translators who have worked for the American military in
Afghanistan.
According to UNHCR, all persons who are seen to support NATO-soldiers
and people working for NATO, as well as foreigners and people working for
foreigners are at risk of being targeted by the Taliban. UNHCR commented
that regarding staff employed by the US military or ISAF, there is a high
possibility for every staff member being intimidated by the Taliban.
Interpreters as well as local drivers working for companies supporting the
bases are at risk. UNHCR mentioned it as rule of thumb that all blue-collar
employees who are seen going in and out of military bases as well as camps

3
on a regular basis, may be at risk of intimidation by the Taliban. As United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed it: 'the more
visible you are the higher the risk you run of being targeted’. In practice,
however, it is difficult to distinguish between the various levels of
employment according to UNHCR. In general, all Afghans who are
associated with foreigners could be at risk in Kabul as well as in the
countryside. (Country of Origin Information for Use in the Asylum
Determination Process. (Report from Danish Immigration Service’s factfinding mission to Kabul, Afghanistan, 2011, p.17)
Interpreter and translator duties include working beside the United States military
and coalition military members, supporting the large phalanx of private U.S. contractors,
and, at times, fighting and dying in the performance of their duties. However, while the
interpreters and translators were intensely loyal to their work, their commitment came at
great risk and cost to themselves, their families, and their communities. According to
Celeski (2005), the Al-Qaida terrorists and Taliban insurgents quickly recognized the
significant roles the interpreters and translators served and began a campaign of threats,
intimidation, and terror to undermine COIN. Celeski (2005) adds that the additional
objective of the insurgents was to strip away any ability of the U.S. and coalition to work
with and engage the local populace. This meant minimum contact with national Afghan
government actors on vital security, stabilization, and rebuilding projects. Needed
programs to ensure peace and stability in the country were hampered and, in some cases,
jeopardized altogether (Pul, 2013).
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These reports make it clear those Afghan interpreters and translators working with
the coalition forces are at risk. The skills of the interpreters and translators to bridge
Eastern and Western languages and cultures were deemed instrumental by the terrorists,
Taliban and the coalition. As part of a range of actions under consideration for the United
States and Afghan-led transition plan, the United States government enacted special visa
programs for Afghan interpreters and translators. According to the National Defense
Authorization Act (2006), special immigrant status was made available under section
1059 of the act for Afghan nationals who worked directly for the United States Armed
Forces as a translator or interpreter and to their spouses and children. In addition, the act
further stipulated that once admitted to the United States as permanent residents, these
individuals and their families might eventually acquire U.S. Citizenship (National
Defense Authorization Act, 2006).
From a qualitative research stance, many questions surround the translators’ and
interpreters’ lived experiences during this episodic period. For example, how did
immigration experiences affect the participants’ sense of identity? From this framework,
the overarching research endeavor is structured around the concept of identity and
analyzed in the context of the participants’ lived experiences. The frame of reference of
the lived experiences is concentrated on pre-immigration and post-immigration
timeframes.
Is the Afghan Muslim identity a consequence of ethnic and cultural solidarity? Is
the identity among Afghan Muslim immigrants more closely related to socio-economic
conditions, shared values, elements of successful immigration, and community
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belonging? From a qualitative research perspective, how the participants apply meaning
to identity is much more crucial than determining ranges that contrast and measure such
attributes against the construct of identity. Several scholars address the issue of Muslim
identity, but Malik (1992) had a particularly distinctive perspective and outcome. Malik
(1992) maintained that Muslim identity has been based on Islam, and Islam serves as a
rallying point in the postcolonial world. The ongoing debate among Muslims is not
mainly related to being Muslim. Rather, the debate centers on seeking a consensus within
a number of young political and old socio-cultural identities (Malik, 1992). Malik’s work
informs the current study through its countering perspective shared by other Muslim
researchers and scholars, such as Cesari (2004). Cesari described the relatedness between
the practices of Islam as the dominant religion among Muslim nations. Further, these
conditions establish the foundations for Muslim individual and national identities. As a
religion, Islam accommodates ethnic pluralism, but the nation-states led by bureaucratic
elites advocate the imposition of uniformity, all in an effort to impose global nationalism
(Malik, 1992).
Before proceeding, it is appropriate to pause and come to an agreement, or at least
a common understanding, regarding the meaning of identity. The attribute of identity has
been studied for some time. It has reached a status of self-evident notions arising from
one’s firsthand experience (Sfard & Prusak, 2005). Kosmitzki (1996) stated that one’s
subjective identity or sense of self consists of attributes that make one unique, as well as
the characteristics one may share with others. Berry, Phinney, Sam, and Vedder (2006)
stated that there was an effort to improve the body of knowledge about the ethnic
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components of cultural identity for Muslims within the family context. More specifically,
Berry et al. (2006) focused on how the term identity, as used in the past, encapsulates the
relationship between factors such as religion, culture, ethnicity, and national identities.
In contrast to these views, Schachter posited that identity is not a “personal task”
but a co-construction of the individual and socio-cultural factors. In the current research,
the participant’s experiences were explored across a continuum of time, space, and events
that took their form and shape prior to their immigration to the West and in the postimmigration period (2005, p. 391). The broad timeframe of 2003 to 2102 is intended to
better explain the spectrum of identity, beliefs, values, and meaning used by the
participants as they endured dramatic life episodic events during both their pre- and postimmigration experiences.
In addition, the current research narrowed the beam and focused on identity in an
effort to advance dialogue and discussions that both inform and serve social scientific
research. Understanding the construct of identity among this group of underexplored
Afghan Muslims helps deconstruct the relationship between religion, cultures,
environment, and self-knowledge of one’s authenticity, among other factors (Hoare,
1991). Understanding the function and interaction of identity is essential to learning more
about the multiplicity, types, complexities, and the nature of Afghan and Muslim
identities. Hall wrote,
Despite the different terminology, literature is replete with paradoxical
notions of a self and identity: identity is understood as “oneness,” “one
true self,” which people with a shared history and ancestry have in
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common, and yet, it is an entity which is continually recreated, as people
make sense of themselves and the world around them. In a way, identity is
not simply what we are or the names we give to ourselves as positioned by
a single set of narratives. Instead, it is a collection of these experiences
along with the interactions, relationships and boundaries engaged in and
affected by others. If one were to synthesize all of these definitions, it may
be that identity is a complex, multidimensional constructed sum of all
these things: internally and externally shaped with both individual and
national dimensions. This constructed self is further shaped by one’s life
experiences, culture, and religion among relationship interactions. Most
importantly, identity as we know it is not motionless and rigid, rather in
flux and flexible as we experience the world around us. (1994, p. 394)
In a study linking home of origin, host country, and identity, Manning and Roy
(2007), used United Kingdom (UK) Labor Force survey data (2001) to measure identity
integration and broaden the discussion involving identity’s definition to include one’s
“national” identity. In their research, they expanded the scope of identity to that beyond
one’s self, introducing the notion of national identity. Using a research measurement that
asks study participants “What do you consider your national identity to be?”, the
respondents most often associated their own identity with UK-related factors: the value of
religion, attitudes towards inter-marriage, and the importance of racial composition in
schools (Manning & Roy, 2007). Further, in the same study, the researchers found that the
longer the stay in the UK, the more intense was the sense of self-identification with the
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host country (Manning & Roy, 2007). This may suggest that identity conflicts and
tensions among Afghan Muslims immigrants to the United States may develop, persist,
and even become exacerbated the stronger the cultural differences and connections are to
their homeland.
However, in slightly different research about immigrant integration, Bisin,
Patacchin, Verdier, and Zenous (2007) found that first-generation Muslims in the UK, as
a population, tend to integrate and assimilate into Western nations much slower as
compared to other immigrant groups. Bisin et al. (2007) reported that a Muslim who is
born in the UK and has spent more than 50 years in the new host land exhibits, on
average, the same probability of having a strong identity to the new host country as a
non-Muslim who has been in the UK for less than 20 years. This seems to suggest that
unless there is some powerful pulsating force or attachment (e.g., politics, economics,
ethnic, religion, or nationalism), distance and time weaken identity attachment for the
native land in favor of the new host country’s identity, integration, and assimilation.
Further, Bisin et al. (2007) indicated that greater tensions and evidence of cultural
clashes exist among “initial” Muslim immigrants, as compared to first-generation
Muslims, or even non-Muslims who immigrated. Bisin et al. (2007) informed the
researcher for the current study that within each group, second-generation immigrants
have a lower probability of showing a greater attachment to their culture of origin over
time, and this reduction is more pronounced for non-Muslims than for Muslims. In other
words, the longer subsequent Muslim generations remain in their choice “Western” host
country, the more the effects of identity attachment to their native land of origin decrease.
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Conversely, a longer stay also indicates a higher level of identity attachment and
assimilation to the new host country (Bisin & Alberto, 2007; Patacchini, Eleonora,
Verdier, Thierry, Zenou, & Yves, 2007).
In contrast to the much broader discussion about identity, the key question for this
research was what identities are reflected in the pre-immigration and post-immigration
Afghan informant experiences. Thus far, a number of defined identities, such as gender,
age, and sect affiliation have emerged within Afghanistan’s complex social environment.
Canfield (1986) wrote that these identities are based on loyalties, relationships, and
obligations, among other considerations. In traditional Muslim lands, such as
Afghanistan, identity is not a matter of choice because it is handed down from one
generation to the next.
The question of identity does not come up at all in traditional Muslim
societies, as it did in traditional Christian societies. In a traditional Muslim
society, an individual's identity is given by that person's parents and social
environment; everything from one's tribe and kin to the local imam to the
political structure of the state--anchors one's identity in a particular branch
of Islamic faith. (Fukuyama, 2004, p. 2)
Saroglou and Galand (2004) described Muslim and Afghan identity as three
defined identities that factor across pre- and post-immigration experiences. These Afghan
identities include an ethnic and cultural identity that corresponds to pre-immigration
activities and a Muslim and Islam religious identity that correspond to post-immigration
experiences.
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Ethnic identity is particularly important to Afghans. Hashem (1991) wrote that
ethnic identity has a time dimension and hinges on one’s collective experiences and
sentiments that hold both historical as well as ancestral meanings. Afghan identities have
different dimensions where shared experiences bind the members of tribes and ethnic
groups, which are diverse and culturally distinct from all outsiders. According to Smith
(1991), ethnicity gives a minority group a sense of common history in the form of shared
memories, which unite successive generations and result in accumulated experience” (p.
91). This analysis informs the current study in that within Afghanistan, ethnic and
religious identities are arguably more important than other considerations. This is not
intended to diminish shared histories, languages, customs, and practices that are uniquely
tribal or national in Afghanistan. Rather, Afghanistan’s conflict environment forces one
to cling to their ethnic identities in order to strengthen individual and group survival
against external threats (Smith, 1991).
The second key pre-immigration component concerns Afghan cultural identity.
According to Jamal (2008), Afghan cultural identity binds disparate tribes, villages, and
ethnicities to a sense of belonging, based on common experiences, as well as Muslim
beliefs and practices (e.g., family, marriage, song, dress, dance, etc.). The effect of these
practices is in the channelization of cultural identity toward a sense of connection
directed at those who are closer in relation to Muslim lived experiences (Magen, 1985).
This phenomenon informs this research in that cultural identity among Afghans imprints
a sense of exclusiveness and belonging that is never fully relinquished.

11
Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, and Senecal (1997) found that the dimensions of
Afghan cultural identity (e.g., traditions, ethnicity, and religion) may develop differently
and progress at varied speeds from one individual to the next. Bourhis et al. (1997)
indicated that cultural identity formation progresses through stages from a diffused notion
of identity to a more concrete understanding of self. Interestingly, where ethnic identity
served the survival needs of Afghan ethnic groups, cultural identity reinforces the Afghan
sense of who they are, and this sense of self often intersects with other factors, such as
culture, language, and history.
Identities use the resources of history, language, and culture in the
process of becoming rather than being: not “who we are” or
“where we come from,” so much as what we might become, how
we have been represented and how that bears on how we might
represent ourselves. (Hall, 1989, p. 4)
What this says about identities in a broad sense, and Afghan identity in particular,
is that identities interact and are extracted from a collection of meanings that are
outcomes of social and cultural circumstance. This idea of interaction, as observed by
Brah (1996), can be translated into a cross-disciplinary approach that sees identities as
relational. In other words, the idiosyncrasy of Afghan national identity acquires meaning
in relation to the social and cultural context in which identities are constructed.
The third key identity and the attribute that corresponds to post-immigration
Afghan experiences is the Muslim faith or religion of Islam (Saroglou & Galand, 2004).
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Identity becomes problematic precisely when Muslims leave traditional
Muslim societies by, for example, immigrating to Western Europe. One's
identity as a Muslim is no longer supported by the outside society; indeed,
there is strong pressure to conform to the west's prevailing cultural norms.
The question of authenticity arises in a way that it never did in the
traditional society, since there is now a gap between one's inner identity as
a Muslim and one's behavior vis-à-vis the surrounding society.
(Fukuyama, 2006, pp. 5-20)
Muslim identity gives practitioners unity, meaning, and purpose, as well as an
invaluable method to navigate individual life discrepancies. Van Hoof (1999) observed
that the importance of Muslim identity, as represented by Islamic ideals, values, and
beliefs, is that it assists believers in resolving these life discrepancies. Consequently,
Afghan scholars and thinkers alike recognize the irreplaceable importance religion,
particularly Islam, has in the identity formation of the Afghan people (Marcia, 1980).
While structure, coherence, and connection among disparate groups inside Afghanistan
are invaluable as integrators, the post-immigration dimension is arguably more crucial to
identity formation. Hirschman (2004) wrote that for immigrants who are separated from
their homeland and from many relatives, religious membership offers a refuge, in the
sense that it creates a sense of belonging and participation in the face of loss and the
strains of adjustment. This is because Islam, for post-immigration study participants,
provides a sense of community and social support. This is also because the American
towns and communities where Afghan Muslim immigrants settle and experience
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networks of mutual support through religion provides a counterweight that helps
ameliorate the traumas of assimilation (Ebaugh & Chafetz, 2000).
To provide clarity and cohesion, the strategy in the current research study was to
employ a funneled technical approach (Roberts, 2010). In this funneled technical
approach, the bottom of the funnel or wide base was represented by content that portrays
the study participants’ conceptualization of identity and sense of self. This was presented
through a continued narrowing logic that found its way through the lived experiences, as
presented in biographical, narrative form. The opposite end of the funnel—the top,
narrow point, contrasted the widening open structure. At this top end, the funnel’s content
was initially introduced by a case study of Afghanistan (see Chapter 4) and the
phenomenon that historically links this Eastern, rural, highly non-secular nation to the
democratic, secular West. In the modern context of conflict and struggles, one cannot
conduct a thorough discussion of either Afghanistan or the West separately. This is
particularly true when one focuses on the environment and aftermath of 9/11 in the
United States and the assault on the Muslim immigrant identity that followed.
In the discussion of Afghanistan (top, open end of the funnel), lived experiences,
and self-identity, the researcher presents a theoretical understanding that conceptually
frames the conditions, dimensions, and character of this decade-long war and conflict. To
accomplish this theoretical framework, the researcher turned to Huntington’s (1993)
hypothesis of the nature of world tensions and conflicts because of found linkages to
identity. Often viewed as absolute and fundamental incompatibility between the Christian
West and Muslim East, Huntington (1993) serves as one of the key nexus’ to conflict
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resolution in this study. This is because at its core, Huntington’s theory reveals the
immeasurable differences and failed understanding between eclectic identities from
Eastern and Western multicultural orthodoxies. According to Murden, identities that
define who we are remain “too basic in that civilizations are differentiated from each
other by history, language, culture, tradition, and, most important, religion” (2011, p.
416-426). Huntington minimizes the emergence of universal identities and culture
differences due to the speed of interactions and individual engagements that have been
made more common, given a shrinking world (Esposito, 1999).
Huntington posits that the end of the Cold War ushered the world out of its
“Western phase’ of struggles” (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). Moreover, the nature of the
new struggles and nation state clashes will be along cultural fault lines. The world in
Huntington’s (1993) new model would no longer exist because of ideological differences.
Huntington believed that future divides would evolve and persist because of fractures
along cultural and religious differences. As related to this theoretical belief and the issue
of Afghan identity, the researcher for the current study investigated how the study
participants resolved assimilation experiences in these culturally “clashed” environments.
Put differently, how did the study participants bridge their two worlds? What was the
nature of the participants’ internal conflicts that Huntington’s theory posits? Huntington
would have stated that successful assimilation by the study participants presumed balance
and the ability to reconcile their own sense of self with the identity attributes of their new
surroundings. This occurs while reconciling those new identities with native beliefs,
values, and meanings of the past. While further discussion of this theory is reserved for
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the literature review that follows, Huntington’s position is also important as a theoretical
frame of reference for this particular work. Additionally, Huntington’s work is widely
acknowledged as a significant contribution to the theoretical underpinnings that shape
and inform scholars on geopolitical entanglements. Notwithstanding its prominence, it is
not without criticism, as noted in the literature review section that follows.
This researcher used the present conflict in Afghanistan as the context for this
study, and in so doing, cast light onto the current manifestation of Huntington’s cultural
divide against the West (i.e., the United States and its “Western” allies). In this research,
the cultural fault lines were clearly distinguishable in the Afghanistan model, where
clashes between Islamic civilizations and Western democratic states are observable
among several tangible characteristics, including culture, ethnic identity, nationalism, and
religion. Just as Huntington predicted, these discords erupted into violent cultural clashes
and conflict (e.g., the 9/11 attacks). Additionally, these fault lines, particularly as related
to the Afghanistan region, are linked to both national and individual identity of Afghan
citizens (Barker & Muck, 2009).
Rationale for Study
The current research is distinguishable from other related social science inquiries
that focus primarily on the patterns of immigration of Afghan Muslim male refugees to
Western nation-states. The researcher for the current study focused on an under-examined
participant group of Afghans who each directly served in the war in Afghanistan. As such,
the research provided a unique opportunity to explore the dramatic cultural change in
progress in a participant group with unusually strong family, cultural, tribal, social, and
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religious ties with historically intense national allegiance to their birth country. Arguably
more important is the manner in which this study’s participants rationalized, comingled,
and resolved seemingly incongruent beliefs and values in their new host land.
Additionally, this research was an exploration of the lived experiences of Afghan
Muslim males who emigrated from their native Afghanistan to the United States. After
more than 10 years of war, preceded by 30 years of occupied presence and conflict,
unearthing the meanings these participants gave to their identity presented an
extraordinary opportunity for social scientific discovery. This researcher also investigated
the associated phenomenon of individual identity and the meaning ascribed to one’s sense
of self for these study participants. Moreover, considering the matter of lived experiences,
this researcher explored the associated concept of identity for several reasons. Least
among these reasons was the underexplored nature of identity relative to this group of
Afghan Muslim men who immigrated to the West. Arguably more important, the
researcher delved into how identity holistically informed their Muslim experiences in the
West and the static or malleable nature of these individual identities. In addressing these
issues, a seminal question became, “How do Afghan Muslim male interpreters and
translators who immigrated to the United States during the war (2006–2012) reconcile
pre-immigration and post-immigration ethnic, cultural, and Muslim (religious) identity
conflicts?”
The focus on the construct of identity through the lens of Afghan Muslims’ lived
experiences is further influenced by the body of knowledge that says identity as an
individual construct is shaped and molded by several factors. These factors include local,
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ancestral, religion, national, and cultural attributes that interface to form one’s collective
sense of self and identity. In terms of Eastern and Western cultural, societal, and identity
differences, the degrees of separation could not be greater for an Afghan emigrating from
Kabul to Kansas, for example. Understanding how this transference occurs and the
factors that contribute to successful acculturation and assimilation helps deconstruct
barriers and re-shape images that have repeatedly fueled intra- and inter-group conflict
between families, tribes, cultures, ethnic groups and global communities. Leveraging
qualitative methods to study and learn more about the theoretical framework of identity,
as related to this particular group, is to become better informed about the construction of
identity and its outcome in human interaction.
Purpose and Goals
Despite the wave of articles, books, and reports about Afghanistan and its relation
to the war, significantly less material exists on Afghanistan immigrants and refugee
movements to the West (Pul, 2013). This is especially true if one is interested in
understanding the lived experiences of the immigrant interpreters and translators who
transitioned from Afghanistan to the United States. This population of Afghan nationals,
who worked with the United States Armed Forces and allies, were pivotal to the
successful partnering with the Afghan security forces and has not been studied in great
depth. According to Pul (2013), researchers have primarily focused on assimilation, along
with health, economic, and workplace perceptions and discrimination issues experienced
by Afghan or Muslim refugee immigrants to the West. Existing research primarily relies
on data related to refugees who have migrated to the United States, Canada, and Europe
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following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the late 1970s through the 1980s
(Emadi, 2005). The research methodologies have also often rested on quantitative
approaches, relying heavily on United States census data to explore the aforementioned
social issues according to Emadi (2005). A problem with this approach is that it examines
the issue of Afghan Muslim immigrants predominantly from the perspective of the host
state. Additionally, the focus has almost exclusively been on the effects the immigrant
group has had on the host nation’s economy, commerce, social, education, political
institutions, and state infrastructures (Emadi, 2005). This gap in the literature informed
and motivated this researcher to examine the effects of the immigrant group’s migration
to the United States and how this event has shaped participant beliefs, understandings,
and conceptualizations of their identities and lived experiences. For this research, inquiry
and analysis of the pre-immigration period began at the start of the Afghan War (2003).
This means the interpreters’ and translators’ narrative terms of reference may start as
early as three years prior to the enactment of the U.S. Visa legislation (2006). According
to the National Defense Authorization Act (2006), special immigrant status was made
available under section 1059 of the act to Afghan nationals who worked directly for the
United States Armed Forces as a translator or interpreter. The aim of the current research
study was to capture the experiences and lived history of the participants during the war,
and beyond the period when immigration to the west commenced.
Problem Statement
Afghan Muslim male interpreters and translators experience interpersonal
struggles and intergroup conflict as they migrate from the East to the West. In yielding to
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Western assimilation and acculturation pressures, interpersonal tensions emerge between
and within native family units who seek to honor and cling to traditional tribal and ethnic
beliefs, values, and customs. Additionally, intergroup conflict arises as Afghan Muslim
male interpreters and translators attempt to reconcile those native traditions and
associated identities with the customs, values, and beliefs of their new host land. The
problem is defining and understanding the disparate identities for this population group
during their immigration to the West. To this end, are the identities the same and or static
across both pre- and post- immigration periods? Also, does finding the right balance
between bridging the native social, cultural, and religious constructs matter? Research
needs to be conducted to better understand the identity issues of this Afghan Muslim
male group and the nature of their interpersonal and intergroup conflict. And, the aim of
such future research must be to design more constructive methods to help participants
mitigate this identity conflict issue, and enhance cross-cultural awareness.
Research Questions
To explore the rarely-researched Afghan Muslim male interpreter and translator
“conflict and change” issue of identity, the primary research question of the current study
is: What are the lived experiences during pre- and post-immigration of Afghan Muslim
interpreters and translators who migrated to the United States during the Afghanistan War
(2003 - 2012)? Supporting research sub-questions were:
1. How do these Afghan Muslim males conceptualize identity?
2. How do these experiences shape, inform, and affect their developed identities?
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3. How does intergroup conflict shape experiences and influence identity
dilemmas within the study group?
Reflexivity
According to Creswell (2007), the written text and the researcher are intertwined.
Meaning, what one writes and who one is are presented through communications via
various reflections. These reflections are a compilation of one’s views about social issues,
race, class, gender, religion, and politics, among other factors. This study, therefore, is not
written void of all interpretations and reflections by the researcher—honesty and integrity
prevent the researcher from stating otherwise. However, where certain reflections have
emerged, attempts to mitigate their presence through full disclosure assisted in delivering
the voices of the storyteller without distortion, bias, or reflections by the researcher. In
the spirit of full disclosure, since 2007, the researcher had lived and worked routinely in
Southwest Asia, primarily in Afghanistan, in the service of the International Military
Coalition. Moreover, throughout the researcher’s presence in Afghanistan, he was with
and around interpreters and translators, hearing and learning about their stories while
attempting to understand the complexities of the identities of the Afghan individuals he
came into contact with. In reflecting on those interactions and this research study, the
researcher understands that his personal and professional commitment in Afghanistan
could unduly sway this research. To guard against this threat and bias, outside scrutiny of
the research was constantly necessary, and regular reflection on the methods employed in
this study served as a useful tool, as observed by Guba and Lincoln (1985). Moreover,
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Guba and Lincoln (1985) observed that reflective commentary should also be used in this
instance, and can be applied in a variety of ways.
The reflective commentary may also be used to record the researcher’s
initial impressions of each data collection session, patterns appearing to
emerge in the data collected and theories generated. The commentary can
play a key role in what Guba and Lincoln term ’progressive subjectivity’,
or the monitoring of the researcher’s own developing constructions,
which the writers consider critical in establishing credibility. Ultimately,
the section of the commentary dealing with emerging patterns and
theories should inform that part of the research report that addresses the
project’s results, and any discussion in the report of the effectiveness of
the study maybe based on the investigator’s methods analysis within the
reflective commentary. (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 70-71)
During the one on one-interview sessions with each of the participants
my own reflections surfaced. I was conflicted as I listened to their emotional
stories. My conflict involved feelings of loss and pain over the American and
coalition soldiers that committed themselves, and in some instances sacrificed
their lives for Afghanistan and its people. This researcher’s own conflict
emerged while working to convey the narratives of Afghan Muslim men. Some
of these men at times seemed dismissive of the US involvement and appeared to
levy blame on the coalition for the destruction and deaths. As I worked to convey
the subject’s stories, what of the narratives and lived experiences of those
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countless American lives that will be forever changed as a consequence of this
conflict. As a retired American military officer who served in the same war, I am
not sure I ever fully resolved this conflict. I simply resigned myself to focus on
the research at hand, and apply the principles, research techniques and to work
within the ethical boundaries I have been exposed to in preparation for this study.
Through the researcher’s work and interactions, he came to admire the beauty of
the Afghan people, their culture, and heritage, while often being bewildered at the level
of violence among Afghans and the dismissal at the loss of life as some pre-ordained will.
In studying the Afghan society, the researcher saw the promise of a proud nation and
remained saddened by the inexplicable and contradictory theft, corruption, and deceit at
the hands of those entrusted with power. The researcher felt strongly about the future for
the Afghans and believed that they would be best served in this research with scholarly,
impartial, and unbiased research. He also remained steadfast in his convictions that
rigorous qualitative research methods applied consistently throughout the entire process
provide a voice to those silenced through violence, conflict, marginalization, and
oppression.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
In every country within the Muslim world, Islam is either a State religion or under
State control. This condition applies to even the most secular “Muslim” states. For some,
leaving the Muslim dominated Islamic East, offers freedoms of choice and experiences
where other religions exist in harmony. Such choice among Afghan immigrants leads to a
range of new, or possible hybrid Muslim identities.

—Jocelyne Cesari, 2004

Despite numerous reports, articles, and literature on refugees from Afghanistan
arriving in the United States and Europe, comparatively little research has described the
lived experiences of Afghan male immigrants. The population of Afghan nationals that
worked with United States and coalition armed forces was pivotal to the United States’
successful partnership with the Afghan security forces, but has not been studied in great
depth. To date, researchers have focused primarily on health, economic, workplace
perception, and discrimination issues of Afghan refugees in the United States, Canada,
and Europe. The existing literature is in large part based on the data regarding refugees
who migrated to the United States following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from
the late 1970s to the 1990s. In addition, the research methodologies have mainly relied on
quantitative approaches to explore the aforementioned social issues (Emadi, 2005).
Because this study uses a qualitative analytical approach to investigate the lived
experiences of male Afghan Muslim immigrants, this literature review takes a more
holistic approach to framing the context and subsequent debate. This approach also
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allows a careful study of how the participants view their identities in the context of their
world experiences. It accomplishes this by recognizing and acknowledging that these
experiences are bracketed by time, events, history, and geopolitical circumstances, among
other factors that contribute to the formulation of self-identity (Suleiman, 1987). In this
vein, both pre- and post-immigration conditions have significance for this paper as they
inject meaning and purpose into the lives of the participants requiring their interpretation
and understanding. Also, rather than simply examining post-immigration experiences,
this research explores pre- and post-migration events combined. This allows for a more
thorough understanding and comparison of the experiences that will improve both the
researcher and reader’s understanding of perceived identity changes among the
participants during their lived experiences and assimilation to the West.
This literature review is constructed in two distinct, but logically connected parts.
Part one explores Afghanistan and pre-immigration patterns of Afghan Muslim behavior
and interaction in a global context. This section focuses on Afghan national experiences
and regional and external pressures, in addition to global interactions that have helped to
shape pre-immigration lived experiences. The section also looks critically at cultural,
ethnic, and religious influences, particularly as they contribute to identity development
among Afghan Muslim male groups. Lastly, this section of the literature review also
explores individual identity issues pre- and post-immigration as well as the familial and
group identity issues across related time periods.
In part two, this literature review provides an examination of Afghan Muslim
post-immigration experiences. In this section, the research study draws on a wide array of
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existing literature, reports and journals that assist in uncovering identity-related findings
learned from previous inquires of Muslim-world interactions and experiences. These
interactions and experiences are transferred from native lived activities and events to new
host country experiences. Further, in this section, focus is given to Muslim self-identity
and the observed identity changes and differentiations between pre- and post-immigration
periods. However, before addressing prevalent and related literature on either pre- or
post-immigration Afghan Muslim issues, a contextual framework is presented. To this
end, this research literature review begins by examining the ideological rifts that establish
the preconditions that undergird twenty-first century experiences and identities among
Afghan Muslims. What we know from the literature that follows is that these identities
are not singular and symmetrical. Rather, they appear to be uniquely influenced and
shaped by ethnic, cultural, national, as well as religious factors.
Global and Cultural Ideological Differences
In discussing tentative findings on the complexities and paradoxes of Islamic
Muslim identity in Afghanistan and conflict in a conservative world, Mazrui (1996)
writes extensively on the ideological shifts that took place in the lead-up to the twentyfirst century. He writes about the ideological divides within the Western world between
liberals and conservatives in response to Muslim and Islamic fundamentalism. While
Islamic fundamentalists are entrenched in a global struggle against Western ideology and
those that would support it, the ironies that exist within nation states are noteworthy.
Mazrui (1996) observes that jockeying for political power between American
conservative and liberal parties is affecting Muslims and Islam globally; in France, there

26
is growing hostility towards foreigners and Muslims, in Germany, xenophobia, and in
America, a foreign policy that is frequently pro-Muslim, but often unsympathetic
domestically.
To better understand the extent of the effect on Muslims and non-Muslims
globally, this literature review examines the Cold War phenomenon that eventually had
an impact on the lives of Afghans. The success of the West in defeating communism
during the Cold War created unforeseen circumstances when a political vacuum emerged
as Soviet power collapsed. According to Dennis (2004), “one of the stabilizing facts of
the Cold War competition was that both East and West kept their client states in check.
While some rivalries fueled during the Cold War, others clearly were suppressed by it”
(pp. 25-27). Unchecked, the former satellite states of the Soviet Union were suddenly
without an identity that had previously united them - a communist ideology.
With the failure of this ideology, former Soviet satellite nations reverted to
religion, suppressed under communism, but now used to self-identify and unify their
populations. Dennis (2004) claims that three events resulted from the demise of the
Soviet Union: an ideological vacuum, a power vacuum, and global weapons proliferation.
Of the three, the ideological effects were most prevalent and impactful on Muslim
experiences as fundamentalists moved quickly to gain political standing:
At its height, the Cold War generally worked to suppress other political
ideologies as both the Americans and Soviets (and their respective allies)
committed tremendous resources to either democratic or communist
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parties or leaders in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. (Dennis, 2004, p.
27)
Since the conclusion of the Cold War, and the subsequent withdrawal from large
swaths of the global mosaic by foes, Islamic fundamentalism gained an ideological
foothold. And while the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism is explained, the motives
behind the fundamentalists’ rage against the West, and particularly the United States, are
less defined (Dennis, 2004). Through this uncertainty, we observe that the world is now
connected. This means trade, commerce, and communications effectively link previously
isolated nations and forces, forming partnerships, while at the same time establishing
enduring structures that rely on each other to thrive. Dennis (2004) suggests that Islamic
fundamentalism is hostile to any outside force that makes their aim of a puritanical entity
harder to achieve. In addition, a globally connected universe exposes Muslims to a
secular and enticing Western culture. Another rationale offered by Dennis (2004) is that
fundamentalists hold the view that they are the heirs to an ancient Arabic heritage, which
they have failed to uphold. As previously indicated, the politically changed landscape and
ideological differences caused seismic changes in Africa and elsewhere. These changes
eventually reached Southwest Asia and subsequently rippled across Afghanistan.
While many researchers support Dennis’ (2004) view, others offer an alternative
theory. One such theory, as provided by Samuel P. Huntington, has come to be known as
the “Clash of Civilizations.” In 1993, Huntington presented his hypothesis, which posits
that conflicts in the world would no longer exist because of ideological differences, but
rather according to fractures along cultural and religious divides. Huntington’s theory is
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generally acknowledged as a major contribution to the theoretical discussion. His work
focuses on civilization conflict and broader intellectual debates and discussions about the
driving forces behind today’s more complex geopolitical disagreements.
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new
world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great
divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world
affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between
nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will
dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the
battle lines of the future. (Huntington, 1993, p. 22)
For Huntington and others holding the same belief, what matters most is not
ideological dissimilarities - rather, it is cultural and identity similarities that define people
through language, religion, culture, history, customs, and institutions (Schweitzer &
Shay, 2011). Still, as the political and cultural reality of today’s post-9/11 world adds
credence to Huntington’s basic premise, his theory is not immune to criticism.
Esposito (1999) faults Huntington for depicting all Muslim states as complicit in
their cultural conflict and struggle with the West. Indeed, Huntington often used a
metaphor about a northern and a southern Italian village with distinctly different customs,
but sharing a common Italian heritage, ethnicity, and identity, compared to a German
neighbor to the north. In this sense, Huntington believed that Muslims, whether they are
Afghan or Algerian, share a similar identity that is nested in their common religious
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practice of Islam. The problem, as pointed out by Esposito (1999), is that Islamic
fundamentalism is rooted in a minority. And while these minorities fall under a common
fundamentalist umbrella, they are often distinguishable by their philosophical uniqueness.
Countering both views, Schweitzer and Shay (2011) posit that the Muslim majority is
secular or moderate and, even more importantly, pragmatic and far from engaged conflict
with the West. Many agree that Huntington’s one-size-fits-all model unfairly casts both
moderate and fundamentalist Muslims in the same indistinguishable category.
Afghan Individual Pre-Immigration Identity
What the above criticisms underscore is the diverse and dynamic nature of both
the country of Afghanistan and its people. The environment has a powerful role to play in
shaping the identity of the nation and, as a consequence, its population. Where the
Afghan national identity is concerned, categories such as history, culture, ethnicity,
customs, and institutions all play integral roles (Canfield, 1986). In addition, Canfield
(1986) maintains that the use of these categories is important to putting into order a
“normative orientation” regarding the events and social order that feed one’s self-identity.
These categories serve a supplementary purpose in addition to ensuring clarity regarding
what it means to be an Afghan. Other researchers refer to these categories as a national
phenomenon that connects and binds each Afghan to one another. Canfield (1986)
describes the phenomenon as a construct of self-identity that is complex and important to
the common Afghan identity in that it permeates all facets of the social order. Even more
interesting is the notion that self-identity is best understood as a social struggle or a kind
of give and take between reality and one’s sense of what is real.
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Identity entails a confrontation between the ideal and the real and affects
both the construct and the situation within which it is used. The construct
shapes the situation by defining it in terms of familiar, established
concepts, whereas the actual situation, on the other hand, places a strain
on the ideal construct so as to “wear” the construct into its own image.
Over time the construct is shaped to fit, more or less, the kinds of
situation that regularly arise in human relationships so that the meanings
of social categories received from one generation are often infused with
fresh nuances and by the time they are passed on to the next social
categories, like all cultural phenomena, are developed in the experience
of social groups. (Spiro, 1984, pp. 185-186)
What this says about Afghan self-identity, among other things, is that Afghan
people work to accommodate and reconcile their idea of social meaning and identity
through individual reference points. These reference points then help them to fit reality
neatly into their own self-identity construct or notion. Further, this individually
prescribed notion of self-identity is reinforced through shared experiences that connect
Afghan social groups, tribes, families, and individuals (Spiro, 1984). The idea of
common experiences is a powerful component of identity self-development and links the
notion of belonging to one’s native people, history, culture, and society to Afghan
experiences and social groups. According to Canfield (1986), Afghan social groups
establish unique identity categories. These identities have lasting traditions for many,
taking root as enduring parts of the societal structure. What follows next is a closer look
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at some of these iconic Afghan traditions and how they are viewed in the lived
experiences and manifest themselves in the phenomenon of self-identity.
Afghan identity is often synonymous with how Afghans view traditions,
according to Tapper (1984). For Afghans, such traditions often include centuries-old
customs and beliefs that many consider part of their national treasures. These national
treasures, traditions, or identities are further detailed in varied literature about social
relationships and affiliations known as watan and qawn. Canfield (1986) and Tapper
(1984) state that belonging is a critical component of the Afghan sense of self. The word
watan translates as “homeland” and suggests a deeply held connection, relationship, and
belonging to one’s birthplace, community, or native home. Further, when Afghan
scholars present their findings surrounding the concept of watan, they frequently describe
a relationship between the homeland and the individual. This relationship is authentic and
centered on real depth and relatedness that results in a sense of obligation that is
permanent and enduring. The sense of obligation as the underpinning of watan is
understood as sharing and helping people who are connected to a common village or
region (Canfield, 1986). Moreover, the sense of self-identity resulting from such an
attachment, shared experience, and permanent belonging to a place is strengthened by
kinship (Tapper, 1984).
The English translation of the Dari or Pashtun (the official Afghan languages)
word qwan is “kinship.” According to Tapper (1984), qawn underscores the importance
of ancestral relationships to the Afghans. Other Afghan scholars, such as Canfield (1986),
also note that the meaning and interpretation of qawn can sometimes be extended to close
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friends. Often these connections, qawn refer to those who speak a common language and
broadly share an ethnic identity, observing similar rituals and observances.
Regarding the relationship between watan and qawn, it is important to understand
that while both are important and powerful elements, together they intersect at the heart
of defined Afghan identity. According to Canfield (1986), they can be vitally important
to the Afghan identity and sense of self, especially when reinforcing one another and
particularly when based upon tribal relationships and sect affiliation. Regarding sect
affiliation, certain elements require expansion, as the discussion of “sect identity” takes
on a unique dynamic in Afghan society. While the sect is a significant feature of one’s
identity, it is often too taboo a subject to address publicly or in one-on-one conversations.
Typically, one’s family name, homeland, village or tribe, dialect, or other cultural
indicators are sufficient enough to identify one’s sect in Afghan society.
As nation-oriented Afghans consider it an inappropriate basis of status,
then avoid mentioning it. But for most traditional people that I have met –
i.e., the ritual Hazaras and the “folk” populations of the cities – sect
identity is a significant mark of status, because to them Sunni identity is
implies compliance and identification with the rule of government and
Shi’ite identity implies recalcitrance and alienation from it. (Canfield,
1986, p. 187)
The story of Afghanistan’s colorful and rich identities, made up of ethnic groups
of Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Baluchi, and Turkoman people, is well absorbed
through the lens of the author Khaled Hosseini. Hosseini’s (2003) powerful tale, The Kite
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Runner, reveals the diverse composition of a heterogeneous nation and people. In this
work, the reader experiences a sense that Afghanistan is a multiethnic blend of centuriesold tribal influences, customs, and more than twenty eclectic languages that are each
honored and preserved today. Of these languages, only Dari and Pashtun are recognized
as official government languages. Understanding the experiences and identity of
Afghanistan means coming to terms with the unstable and ever-changing geopolitical
landscape. As one absorbs Hosseini’s (2003) work, a reader comes away with the
understanding that Afghanistan has not had the good fortune of peace for nearly 40 years.
And, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, foreign powers such as Britain and
Russia often violated the sovereign territory of Afghanistan for their own political and
economic self-interest. On top of these global conflicts, regional violations of Afghan
territory by neighboring Pakistan to the east, and governmental meddling by Iran to the
west, have added to internal pressures (Canfield, 1986). Contributing to these internal
issues are the fragmented demands of ethnic groups divided along Sunni and Shi’a
orientations, making the challenges of governance immense under normal circumstances
(Hosseini, 2003) - that is, unless leaders were able to rally the people around a shared
cause, common experience, or national identity.
Repeatedly, Afghan leaders have found such a rallying point in the iconic symbol
of national identity - the Afghan flag. According to Poullada (1973), the symbolism of
the flag was captured by the use of the national seal that is placed at its center. This flag
connected the Afghan people, heritage, and identity with that of Muslims around the
world, as the flag embodies the Islamic character and faith. Canfield (1986) writes that at

34
the flag’s center was a mosque, inside which were the outlines of a prayer niche
representing the piety of the people, and a pulpit representing authority of the ulema or
Islamic scholars.

Figure 1. Afghan National Flag
http://www.mapsofworld.com/flags/afghanistan-flag.html
In practice, Afghan rulers aligned themselves, their agendas, and their campaigns
to the national flag and ostensibly to the nation’s identity by using grand Islamic titles to
attract loyalty from the people. According to Stewart (1973), the title Commander of the
Faithful was used by Dost Muhammad, who reigned from 1826 to 1864. The title of King
of Islam was also used by Abdul Rahman (reigned 1880–1901). This practice of aligning
one’s rule with the iconography of the national identity, in this case Islam, continued well
into the twentieth century by Habibullah, who reigned from 1901 to 1919 and called
himself “The Lamp of the Nation and Religion.” And finally, King Zaher Shah, who
ruled from 1933 to 1973, referred to himself as “Dependent of God.” Each of these rulers
recognized the national identity embodied in the symbolic Afghan flag. Each of these
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rulers also saw the legitimacy of the national flag, and by linking their rule to these
cherished Islamic symbols, sought to maximize their legitimacy, as well (Stewart, 1973).
Eventually, rulers succumb to the will of the people (Younos, 1998). Meeting the
demands of a diverse nation, ethnically identified as Pashtun, Tajik, and Hazara, among
others, is difficult under the best conditions. This is because these groups identify with
those who speak their language and share their common culture (Younos, 1998). The
overarching commitments and loyalties that these groups exhibit are primarily to their
own ethnic groups or tribes. According to Robson (2002), these groups’ identification
with the nation is of lesser importance, and Afghan development has suffered as a
consequence of competing multiethnic identities. The map of Afghanistan below shows
the areas of origin of the country’s native tribes. Also, the open land mass may shed some
light on the influence that geographic conditions have had on many tribal and group
customs, traditions, and religious practices. This is because much of what is visible today
in Afghanistan is believed to have originated from neighboring regions (Robson &
Lipson, 2002).
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Figure 2. Afghanistan Country Map
http://www.mapsofworld.com/flags/afghanistan-flag.html
Afghan Tribal and Group Identities
Pashtuns. The majority ethnic group in Afghanistan is the Pashtuns. According to
Robson and Lipson (2002), roughly 38% of the Afghan population comprises Pashtuns
who view themselves as holy warriors. They are a resourceful people who take pride in
the difficult lifestyle they have carved out of the austere and often inhospitable Afghan
landscape. Robson and Lipson (2002) also state that they are poor but able to thrive on
adversity, and they can prevail in conditions that would easily defeat others. Scholars
have often commented on the tribal relatedness, identity, and fighting ethos of this group.
The defeat of the British in the nineteenth century was mainly at the hands of the
Pashtuns (Hosseini, 2003). In the twentieth century, the Soviets were soundly defeated
and driven out of the country by Mujaheddin fighters - again, mainly comprised of
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Pashtun warriors. Like much of the country, the Pashtuns are deeply committed to their
Islamic belief, and equally faithful to their Sunni heritage, customs, and values. It is these
cultural values that have at times placed the group at odds with other tribes, national
values, and even Islam itself (Hosseini, 2003). A set of common core values links the
tribes together and represents the Pashtun identity. Younos (1998) identified these values
that guide Pashtun interpersonal and intertribal relationships internally and with
outsiders. They include honor (ghayrat); the family, especially the defense of female
members of the tribe (mamus); bravery in battle (tureh); steadfastness (sabats); and
righteousness (imamdar).
Tajiks. The Tajiks represent the second largest Afghan ethnic group according to
Robson, Lipson, and Younos (1998). They comprise an estimated 25% of the Afghan
population. They are loyal Muslims of Sunni origin. In terms of ethnicity and language,
this group identifies closely with old Persia (now Iran) mainly because of Afghanistan’s
geographical location between the Indian subcontinent, China, and Central Asia (Robson
& Lipson, 2002; Younos, 1998). The Tajiks speak Dari, the historic dialect of Afghan
Persian, and are the most influential and predominant Dari-speaking ethnicity within
Afghanistan. According to Robson and Lipson (2002), they are believed to be among the
earliest settlers and native groups of Afghanistan and Turkmenistan to the north.
Geographically, their largest population mass is situated among the difficult Hindu Kush
mountain areas that stretch from the north, with heavy pockets of populations down to the
south and west, near Iran.
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Writings from Afghan scholars like Younos (1998), Robson & Lipson (2002), and
Hosseini (2003) reflect the fact that these people have been severely persecuted and have
often found themselves outcasts in their own country. Nearly half of the Afghans who
fled the country during the Soviet invasion were Tajiks (Younos, 1998). While their
identity is rooted in their cultural past, they are primarily Sunni Muslims, but some Tajiks
belong to the Islamic Shi’a sect (Lipson, 2002). Furthermore, the internal differences
within the tribe (Sunni vs. Shi’a) have created tensions both for the tribe itself and for the
Afghan nation.
Hazaras. The third most populous Afghan tribe is the Hazaras; these people also
speak Dari. They are mostly settled in the mountain areas surrounding the center of
Afghanistan, and they share their nomadic lifestyle with their Mongolian ancestors. They
comprise about 20% of the national population (which is roughly 5 million Afghan
citizens). Their culture is deeply connected to the land and livestock, and they are not tied
to any particular area. As such, this lifestyle has often caused conflict with others who
view people’s worth according to the land that they own. According to Younos (1998),
Hazaras are not particularly respectful of these traditions.
Uzbeks. The Uzbeks according to Younos (1998), and Robson & Lipson (2002)
represent roughly 6% of the Afghan population and live a farming existence in the
northernmost region of the country. The literature informs us that the Uzbeks are also
Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi sect, and have interwoven some orthodox customs and
values into their own Islamic practices (Robson & Lipson, 2002). Although they are
generally not orthodox Muslims, Islam is an integral part of their cultural identity
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(Robson & Lipson, 2002). They speak a Turkish dialect called Altaic Uzbek, and their
cultural heritage is rooted in their Sunni Muslim beliefs.
Turkmen. The Turkmen is a minority Afghan tribe that lives mainly along the
Western corridor of Afghanistan, straddling the border with Turkmenistan. They also
share a nomadic lifestyle and they speak a similar Turkish Altaic dialect to their Uzbek
neighbors (Robson & Lipson, 2002). They are Sunni Muslims whose identity is deeply
affiliated with their Islamic religious beliefs and cultural traditions. Additionally, their
values and beliefs reflect a deep connectedness to their land of origin, Turkmenistan,
rather than their present Afghan homeland.
Religious Identity
In Afghanistan, Islam is the official state religion by constitutional degree; 99% of
the country’s inhabitants are Muslim, which can be further divided into 80% Sunni, 19%
Shi’a, and 1% other (Borchgrevink, 2007). This means that nearly all citizens share the
Afghan identity of being a Muslim. But even among their highly homogeneous Islamic
shared experiences, vastly different beliefs and interpretations exist between and among
tribes. Borchgrevink (2007) reminds us that religious civil society, however, is not a
single, uniform condition, and among the many interpretations of Islam, there are a range
of actors that include reform-friendly and pro-government moderates, Islamists,
conservative traditionalists, and radical fundamentalists. These differences ensure a wide
array of influences that compete against one another.
Borchgrevink’s (2007) work informs us that for the eclectic Afghan ethnic
population, religious identity is vitally important, and in some cases, crucial to the primal
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orientations of lived experiences. The main tribes of Afghanistan all consider Islam as
particularly relevant for identity formation. And, as the literature underscores
(Borchgrevink, 2007; Anderson, 1983; Hinde, 1999), Islam bonds the Afghan population
even though the nation is deeply divided along ethnic and tribal lines. In this way, both
Islam and tribal traditions intersect to undergird individual and cultural identity
(Anderson, 1983).
These ethnic identities and diverse formations encourage the quest for meaning in
individual lives; offer ways of answering existential enigmas; emphasize order and
structure; and support coherence and integration between cognitions, emotions, and
actions (Hinde, 1999). Other scholars, such as Piedmont (1999), point to the sense of
unity, purpose, and social connectedness that bonds seemingly disparate groups beyond
what he referred to as “the spatiotemporal discrepancies” of the visible Afghan
landscape. Islam is therefore seen as the identity linchpin creating formations that are
elevated above the nation and offer a sense of belonging and unity, meaning, and shared
experiences. In post-Eriksonian terms (Marcia, 1980), religion could then be conceived as
encouraging both commitment and exploration in identity. As a result, groups relate to
one another simply by virtue of their religious heritage, and it is that heritage and
reverence for religion that has both served Afghanistan during the conflict and
simultaneously prevented significant development and modernization (Canfield, 1986).
Canfield’s (1986) writings remind this researcher that identity for an Afghan is
not a simple proposition. Identity is complex, dynamic, enduring, and multifaceted at all
at once, according to Canfield (1986). The literature also informs us that the Afghan
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national identity is embodied in the rich cultural heritage, traditions, and symbols that
belong to Afghanistan its people, customs, and beliefs. For individual Afghans, the
cultural or national identity not only holds diverse meanings, but also is interpreted
differently depending on one’s life experiences. In addition, these identities are
developed from one’s tribal and ethnic affiliation, country beliefs, religion, family
patterns, traditions, and obligations (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). The question for this
research going forward, therefore, concerns the degree to which identity in the studied
participant group of Afghan Muslim men immigrating to the West (i.e., the United States,
Canada, or Europe) is fixed or malleable as a result of pre-immigration experiences.
Afghan Individual Post-Immigration Identity
More than at any other time in history, we can observe the interwoven nature of
world systems as demonstrated by connected economies and agricultures, conglomerates
and business mergers, nation-state alliances and partnerships, all of which meet at so
many levels. The depth and dimension of these interconnected systems is facilitated and
enhanced by advanced technologies, modern transportation networks, global commerce,
and the view that once formidable barriers that isolated peoples and nations are now
porous, open, and underpinned by one another.
In terms of these changes and their impact on people, lives, and identities, Brah
(1996) predicted that the flow of populations between regions of the world would
continue to increase as people migrate. Also, the migrations would be undertaken in order
to seek increased opportunities and better lives, or else to flee from their home countries,
escaping famine or the global injustices of conflict, war, insecurity, or profound social

42
and economic inequities (Brah, 1996). The focus of this research is the exploration of
these journeys across time, space, and events and the derived meanings that define the
circumstances as viewed through the lens of the participants themselves. According to
Brah (1996), to historicize the narratives of these journeys, it is necessary to look not
only at who travels, but also when, how, and under what circumstances. This is because
only then does the whole identity that affects the outcomes of lived experiences, either
positively or adversely, begin to emerge. Put differently, Jamal (2008) states that these
circumstances have serious and lasting impacts on the everyday lives and experiences of
Afghan Muslim immigrants as they settle in their new host lands in the West.
In terms of westward immigrant movement, a change in the 1965 United States
immigration law opened the doors to a significant number of immigrants of Islam and
Muslim origin (Suleiman, 1994). Entrance into America by the initial wave of Muslims
seemed to affirm traditional patterns of immigrant migrations, as the first arrivals were
mainly composed of those with the means and resources to undergo a new beginning.
And, like every other member of an immigrant group to America, the first wave of
Muslims arrived seeking better opportunities (Britto & Amer, 2007). In addition,
remaining faithful to their sense of self and identities as Muslims assuaged the sense of
fear and isolation. This belief is supported by the literature from Suleiman (1994) and
Jamal (2008), which suggest that many Muslim immigrants think of Islam not in an
individual sense, but rather as a collective set of experiences derived from a shared
identity. Furthermore, this identity is developed out of one’s native surroundings: culture,
family, traditions, and ethnicity (Suleiman, 1994). What the literature also tells us is that
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these initial waves of Muslim immigrants held tightly to their beliefs and traditions about
family and religion, believing that they were only temporary sojourners in the United
States or the West.
Judging by the autobiographical accounts and other historical sources, many of
the early immigrants perceived much of their early movements as transient
phenomenon. Their idea or dream was to amass all of the wealth possible, in the
shortest time and then to return home. (Khalaf, 2004, p. 8)
Cultural Globalization
Many scholars have explored the phenomenon of cultural and religious
transnational movements. Cesari (2004) describes this cultural globalization as “the
intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way
that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”
(p. 91). The effect of this phenomenon is a narrowing of the physical distance between
once vastly separated spatial and social dimensions. To live globally means to live in a
world where social proximity is constructed over and in spite of geographic distance, and
where geographic proximity no longer leads a priori to social ties (Beck, 2000).
Unsurprisingly, this researcher finds in the literature that in this instance, Islam serves
Muslim immigrants by acting as a unifying force by which they continue to identify
themselves by their cultural heritage, gender, nationality, class, and group affiliation.
However, their global trans-movements to Western cultures are telling in that their
desires speak broadly to either inconsistencies or ruptures in the clarity and meanings of
identities. In writing about American-Muslim identity, Suleiman (1994) says that while
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identifying with native cultural heritages, these Muslim immigrants seek something from
the West and America. Further, he observes that these groups “relish the possibilities of
establishing a new identity within the complexity of American pluralism. And, this new
identity integrates the dual components of previous culture and American citizenship”
(Suleiman, 1994, p. 170).
Thus, it can be concluded that the debate about Muslim and ethnic identity is
much more complicated and complex than previously thought. This view is underscored
by the fact that the structure of Muslim and ethnic identity in Afghanistan is uniquely
different in practice (e.g., orthodoxy and progressiveness) than the Muslim structural
identity in America (Suleiman, 1994). The question that emerges from this debate is the
nature of this structural phenomenon in the United States against the countering argument
of assimilation in contrast to pluralist perspectives.
The academic debate between supporters of assimilation and pluralist model of
identity construction in the United States is best characterized by Yancey, Ericksen, and
Juliani (1976). The assimilation purists argued that for later generation of immigrants to
America, the greater the distance in time away from the country of origin, the less
important the ethnic group identity (Park, 1950). Wirth (1928) points out this
phenomenon occurs because external and internal forces combine to ensure that the
integrity of ethnic group identity naturally diminishes over time. A major sociological
study in Chicago in the 1920s revealed that through declining residential segregation,
limited social mobility, and increased intermarriage, cohesiveness among ethnically
homogenous immigrant groups was diminished. The research suggests that when
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descendants of immigrants leave their ethnically homogenous areas, they assume an
ethnic hybrid—while at the same time, their identities become influenced and begin to
reflect more of their new cultural environment (Hechter, 1974). Yancey and associates
(1996) suggests that these groups do not automatically assimilate over time. Rather, they
follow a pluralist model where features of their native identity continue to be observed
(e.g., intermarriage and Islamic religious practices), albeit dissimilar from the wider
segregated group. The main point is their practice of deeply held customs remains
consistent with native traditions and represents a willingness to remain connected to their
identity, passing these customs and traditions to future generations.
These findings appear to support research conducted in the United Kingdom by
Manning and Roy (2007), who found that second-generation descendants of immigrant
Muslims showed a lower probability of attachment to their culture of origin. Conversely,
the initial or first-generation Muslim immigrants demonstrated a higher attachment to
their origin country. What these studies reveal is that absent of some overriding cause
(e.g., political, economic, or social), ethnic identity among individuals weakens as other
identities emerge. According to Gordon (1964), the phenomenon is even more dramatic
because once the primary immigrant group becomes ethnically heterogeneous, cultural
assimilation occurs and the originating cultural identity fades.
The assimilation model of identity in the context of post-immigration offers a
major contrast to the pluralist design. In her book entitled Ethnic Options, Choosing
Identity in America, Waters (1990) argues that immigrant assimilation is not predictable
or inevitable. Citing findings from Novak (1996), ethnic identity is not influenced in a
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significant way, and Waters bolsters her claim that post-immigrant Muslim populations
maintain a homogeneous relationship within the ethnic community of origin.
Furthermore, even with ethnic mixed marriages or intermarriages, the evidence suggests
that a strong sense of ethnic identity is continued among subsequent generations.
Supporting this view, another set of surveys shows continued high endogamy, attitudinal
differences, and self-identification among immigrant groups (Greeley, 1974). This
sustained pattern of self-identification underscores the view that identity patterns do not
“simply” disappear, as noted in earlier work by Gordon (1964).
While the debate between assimilation theorists and pluralists persists, an
interesting hypothesis has emerged that questions the relative importance of either
prevailing perspective: new ethnic identity theory. This view holds that immigrants to the
United States adhere to a kind of “dime store” persona when it comes to ethnicity and
identity (Stein & Hill, 1979). This phenomenon suggests that later generational
immigrants selectively choose when and where to self-identify with their ethnic identity
of origin. Stein and Hill (1979) found that when the later generation’s identity was linked
to an attachment, such as a flag or anthem - as is the case of Afghan immigrants - this
could sometimes be viewed as superficial. In such cases, such attachment was considered
nothing more than a symbolic gesture and appeared as casual as shopping in a dime store.
In doing so, the immigrants diminish their ethnicity and their own sense of identity
through public displays of inauthentic behavior. While this behavior appears superficial
and trivial in some instances, symbolic attachment remains an important factor in the
Afghan Muslim identity, as discussed in the previous section. Despite these criticisms,
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authentic demonstrations of ethnic identification are omnipresent in the post-immigration
lived experiences and reflexive of a rich and meaningful heritage that asserts itself
throughout the immigrant’s daily existence.
Afghan Family Identity during Pre-immigration
The bedrock of Afghan society, values, and culture is the family structure
(Hosseini, 2004). Although the Afghan people sometime voice and demonstrate
conflicting views regarding their traditional practices, customs, and rituals, the literature
is clear regarding their resolute respect, reverence, and commitment to the family.
According to Merrill, Paxson, and Tobey (2006), the family is the single most important
institution in Afghan society, and the Afghan people have strong values, beliefs, and rules
guiding the family and its members’ behaviors. By definition, the view of the individual
family unit in Afghanistan also includes the extended family (Marsden, 1998). This
means that in a country fractured by post-colonial entanglements, modern war, conflict,
and ethnic divides, one’s individual security and safety are dependent on others (Merrill,
Paxson, & Tobey, 2006). It is the daily struggle itself and the reliance on others that
strengthens the bonds between and among family members. Additionally, family
members rely on one another to satisfy their basic needs and help each other navigate
complex conditions that can determine lived existence. To this end, Hosseini (2003)
emphasizes the resilience of the family, as these complex conditions are often dynamic
and vacillate wildly depending upon ethnic and tribal affiliation and region of the county.
Specific to the Afghan family unit and structure is the closely held belief in and
practice of endogamous marriages (Marsden, 1998). This strong rural, tribal, and ethnic
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endorsement of extending relationships within one’s homogenous group is reinforced and
often variably applied throughout Afghanistan. The practice also extends to arranged
cross-relative inter-marriages within the family, and arranged intra-marriages within
tribal groups and clans (Marsden, 1998). Among the outcomes of the practice of arranged
marriages is the continuation and survival of the cultural, clan, and ethnic groups.
Another key consideration is that the practice of endogamous marriages serves as a
powerful example of how the Afghan culture and society pays homage to the male
gender. The male position, as underscored by Merrill and colleagues (2006), is honored
in the family and the tribe. Literature such as The Kite Runner (Hosseini, 2003) offers a
unique glimpse into the nature and importance of inheritance through male gender lines.
According to Lipson, Mehid, Robson, and Younos (2002), the permitted use of polygyny
and the patriarchal authority afforded to men has at times been on the receiving end of
world condemnation. This is because these practices have sometimes been harmful to the
rights and freedoms of women and girls (Marsden, 1998). That said, in Afghan culture,
the family is sacred, and privacy within the home is an important value that is strictly
maintained. This value extends not only to the confines of the home, but outside the
home as well. For example, publicly, women are traditionally covered from head to toe in
garments called burkas. According to Merrill et al. (2006), this prevents other males from
seeing the women as the patriarch does, reinforcing the belief that she belongs to only the
family, and is not to be viewed by others.
While there is an unmistakable high regard for the role of the father and males in
the Afghan society and homes, according to Marsden (1998), reverence is bestowed to
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mothers and senior females in the dwellings, as well. This is important because the senior
female in the home is responsible for management of the home and ensuring all domestic
duties (e.g., cooking, cleaning, child rearing, etc.) are performed. To ensure the home is
maintained, the senior female that is usually determined by age delegate’s responsibilities
among other younger females occupying the home (Lipson et al., 2002). Arguably, this
role becomes more important and much more complicated if multiple wives exist in the
same dwelling (Marsden, 1998).
Extended family households may contain three to four generations including
the male head of family and his wife, his brothers, several sons and their
families, cousins with their families, as well as all unmarried and widowed
female, and elderly grandparents. These multigenerational units practice
close economic cooperation and come together on all life-crisis occasions.
This permits cohesive in-group solidarity to be maintained. (Merrill, Paxson,
& Tobey, 2006, p. 7-8)
If multiple wives share the same house, sometimes the wives will each have their
own rooms, or floors furnished with their own belongings, and their own facilities such as
kitchens or even bathrooms (Marsden, 1998). However, there is typically a joint space
within the home where the entire family unit comes together to bond, socialize, and
entertain, according to Hosseini (2003). To avoid conflict and maintain harmony within
the family, this experience requires close cooperation and support among all involved.
For example, the women of the home work together to care for, socialize, and discipline
the children while sharing the domestic duties (Foster, 1996). The shared family
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arrangement also has other benefits according to Lipson and colleagues (2002), including
economic and social advantages as families struggle to survive in the challenging poverty
conditions and conflict areas that are prevalent throughout the country. Also, the
communal family structure strengthens the bond, connection and respect between and
among members while creating strong support systems that not only serve the family but
the tribe and clan (Foster, 1996). And, this communal, family construct not only satisfies
economic, security and social needs, it also lends to family identity. According to
Hosseini (2003), this familial identity is unique and distinct from every other clan and
tribal sense of being, and it represents important considerations and offers vital meaning
to Afghan daily-lived existence.
Outside the family, there is reliance upon the tribal community and elders for
matters involving land rights, group rivalries, and dispute settlements with other families
and groups (Foster, 1996). According to Wardak (2002), the mechanism by which
disputes are settled in the village and tribal areas in Afghanistan is through the Loya Jirga
conflict resolution process. The Loya Jirga council is an assembly of adult males that
serves as an important economic, ethnic, political, and cultural mainstay of the civil
system as practiced in Afghanistan (Merrill et al., 2006). Loya Jirga translates to
“assembly” in Persian, and it often refers to a party commission or type of democratic
council. The writings from Foster (1996), Spain (1990), and Wardak (2002) state that the
Loya Jirga normally calls for the village elders to participate and members who have
unique backgrounds regarding the conflict are often selected. The Loya Jirga uses both
judicial and executive roles to settle all disputes pertaining to the distribution of land,
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properties, blood feuds, debts, and other important affairs (Foster, 1996). Additionally,
the Loya Jirga works to ensure participation of conflicting parties during the proceedings.
According to Wardak (2002), these actions are undertaken on the basis of traditions and
principles of justice that are acknowledged and predicated on historic practice and
customs. The Loya Jirga seeks not just to end the conflict and disputes, but has as an
overarching objective to find the root causes of the conflict and restore and ensure family
and tribal harmony (Spain, 1990).
Afghan Family Identity during Post-Immigration
In contrast to the complicated dynamic that characterizes the indigenous Afghan
family experience, the experiences in the United States as compared to the family issues
in Afghanistan appear very different. As in Afghanistan, the family continues to serve as
the centerpiece of existence. Thus, the Afghan family - in both tribal and cultural focus is centered not on the individual, but rather the family (Hosseini, 2003). Spain (1990)
writes that it is this family focus that underpins the emotional and psychological wellbeing for people. He also notes that just as the family is the strength of the Afghan tribal
system, it is also the nucleus of cultural foundations among Afghan families in the United
States and the West (Spain, 1990). In terms of differences in Afghan immigrant family
values, member roles, and traditional practices in the West compared to their native land
in the East, tensions increase as socialization occurs. According to Robson, Lipson,
Younos, and Mehdi (2003), Afghans tend to socialize almost exclusively among and with
immediate and extended family members and homogenous groups, tribes, or clans. In
contrast, U.S. family socialization practices are less restrictive and more inviting of other

52
social groups extending well beyond the family core. Unfortunately, Westerners often
misinterpret this internalized socialization pattern among immigrant Afghans as a
rejection of the community and its non-Afghan members (Merrill et al., 2006).
Another difference that causes stress and conflict within the Afghan family in the
West is the freedoms enjoyed by women, and in particular, the roles they play outside the
home in the United States. In the U.S., tensions surface as Afghan women seek work
outside the home as contrasted to their traditional domestic roles in their native lands
(Spain, 1990). These tensions have evolved because Afghan women have adapted to
work outside the home, and they have concluded that they must enter the work force in
order to contribute to the family income and sustainment (Robson et al., 2002). Spain
(1990) suggests that this arrangement disrupts the traditional Afghan family relationship
and is only partially mitigated if Western values that buttress economic well-being are
balanced by the Afghan value for patriarchal headship. According to Afghan scholars
such as Lipson and Omidian (1996), husbands whose wives earn salaries and have
economic freedom suffer a loss of their paternal headship role that is important in Afghan
culture and society. These new found freedoms or social realities negatively impact the
couple’s relationship with each other as the traditional male provider and female family
and home caretaker roles are up-ended. Also, the tensions surrounding the Afghan
couple’s relationship are made more complicated, as noted by Lipson and Omidian
(1996), if children are involved. In addition, their eventual exposure to conventional
America (e.g., schools, playgrounds, etc.) can influence the family dynamics.
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A key difference between Afghan and a mainstream American culture is that
the latter stresses the independence of the individual while the former
emphasizes the individual’s dependence on the family. In Afghanistan, life
doesn't belong to just one person, an Afghan commented. "Every decision is
connected to the family - we are all tied together. (Robson, Lipson, Younos,
& Mehdi, 2002, p. 25)
According to Omidian (1996), Afghan communities in the U.S. have made
concessions to Western culture. These concessions introduce stress and tension into the
family dynamic as American sensibilities begin extending into the Afghan traditional
home where native values are confronted. These native values underscore family
interdependence and obedience to elders (Robson et al., 2002). Additionally, conflicts
arise as American schools encourage individuality and assertiveness, which may pose a
challenge to Afghan-held family beliefs of modesty and emphasis on the group, rather
than the individual (Hosseini, 2003). Afghans, whether in their native land or in the
United States, cling tightly to their family privacy, and studies indicate that while they
respect the freedoms found in Western societies, they also reject certain societal aspects
(Lipson & Omidian, 1996). With the potential clash of values and complications
stemming from social interactions, finding the right balance between recognizing
Western freedoms and continuing to embrace Afghan traditional beliefs is important.
This balance is important to maintaining the Afghan sense of self and successful cultural
assimilation and acculturation in the West (Merrill, Paxson, & Tobey, 2006).
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Pan-ethnic Identity
Scholars like Feagin and Feagin (2003) note that pan-ethnic identity is important
to studies such as this one because the developed identity is influenced and shaped by
factors both internal and external to the immigrant’s environments. Identities of
immigrant populations are harmed when they are summarily grouped together into one
category of Asians, Africans, or in this case, Muslims. According to Marvasti and
McKinney (2004), treating all groups the same fails to honor and recognize the cultures,
traditions, and customs that comprise pan-ethnic experiences and identities. Additionally,
as pointed out by Marvasti and McKinney (2004), this mass group effect often leads to
discrimination and injustices against the minority by the majority actors. In a modern
context, this was observed and ran its course as swift condemnation of all Muslims
throughout the United States following the attack on 9/11 by men of Arab-Muslim
descent. In response, immigrant groups in the United States often self-identify as an
American in order to avoid misrecognition and being singled out as foreign (Feagin &
Feagin, 2003). Consequently, today we have “African-American,” “Asian-American,”
and “Afghan-American” to act as shared cultural symbols offering a sense of belonging,
and more importantly, to diffuse one’s distinctiveness among post-immigration
populations.
This chapter explored a wide breadth of literature about Afghan Muslim pre- and
post-immigration experiences and patterns of identity. It begins with an examination of
the prevailing global effects that contribute to conditions in Southwest Asia and directly
impact the country of Afghanistan and its people. It focuses on life as an Afghan citizen
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along with the experiences, the internal and external pressures, and the interactions that
combine to shape pre-immigration experiences. Religion is an important element of
Afghan identity, and Marvasti and McKinney (2004) offer that Islamic fundamentalism is
hostile to any outside force that makes their aim of a puritanical entity harder to achieve.
In addition, a globally connected universe exposes Muslims to a secular and enticing
Western culture. In contrast, this paper re-introduces the clash of civilizations theory
(Huntington, 1993), which long hovered over global political structures, and its various
critics, including Esposito (2000), who offered counter positions that sought to invalidate
the notion of ideological struggles between the East and West. Still, in discussing
tentative findings on the complexities and paradoxes of Islamic Muslim identity in
Afghanistan and conflict in a conservative world, this research presented the ideological
shifts that occurred during the run-up to the twenty-first century. And, citing Mazrui
(1996) among others, the literature served to frame the debate concerning the divides that
underlie conflicts between liberals and conservatives in response to Muslim and Islamic
fundamentalism. The section on pre-immigration literature closed with the presentation
of the contextual canvas that allows Afghan Muslims to self-identify. Here, the study
amplifies the point that language, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, heritage, and customs
contribute to a shared Afghan experience that reverberates against many facets of social
and cultural order.
In part two (post-immigration), this research study provided an examination of
Afghan Muslim post-immigration experiences. As changes in the 1965 American
immigration laws opened the doors to a significant number of practicing Muslim
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immigrants, the literature viewed their identity in the West as complex, multilayered, and
adaptive. Considerable attention is given to the perspective that from the moment
immigrants arrive in the West, opposing forces are at work, which according to Wirth
(1928), results in a diminished identification with the country of origin. This view is
balanced somewhat by Waters (1990), who argues that immigrant assimilation is not
predictable or inevitable; later generational immigrants selectively choose when and
where to self-identify with their ethnic origin. Additionally, the literature demonstrates
that in response, immigrant groups in the United States self-identify as an American in
order to avoid unfair majority behavior. The pivotal point is the notion that Muslim
immigrants in America frequently consider Islam as a collective set of experiences
derived from a common identity, rather than in a purely individual sense (Wahud, 1999).
And, while this literature review presented a range of authors that show a more holistic
approach of considering Muslims as a new minority within Western democracy. This is
done while comparing the interactions and addressing the impact and implications of
increased Islamic identity. In context, Islamic self-identity, as related to migrants’ preand post-immigration experiences, is pervasive throughout this research study.
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Chapter 3
Modern Afghanistan: Politics, Governance, and History
It was during the period 1887 to 1893 that the territory known as Afghanistan was
delineated. Throughout this period, Afghanistan and its land served as the ancestral home
to several ethnic identities, including the Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and
Turkmen tribes. According to Robson, Lipson, Younos, and Mehdi (2002), the modern
Afghan boundaries were decided upon not through careful deliberation or even conquest,
but through the geographical restrictions that came into being through the interests of
foreign powers. These outside entities arbitrarily divided lands that had traditionally been
occupied by one of many ethnic tribes or groups (Maley, 2002). The inhabitants of these
lands were naturally linked to their areas by language, culture, and heritage. According to
Wieland-Karmi (1998), the new land and territories were predominantly the work of
outside forces, including British, Indian, and Russian powers. Additionally, the
interventions by these outside forces not only shifted land affiliation, but also contributed
to social and ethnic unrest among the groups, creating rivalries and inter-group tensions
over land and territorial disputes. Tribal experiences and identities are often defined in
Afghanistan by land (Maley, 2010). However, such affiliations and tribal-identity
connections to the land seemed inconsequential to outside forces. According to Robson et
al. (2002), these foreign forces demonstrated neither concern for nor interest in the
disparate Afghan identities, be they ethnic, cultural, tribal, or religious.
Thus, the heterogeneity of the population of Afghanistan is so great that
neither language nor religion nor any other cultural pattern forms a unifying
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national force for all the country’s inhabitants. Even Islam, to which around
99% of all Afghans adhere, is not available as a force for national unity
because in Afghanistan it takes a multitude of heterogeneous and often
contradictory forms. (Wieland-Karmi, 1998, p. 6)
According to Maley (2010), during the nineteenth century, other nations viewed
Afghanistan and its heterogeneous population with modest interest. Maley (2010) also
notes that the Afghan territory itself was viewed by many as a desolate, unyielding
outpost with little potential value, aside from serving as a pathway to more resource rich
Central Asian lands and lucrative territorial interests in Southeast Asia. However, that
view changed sharply at the turn of the twentieth century, when Britain and Russia found
themselves engaged in a strategic game of cat and mouse designed to deny each other
regional advantages. According to Wieland-Karmi (1998), these colonial interactions
continued to have a local impact and lasting influence on the Afghan people, as their
identity became threatened by subjugation, talk of annexation, and national boundary
realignment.
This newly arisen national identity was accompanied by a de-Pashtunisation
of the national ideology because the majority of the non-Pashtun population
now also identified itself with Afghanistan as a country. However, this
Afghan identity could hardly be anchored to any common values, traditions
or experiences, since any definition of national values inevitably failed
against the cultural heterogeneity of Afghanistan and the varying models of
ethnic origin in existence. (Glatzer, 2001, p. 383)
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What the region and the world began to see was a classic rivalry between the
colonial British and Russian powers, and their game was played out across a 250,000square-kilometer swath of land roughly the size of Texas. This placed the Afghan Islamic
territory in a precarious position. Immediately, Afghanistan became a buffer state for
foreign powers and their military forces, and the country was not only caught in the
middle, but also now part of the rivalry itself (Migdal, 1998). Fortunately, though
Afghanistan would suffer by having its ethnic, cultural, and national identities trampled
on without consideration, it was spared major violence - at least in the short term. This
was in part because neither Britain nor Russia was willing to risk their potential strategic
and economic interests by allowing their rivalry to erupt into military conflict (Becker,
1968). As a result, the game continued well into the twentieth century when the
boundaries of what is now called Afghanistan had been largely fixed, although not
necessarily in a manner satisfactory to the parties involved (Becker, 1968). While the
game continued to be played well into the twentieth century, its origins can be traced
back to the eighteenth century. During this time, the British Monarchy’s drive into Asia
had pushed into India, establishing the region as a suitable strong point. To this end, the
British established a stronghold in India as part of its colonial expansion (Robson,
Lipson, Younos, & Mehdi, 2002). At the same time, Russia’s need for warm water ports
also saw India as a good gateway to the Indian Ocean (Becker, 1968).
In contrast to the external posturing from the British and Russian forces, power,
politics, and eventually identity issues associated with land changes began having an
impact on the local Afghan tribes (Hilton, 2001). Inside Afghanistan and in a move to
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gain standing and capitalize on the discord between the two foreign powers, local
struggles began to take place between the indigenous Afghan tribes of Pahtuns, Hazaras,
and Tajiks. Hilton (2001) writes that the outcome of this tension was that families turned
against each other, neighbors fought against neighbors, and tribal relationships suffered,
as territorial boundary disputes grew increasingly contentious and violent as ancestral
lands were redistributed. Maley (1968) and Hilton (2001) speculate that the rise in
intertribal conflict coincided with the Russian forces’ placement in northern Afghanistan
and in a counterbalancing move, the British takeover and occupation in the south.
Predictably, both the British and the Russians viewed Afghanistan as viable strategic
options for commercial enterprise and shipping (Becker, 1968). However, their
competition created additional conflict and tensions that eventually led to a series of
skirmishes and battles between Britain and Afghanistan (Robson et al., 2002).
From Afghanistan's point of view, the most relevant result of the Great Game
was the series of wars that the British fought against the Afghan Pashtuns in
hopes of keeping the Russians at arm's length. These wars, which were
unpopular in Britain and occasioned much controversy among the British
troops fighting them, ultimately failed: The Pashtuns retained control over
their areas. The first of the wars lasted from 1839 to 1842 and the second
from 1878 to 1880. (Robson, Lipson, Younos, & Mehdi, 2002, p. 15)
According to Hilton (2001), the wars between the British and the Afghans
resulted in failure for the English because the conflicts were unpopular in England and, as
a consequence, lacked all manner of support. But the conflict did have a lasting effect in

61
Afghanistan, as some southern boundaries were again changed, thereby displacing local
tribes. The exception to this was the Pashtun tribal group (Becker, 1968). The Pashtun
land boundary settlement was a victory for the tribe and was due in large part to
Abdurrahman Khan, a Pashtun leader who studied and understood British military tactics.
According to Robson et al. (2002), Khan rose to power in Afghanistan by virtue of his
military guile and ability to gather large patches of the countryside, thereby consolidating
his Pashtun kingdom. However, his reign came at a cost for many non-Pashtun tribes and
groups.
Bracketed by foreign forces to his north and south, Khan resorted to harsh tactics
in order to exert control and gain allegiance from the different tribes. Maley (2010) noted
that Khan ordered forced displacements of people considered threats to his reign,
including groups and tribes deemed enemies to the kingdom. As such, Pashtuns inherited
areas previously occupied by non-Pashtun tribes and the old occupants, failing to exhibit
proper loyalties, often found themselves forcibly relocated to lands and areas north of the
Hindu Kush that were harsh and certainly less hospitable (Robson et al., 2002). Khan’s
strategies divided the tribes and inflamed intertribal anger and hostility. Khan’s tactic
also created new boundaries and provinces for governors that currently exist today. The
creation of these fixed demarcations that were established in 1893 would come to be
known as the Durand Line. According to Edwards (1996), the Durand Line was never
intended to serve as a physical barrier to encase Afghanistan from outside threats. Rather,
the Durand boundary between Afghanistan and India was developed to denote the
conceptualized line of strategic interest between Afghanistan and British India.
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In 1891, after much saber rattling, the Russians and the British, with
Abdurrahman as observer, agreed that the Amu Darya would form the
boundary between Russia and the Afghan territory, leaving the fertile
agricultural area between the river and the mountains in Afghan control.
They also decided to include the Wakhan Corridor in Afghan territory, as a
buffer between Russia and British India. (Robson, Lipson, Younos, and
Mehdi, 2002, p. 17)
Afghanistan’s Reform and Modernization Movement
The colonial imprint created tensions and conflict among the competing tribes and
groups, and these tensions lasted well into the twentieth century. According to Goodson
(2001), despite these conditions, Afghanistan was characterized by a period of reform and
modernization. And, just as he was in the boundary settlement issue, Abdurrahman Khan
became a central figure in the Afghan reform movement, as well. Khan demonstrated an
interest in technology and, as a result of his exposure to the British forces and their
capabilities on the battlefield, he opened the door to technological advancement in
Afghanistan (Robson et al., 2002). Khan sought to capitalize on the period of relative
calm by introducing technology into the military and elsewhere in society. After his death
in 1919, his grandson, Amanullah, reigned and continued modernization plans while
embracing social and education reforms for women (Edwards, 1996). Equally important
for the people’s sense of identity, however, Amanullah grew tired of fighting with the
British and achieved self-control from the monarchy, thereby setting the conditions for an
alignment with the Russians. Relative stability and political calm came across
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Afghanistan up to the 1950s, when General Mohammad Daud Khan became Prime
Minister. According to Goodson (2001), he reversed some of the reform initiatives that
were implemented by prior regimes, and on the diplomatic front, one of Khan’s first acts
was to stoke the antagonism between the Soviet Union and the United States.
Daud Khan turned to the Soviet Union for financial and military assistance.
The Soviets ultimately became Afghanistan's major aid and trade partner, but
shared the stage with the United States. The competition between the
superpowers in aid of nonaligned Afghanistan benefited Afghanistan's
infrastructure. (Robson, Lipson, Younos, & Mehdi, 2002, p. 22)
From these agreements, Afghanistan would obtain funding for critical
infrastructure, such as dams, roads, railways, and power (Artem, 2001). Also, the outside
investment spurred other transportation means, allowing goods to be moved by barges
and steamboats along Afghanistan’s rivers (Edwards, 1996). This era of economic and
political prosperity, however, would soon end, when Daud Khan sought even closer ties
with the Soviet Union, though achieving this goal would take a demonstration of
considerable commitment by Afghan leaders. This demonstration of commitment would
unfold against the ideological backdrop of Afghan politics. According to Artem (2001)
and Robson et al. (2002), Afghan politics became polarized following the National
Assembly’s approval of the 1964 Afghan constitution. As a result, more democratically
elected Afghans were swept into office. To counter this democratic wave and move the
country toward Marxist ideology and practice, Daud Khan abolished the constitution
altogether and solidified his power, creating the Republic of Afghanistan (Sinno, 2008).
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Next, Daud Khan appointed himself as chairman of the Central Committee of the
Republic and Prime Minister (Sinno, 2008). These moves solidified the relationship with
the Soviets and opened the door to roughly 15 years of Marxism and communist
ideological rule. Throughout this brief period, the Marxist reformers, known as the
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, struggled to maintain power and control
across the country. According to Artem (2001), fearful of a Marxist collapse, in 1979
Soviet troops invaded and began a 10-year occupation in Afghanistan, but, the warrior
spirit that embodied the Afghan people’s identity emerged as a rebellion and an
insurgency ensued. As the insurgency escalated, the United States entered the campaign
through proxy (Artem, 2001).
Robson et al. (2002) noted that the United States’ involvement was intended to
halt the spread of communism in the region. Using Pakistan as a gateway for military
supplies, the United States provided the rebel fighters with weapons and anti-aircraft
missiles. This direct support helped the insurgents and forced the complete withdrawal by
the Soviets in 1988 and 1989 (Oliver, 1990). Also, while the United States provided arms
to the fighters, the resistance movement became a rallying cry for the Muslim world to
unite and join the Afghan rebels against occupying forces and restore the sanctity of
Muslim land. Robson et al. (2002) write that this rallying cry, or jihad (e.g., religious
war), opened Afghanistan to conservative and fundamentalist leaning jihadists, such as
the Taliban. Ahmed (2001) observed that the recruitment also allowed radical jihadists
inside Afghanistan, including Osama Bin Laden. With its geopolitical and strategic aim
of containing the Soviets and communism achieved, the United States left Afghanistan to
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its own devices (Goodson, 2001). With a fragile Afghan state and rebels now pursuing
their own tribal interests, the Taliban took advantage of the political and power vacuum
by seizing power and providing refuge to Bin Laden. The U.S. official 9/11 report

states that Bin Laden’s subsequent jihad against the United States would ultimately lead
to the attacks on September 11, 2001.

The fate of Afghanistan and its regional “buffer state” predicament was not a
consequence of internal demands, but rather of external actors. Robson, Lipson, Younos
and Mehdi (2002), argue that none of the external actors shared a modicum of concern
for the Afghan nation, its identity, or its Muslim heritage. According to Goodson (2001),
these actions had both intended and unintended consequences of leaving the nation
fractured, weak and with a central government in name only. In many parts of the
country, the national government was a ubiquitous presence; in others, it was, for the
most part, a passive and distant annoyance to remote tribes, villagers, and their leaders
(Edwards, 1996).
Period of Turmoil: 1978 - 1979
Afghan history demonstrates that on the rare occasions during the twentieth
century when the state could rally power and quell unrest (e.g., during the Safi Pashtun
revolt in 1947); such demonstrations were usually modest in purpose, short-lived, and the
exception. The effect of the weakened Afghan government meant that national leaders
struggled to build a broad enough coalition to extend governance outside of Kabul and
into the vast and contrasting rural areas (Barfield, 2010). Where external threats were
concerned, Afghans gained a reputation as being quick to rally around national symbols
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of identity, such as the flag and Islam. Barfield (2010), however, notes that this was not
the case for internal conflicts, which were often regarded as legitimate struggles.
Shahrani and Canfield (1984) observe that these internal struggles served to regulate the
social practices that further strengthened ethnic, cultural, and tribal identity, while
lessening national state influence. As a result, the national government was unable to
extend control and penetrate the rich sense of ethnic and cultural identity and community
that thrived amid the country’s complex rural life. This failure would prevent an effective
national response once tensions and conflicts started to emerge in the late twentieth
century (Shahrani & Canfield, 1984).
Some Afghan scholars claim that the regional circumstances and activities of
outsiders throughout the twentieth century set the conditions for a political chasm that
was culturally and ethnically debilitating (Andrew & Mitrokhim, 2005). These harmful
divisions were the direct cause of a government coup, which stands out because the
driving force for change came not from the Afghan people themselves, but, rather, as a
by-product of conflicts among Kabul’s political elite (Andrew & Mitrokhim, 2005).
Radical Afghan groups, such as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA),
led the ouster of the Daoud government on 27 April 1978. The PDPA comprised two
factions, Khalq (“Masses”) and Parcham (“Banner”), both Marxist, who set aside their
ideological differences in order to transform Afghanistan according to the Soviet
communist model. Some group members not only received training in the Soviet Union,
but inside Afghanistan, as the PDPA enjoyed political favor from Russia, along with
other tangible support (Andrew & Mitrokhim, 2005).
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The nation woke on 28 April 1978 to learn that not only had a new government
been installed, but also one espousing a radically different ideology. Early that morning,
the Marxists who orchestrated the coup stormed the palace and slaughtered Daoud and
members of his family (Arnold, 1983). A small circle of civilian politicians led the new
rulers, the PDPA. Among them, Nur Mohammad Taraki was the designated leader of the
so-called ”Saur Revolution” (inqilab-e saur), which took its name from the Afghan word
for the month April, when the coup occurred (Dorronsoro, 2005). The aim of President
Taraki and the PDPA was twofold: exert national control from Kabul’s capital outward
across the rural areas, and to force a unitary national identity. In doing so, they hoped to
achieve a fused national identity throughout those areas that had only known tribal law,
operated autonomously, and held steadfastly to their own cultures, eclectic languages,
and rich ethnic identities (Arnold, 1983). To implement their Marxist ideology, the new
government would have to confront ethnic and cultural traditions that navigated lived
experiences and defined disparate identities for centuries.
The government’s behavior aroused much opposition that eventually turned
into a rebellion in the countryside. Taraki’s overzealous efforts to assert the
central government’s authority in remote areas that had traditionally been
autonomous, to redistribute land, and to impose taxes on a society unused to
paying those alienated landlords, tribal leaders, and the peasantry. (Destarac
& Levant, 1979, pp. 4-5)
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the Soviets viewed Afghanistan as
a good strategic platform from which to project power and exercise control over their
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Central Asian republics (Arnold, 1983). However, during the 1970s, the Kremlin became
increasingly concerned over the heavy-handedness and brutality of Taraki’s regime.
According to Destarac and Levant (1979), its fears were justified, as rebellion swept the
country and the government demonstrated considerable ineptness in putting down the
insurgents and controlling the rural tribal areas. The Soviets concluded that Taraki’s toplevel officials could not find the right balance between moving forward with ideological
changes based on Marxist tenets and coalescing the rural tribes behind them. For this
failure, they blamed Hafizullah Amin, Taraki’s deputy, and pressed for his removal. In
the ensuing turmoil, Taraki’s presidency was short-lived; a few months after the coup that
brought him to power, he was assassinated on the orders of his deputy, Amin, who
considered him too sensitive to ethnic and cultural identity issues of the diverse
population groups (Destarac & Levant, 1979).
The Soviets were surprised at the assassination of Taraki, but even more surprised
to learn that Amin proved no more capable of quelling Muslim insurgency than his
predecessor. According to Dorronsoro (2005), their concerns intensified as the strength of
the rebellion increased, fearing that if the insurgents succeeded, they would install a
conservative Islamic government. The Soviets believed the rebellion could destabilize the
entire region, as conservative Muslim governments in the region would likely be antiMarxist and present a threat to strategic Soviet interests in the nearby Central Asian
republics. Another concern was that a new regime in Afghanistan could turn to the
United States, posing another, more-global threat to the Soviets (Dorronsoro, 2005). In
December 1979, an invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet military seemed the only
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logical response. While Soviet surrogates were continuously frustrated in their attempts
to build a united Afghan identity under Marxism, paradoxically, a united Afghan state did
emerge in the form of widespread resistance to the Soviet occupation (Robson et al.,
2002).
Afghan armed, organized resistance to the foreign invasion came to be known as
the mujahedeen, or practitioners of jihad. The Afghan mujahedeen symbolized the
nation’s diverse population; rich ethnic, cultural, and religious identities; and strongly
held Muslim values. In other words, the mujahedeen held the very attributes that the
communists feared, despised, and worked in vain to eradicate (Dorronsoro, 2005).
According to Roy (1990), this diversity would be a positive force in the early years of the
anti-Soviet insurgency. This was because such diversity, by its very nature, was more
difficult to cut off, even if a branch or tribal element became vulnerable to Soviet
influences (Roy, 1990). Dorronsoro (2005) writes that the same diversity would also
inhibit the group and contribute to its weakening or collapse, as ethnic and tribal
differences eventually made any exercise of power at the national level all but
impossible.
The mujahedeen reflected the complexities of Afghan society – which is
differentiated significantly on ethnic, sectarian, spatial, economic, and
gender lines – and manifested a number of sharp ideological distinctions as
well. They included parties as diverse as the near-Leninist Hezb-e-Islami
(“Party of Islam”), headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the moderate
Islamist Jamiat-e-Islami (“Islamic Society”) of Burhanuddin Rabbani, as
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well as smaller parties led by figures such as Pir Sayid Ahmad Gailani and
Sibghatullah Mojadiddi, who reflected Sufi influences and supported the
return of Zahir Shah, and Abdul Rab al-Rasoul Sayyaf, who was much
more influenced by Wahhabi tendencies originating from the Arabian
peninsula. (Roy, 1990, pp. 98-148)
According to Roy (1990), at its height, the mujahedeen was successful in its longfought campaign to repel the Soviets from Afghanistan (Zahab & Roy, 2004). The United
States and Pakistan militarily financially sustained and supported the mujahedeen in their
resistance during the 1980s. The United States’ geopolitical concern was the spread of
communism; keenly aware of the strategic aims of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the United
States was unwilling to see the Soviets expand their power and influence further
throughout Central Asia (Roy, 1990). In contrast to U.S. strategic concerns, Pakistan
demonstrated a more regional focus over territorial and border issues (Zahab & Roy,
2004). These differences meant that while ostensibly partnering on the Russian-Marxist
problem in Afghanistan, both the United States and Pakistan sought outcomes based on
state-centric interest - these dissimilar interests would have devastating results a decade
or so later (Roy, 1990).
The consequences of the war could not have been more detrimental physically
and emotionally to Afghan citizens. The Marxist purge and violence resulted in nearly
250 Afghans being killed a day; and according to Khalidi (1991), this rate continued for
10 consecutive years. Moreover, such prolonged violence created an enormous
humanitarian crisis with huge social problems, forced migration, dislocations, and
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separation of families (Schmeidl & Maley, 2008). Estimates of the Afghan population at
the start of the conflict in 1979 approximated 13 million; toward the end, it was roughly 6
million, with Afghans living as refugees in neighboring Pakistan to the east and Iran to
the west (Terry, 2002).
In 1996, after the Pashtun dominated Taliban rose to power, ethnic
minorities and opponents of the Taliban suffered persecution and fled to
Pakistan. For many Afghan refugees, persecution continued in Pakistan,
where they were threatened and in some cases killed. (Robson, Lipson,
Younos & Mehdi, 2002, pp. 4-5).
Scholars suggest that it was this series of events and the connection to Pakistan
that ultimately served as the flashpoint for the Taliban. The refugee camps became
breeding grounds where vulnerable populations were preyed upon by Islamic extremists,
who were tolerated and encouraged by elements of the Pakistan government (Terry,
2002). This meant that the Afghan lived experiences and identities, rooted in centurieslong tradition and recently put upon by Marxism, were about to experience another
dramatic shift. However, this time the shift was back towards a brand of Islam.
Unfortunately, the shift was toward a radical and fundamentalist brand under Taliban rule
(Roy, 1990).
The Afghan scholar Orywal (1999) observed that from the twentieth century
onward, conflict and war have been the hallmark of the Afghan life experience. He also
noted that where the state is concerned, many observers view the country as a nation in
name only. Remarkably, even through this series of crises and identity struggles, ethnic
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groups not only survived, but, according to Schetter (2002), also emerged from the
turmoil with more power and wider national influence. To better understand this
phenomenon requires an appreciation of the Afghan experience and placing that
experience into context, beginning with postcolonial rule (Schetter, 2002).
According to Robson (2002), at the inception of the Afghan state in the nineteenth
century, the British and Russian colonial powers determined that indigenous Pashtun
tribes would be best to carry out the day-to-day rule. Their decision was based largely on
Afghanistan’s heterogeneous tribal history and language patterns that seemed to neatly
intersect Pashtun identity patterns (Rubin, 1995). These patterns extended well into other
tribal experiences, recognizing Pashtun tribal origins and giving the group prominence in
society that resulted in even wider influence among the colonial forces:
The Pashtun ruling family employed the ethnic patterns that came into
existence in order to regulate access to public goods and offices. Pashtuns
were privileged in all areas and dominated the military. Tajiks were left with
the economic sector and the educational institutions, whereas the Hazaras
were marginalized in general. The different treatment of the people went
along with the forming of ethnic stereotypes: Pashtuns were considered
“bellicose”, Tajiks were said to be “thrifty”, Uzbeks were known as “brutal,”
and the Hazaras as “illiterate” and “poor”. Even though the politics of the
nation state thus created an ethnic hierarchy, there were surprisingly few
ethnic conflicts. (Schetter, 2002, pp. 15-29)
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Pashtun Ethnic Identity
The Pashtun ethnic identity is characterized by scholars and researchers who view
the group’s enduring tribal markers as linked to their past. Schetter (2002) maintains that
their ethnic category is further identified by tribal elements that, in the past, resulted in
intra-ethnic segmentation, as opposed to coalesced political action. As a consequence,
ethnic identity, for the majority of Pashtun tribal members, has become synonymous with
tribal loyalty and group connectedness (Kakar, 1979). Additionally, in so far as the state
and the national political landscape are concerned, the Pashtun narrative appears
inconsequential in Afghan modern history (Schetter, 2002). This appears to be the case
because until the close of the nineteenth century, the Pashtun people did not seek power,
nor did they attribute any great significance to their own ethnic identity or experience
outside of the tribe; that is, not until the colonial imprint led to the birth of the Afghan
nation state, and the notion of “Pashtuniztan” or Pashtun land began to develop in the
twentieth century (Kakar, 1979). In addition, it was during the 1950s that the Pashtun
intellectual community and elite visualized the new state’s ideological identity and that of
their tribal narrative and orthodoxy as one in the same (Kakar, 1979).
Hazara Ethnic Identity
While the Pashtun narrative sheds light on its position as the favored identity
resulting from a colonial past, the narrative also indicates that this was not the case for
other less fortunate groups. These groups included Afghan tribal ethnicities that were not
of Pashtun affiliation, specifically the Hazaras. As a Shiite minority, the Hazaras were
among Afghanistan’s most-besieged groups (Ferdinand, 1959). However, just like the
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Pashtun experience, the Hazara identity formation was shaped in large part by British
colonial bias. According to Robson et al. (2002), the notion that this group was
descended from the Mongols was concocted and spread, above all, by the British in the
nineteenth century. Moreover, in the twentieth century, the same stories were used by the
urban Afghan elite, among whom few Hazaras were represented (Bacon, 1951).
Subsequently, with the growing influence of the Pashtun and of Marxist ideology, many
Hazaras, feeling threatened, fled to Shiite-dominated Iran and other safe havens outside
Afghanistan (Schetter, 2002). In exile, their academic elites thrived and they constructed
new strategies based on the group’s ancestral settlement patterns. Academics concluded
that the settlement patterns of their ancestors dated back some 6000 years, making the
Hazaras Afghanistan’s oldest and original inhabitants, and, arguably more important, not
the descendants of latter-day Mongol intruders (Qamberi, 1987). Additionally, Hazara
academics laid claim to territory they believed was wrongly taken from their ancestors by
the Pashtun, evincing tribal areas and migration patterns as proof (Ferdinand, 1959).
These demands served notice of the Hazara elite’s willingness to challenge colonial
orthodoxy. Through the retelling of their experiences, and re-capturing their own identity
through counter-narratives, they gave voice to silenced minorities whose ancestral
heritage had been besmirched (Ferdinand, 1959).
Tajik Ethnic Identity
According to (Qamberi, 1987), among the predominant tribes and ethnicities that
comprise the rich landscape of the Afghan territory, the Tajiks are arguably the most
culturally and socially disadvantaged. Centlivres (1976) supports this belief, noting that
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this is because many Afghans consider the word “Tajik” to be an uncomplimentary term,
referring to people with neither history nor heritage. Centlivres (1976) goes on to assert
that not only are Tajiks viewed as having no picture of their ancestry, but they also
cannot be placed in any ethnic category - that is to say, non-Pashtun or non-Hazara.
According to Rubin (1995), among Afghans, to be a member of this tribal group without
ethnic alignment results in struggles and conflicts, both internally to define one’s sense of
self, and externally to prove one’s Afghan identity. Their struggle to discern a qualifying
pedigree means that as “an ethnic category, Tajik refers ultimately to the residual quality
of any Sunni Persian-speaking people with no common ancestral mythology. The Tajiks
thus face a difficulty in developing an idea of their own spatial and historical origins”
(Centlivres, 1976, pp. 8-13).
For Tajiks in postcolonial Afghanistan, ethnic and tribal alignments could mean
the difference between merely existing, surviving, or even thriving. This is because
power in Afghanistan is based largely on the tribal relationships, ethnic identities, and the
influences of both affiliations (Jenkins, 1994). Furthermore, ethnic and identity
relationships matter when one seeks influence or support at the local or national level of
government. Without these relationships, significant gains cannot be realized, as
competition for relatively few state resources is fierce and often handed out on the basis
of tribal and ethnic alignments (Jenkins, 1994). According to Schetter (2002), this is an
important reason why political actors are genuinely unable to base any demands for
influence on Tajik interests. Moreover, the Tajik narrative that exists, as observed by Roy
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(1990), was created not by Tajiks themselves, but, rather by the Pashtun orthodoxy,
which further weakened the Tajiks’ ethnic identity and their sense of self.
That there was relative coexistence among the tribes is striking, given the nature
of war and conflict that seemed to engulf the state from the 1960s onward. Jenkins (1994)
attributes this willingness to coexist to the political relationship between the state and
tribal areas. Jenkins (1994) maintains that this was despite the weakened state of the
Tajiks’ identity formation during this timeframe. According to Jenkins (1994), ethnic
groups remained blurred concepts for the Afghan population and were not respected as
frameworks for collective actions. On one hand, the government in Kabul lacked the
ability to interfere in rural areas, and it was of little interest or help to tribal inhabitants.
Roy (1990) underscored the lack of trust between the two entities, going as far as to
suggest that the state was viewed as yet another threat to their cultural and social
identities.
What postcolonial conditions in Afghanistan indicate is that ethnicity (or the lack
thereof) became the dominant means by which tribes made economic, political, or social
gains. Roy (1986) writes that even though the late twentieth century period was
dominated by the antagonism between Marxism and Islam, the belligerent parties
increasingly enhanced the ethnic momentum to strengthen their positions. Pstrusinska
(1990) asserts that ethnicity was exploited as a deliberate strategy to pull the majority
Pashtun toward communism, while minimizing and segregating the Tajiks.
As suggested by Pstrusinska (1990), the twentieth century postcolonial period in
Afghanistan resulted in tribal and ethnic group identity issues and value changes for
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individuals. These same changes led to differences in the way the state was perceived,
both inside and outside its borders. These changes in perception grew as the state
increasingly lost power and influence over the people and tribes that it governed. Rubin
(2002) observes that as Afghanistan’s national power eroded, tribal and ethnic groups
advanced their local standing, strengthening their power and demonstrating greater
autonomy over their affairs.
Moreover, as the Afghan war progressed, the national borders no longer served as
effective barriers against political and economic encroachment by regional actors (Rubin,
2002). The result of this decentralized structure meant a weakening of the state, and the
creation of dissimilar entities led by warlords with loyalties only to their own power base
(Schetter, 2002). These conditions combined to lay the groundwork for the 9/11 attacks,
as the ruling Taliban obliquely encouraged or were willfully ignorant of the ongoing
operations of Al Qaeda within Afghanistan (Rubin, 2000). There is a view that outside
Afghan borders, the convergence of foreign meddling further contributed to the events
that resulted in the 9/11 attacks. Whatever the perspective, the reality is that war and
conflict, just as they were during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were again
ravishing the nation during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
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Chapter 4
Afghanistan Modern Conflict and War
Current Conflict
History and scholars remind us that the modern territory of Afghanistan has
repeatedly served foreign powers’ interests due to the country’s battleground location
(Tomsen, 2011). The literature of writers like Hosseini (2003) demonstrates that in a
strategic sense, Afghanistan’s gateway location to Central Asia and Southwest Asia
confirms its importance to global trade and industrial opportunities that both sustain and
fuel great economies. According to Little (2007), after more than three decades of
conflict and war, the Afghan people are weary and fatigued. And, their fatigue and
weariness are seemingly only further burdened by foreign and national elements. Mueller
(1994) argues that regardless of the source of the people’s tension, their fatigue is strong
and palpable and there is growing demand for a real chance at peace, security and a
future for the generations to come.
Where the country and its people are concerned, the almost-continuous
devastation caused to the land for more than 30 years is an embodiment of courage and
strength, as well as a testimony to an Afghan identity that values perseverance, according
to Hosseini (2003). But wars, by their very nature, are often short-lived, partly due to
their cost, devastation, and the incredible emotional scarring of those forced to endure
them (Mueller, 1994). If this assessment is true, then why has the Afghan conflict existed
well beyond 10 years? Have Afghan experiences and national disparate identities
associated with multiple ethnicities and tribal cultures somehow contributed to the
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conflict? To this end, Tomsen (2011) found that a key reason the war continues to linger
in a society fatigued by conflict is in large part attributed to the competing influences of
Islam, the state, and ethnicity. Tomsen (2011) further suggests that these competing
interests become exacerbated when the self-serving motives of Afghan politicians and
leaders are injected into the discussion. When combined, factors such as ethnic, cultural,
and tribal differences become incubators exciting emotional fervor in order to position
each group closer to narrow aims, while simultaneously creating national divisions and
cultural fault lines. Edwards (1996) maintains that these faults cause tensions that make it
all but impossible for a central governing authority to extend national reach and authority
across Afghanistan.
Tomsen (2011) stated the following:
They have had a centrifugal effect on Afghanistan’s political community
through their competing loyalties. Loyalties which in turn have been
exploited by domestic actors seeking to bolster their claims to power; as
well as external actors seeking to achieve their own ends in the space
occupied by Afghanistan. (p. 63)
Despite the political tension, researchers and close observers of Afghanistan’s
body politics viewed the fatigue of war phenomenon to be prominent and pervasive in the
lived experiences of everyday citizens (Edwards, 1996). This pervasiveness was thought
to be sufficient enough to mobilize a war-weary public into encouraging its leaders at all
levels to cease conflict quickly and end the Afghan war. Thus, in consideration of why
the war has lasted so long, politics and fragmented populations emerge as forceful
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contributors. But while these factors speak loudly, they appear to only address the
internal problems associated with the lingering conflict. Walt (1987), in an assessment of
external reasons for why some wars are lengthy, posited that the people who enter you
into the war are not necessarily the best ones to get you out. While referring
predominantly to individual actors in the run up to 19th century military conflicts, Walt’s
(1987) premise does not exclude the military enterprise among the entities that may not
be a best fit for ending the war. Walt (1987) further comments that military power may
be of least utility in peace and re-construction efforts and, in fact, may contribute to more
hostilities in a land so harshly and repeatedly ravaged by long periods of war and conflict.
The military application of power and the theoretical model that frames war and
combat are distinct and discernible attributes in certain wartime environments. According
to Galula (2005), this military model holds up well when contrasts are made between
conventional - or symmetric - and unconventional - or asymmetric - conditions. Military
tacticians observe that conventional war means warfare through the employment of heavy
weaponry, such as tanks and artillery that are arrayed between opposing forces (DoD,
2001). Typically, such systems are deployed across vast open spaces–unlike the rugged,
rolling terrain of Afghanistan (Galula, 2005). In the theoretical model, asymmetric
warfare is commonly referred to as low-intensity combat, or, in the current Afghanistan
war vernacular, COIN. The Department of Defense is thorough in its description and
definition of conventional warfare, calling attention to the external power that undergirds
the event:
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A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long
duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are
organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an
external source. It includes guerrilla warfare, and other direct offensive, low
visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect subversion,
sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape. (DoD, 2001, p. 556)
The two warfare models are distinctly separate, heterogeneous, and, at the same
time, unique in their employment of warfare strategies relative to the conditions and
surroundings. Put differently, the two theories of war (i.e., conventional and
counterinsurgency) are neither complementary to each other, nor are they intended to be
applied in parallel or in a sequential fashion (Kilcullen, 2009). Unfortunately, such
violations of the tenets of employment appear to be precisely what unfolded in
Afghanistan.
The war in Afghanistan has been likened by some critiques of the U.S.
administration as a ship without a rudder, a reference to the early failure to produce a
clear and coherent military strategy for the campaign. From the beginning of the war, the
United States and its coalition partners struggled to gain traction for a number of reasons
(Galula, 2005). Chief among these was a lack of understanding, appreciation, and
awareness of the country’s conditions, people, culture, ethnic make-up, and identity.
The invasion of Afghanistan utilized the modern military of the U.S., and its
success appeared to be quick and easy. However, military and political
leaders were naive to think Afghanistan could be easily occupied and
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secured. Not consulting history was the first mistake made by the Bush
administration in its reaction to 9-11 and the lack of understanding that
permeated decision makers would come to haunt the US strategy for years
to come. More tact and study, however late, reveals that Afghanistan is
embroiled in an ethnic struggle and any attempt to reconcile the country
with its own internal problems must address this. (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 203)
Townsend (2011) added to this discourse, noting that no serious review of the
country’s condition was made prior to the invasion and, as a result, the United States
found itself in one of the most costly military engagements in its history. After
concluding that the initial effort to wage a conventional war was not working and was
likely to result in failure, changes to the U.S. military strategy were made in 2009, several
years into the war. Peek (2014) observed in a recent newspaper article that in terms of the
endgame, Afghanistan was always a riskier war than Iraq. Both have been routinely
compared to Vietnam because of the counterinsurgency elements of conflicts, the
difficult terrain, and perhaps some national psychological masochism (Peek, 2014). The
change in tactics to counterinsurgency operations meant a commitment by the United
States to tailoring a response to the uniqueness of Afghanistan that was far removed from
the edicts of conventional warfare.
Foreign meddling in the affairs of Afghanistan, and its adverse consequences for
the lives of the Afghan people themselves, has made many of them skeptical and, in some
instances, fearful of outsiders (Little, 2007). This mix of skepticism and fear of outsiders
is buttressed by a recent history that has seen the country and its citizens used as pawns
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during much of the last century by external power brokers (Robson, Lipson, Younos, &
Mehdi, 2002). These outside forces have superimposed Afghanistan onto their own
chessboard and ruthlessly and persistently jockeyed back and forth for their own national
interests (Little, 2007). These actions have had a disruptive consequence on the Afghan
regional governments that are predominantly concerned with their own self-preservation,
according to Peek (2014). Such current realities present a new dilemma and suggest that a
multidimensional response is required in the country. If the promise of Afghanistan is to
be realized, such a response must incorporate ethnicity, cultural differences among tribes,
religious identity issues, geography, and regional politics (Robson et al., 2002).
This new strategic model forced the U.S. military and its coalition partners in
Afghanistan to take into account factors such as history, culture, ethnicity, religion,
identity, and the region (Kilcullen, 2009). However, this radical transition from
conventional to counterinsurgency tactics requires a different set of learned skills, and, as
a classroom environment, Afghanistan has proved unforgiving (Little, 2007). To add to
these challenges, all too often political strategy from Washington is tactically carried out
in Afghanistan by a force trained to respond instinctively to attacks, violence, and
mayhem, and with far less training on human engagement and dialog (Kilcullen, 2009). A
good case study and example of the problems that arise when a combat-trained force
assumes a modified conflict resolution role is shown in the National Geographic
documentary, Restrepo (2010).
Restrepo (2010) shows how COIN can go wrong on many levels. During the
making of the documentary, an embedded film crew and journalist traveled with an
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American army platoon from the 173rd Brigade Combat Team. The platoon was
positioned in the Korengal Valley, in the Kunar province of northeastern Afghanistan,
which straddles an insurgent rich area along its border with Pakistan (Restrepo
Documentary, 2010). The platoon’s mission was to identify the insurgents who were
using the Kunar area as a gateway from which to launch attacks inside Afghanistan
(Resterpo, 2010). As is tribal and village custom in rural Afghanistan, local populations
were linked together, not only by their community, but also through familial relationships
(Robson et al., 2002). And, according to the Restrepo documentary (2010), often the
villages were entirely dependent on single-income sources to meet the needs of large
families and tribal communities. In the case of Korengal, the males have traditionally
made a living from lumber and timber trading (Kilcullen, 2009).
Restrepo (2010) shows how the platoon’s actions disrupted timber trading
operations, cutting off the meager supply of dollars that sustained families and villages.
This outcome, coupled with a failed understanding of the culture, people, tribal
relationships, and engagement dynamics, created a hostile environment on both sides
(Kilcullen, 2009). The result was a unit that was unable to adjust to the principles guiding
the COIN model – dialog, engagement, and listening (Beebe & Kaldor, 2010). Tribal
members responded with resistant tactics that caused more military and civilian deaths.
According to the Restrepo documentary (2010), the effects on the ground in Kunar gave
either direct or indirect encouragement to the insurgents as coalition outreach efforts
became less effective. The conditions on the ground and failed interactions created a
divide, pitting the soldiers of the 173rd Brigade Combat Team and local villages against
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each other. The documentary (2010) suggests that as a COIN model, Restrepo was
completely counterproductive. Commenting on the failed COIN actions by the coalition
forces in the region, General McChrystal, former commander of U.S. forces in
Afghanistan wondered of the Korengal fighters: if left alone, would they ever come out
of there to fight. One gets the sense that you create a lot of opposition through operations.
To work effectively, COIN demands close coordination and collaboration with
and among many agencies that can provide needed resources and support where and
when needed. And, often the nature of support is organic to civil organizations as
opposed to military fighting structures (Beebe & Kaldor, 2010). The case of Restrepo
(2010) demonstrates that a combat military unit was asked to straddle the lines between
tactical intelligence gathering (i.e., a combat military role and function), conflict
resolution and, connecting with the local civilian populace by providing road projects,
medical and school supplies, and other community services. According to the Restrepo
documentary (2010), the results were disastrous, as the unit’s civil engagement training
was inadequate and the military and civil mission tasks they attempted to complete at
times seemed to have conflicting purposes. What this suggests about Afghanistan, in
particular, and COIN, in a broader sense, is that successful human engagement is
absolutely essential, and often the level of engagement is at the lowest possible levels of
tribal, village, and district interactions. Galula (2005) maintains that in this instance,
successful interaction is not necessarily dependent on a weapon. Rather, victory is
achieved through skillful human engagement, dialog, trust, and an understanding of what
types of responses best satisfy human needs. None of these aims are achievable under the
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COIN theoretical model without knowledge of the disparate actors involved (Kilcullen,
2009). In Afghanistan, as the literature suggests, the dynamic is complex and presents a
unique set of challenges.
In order to achieve the desired aims in a COIN environment, one must
understand the theoretical model that underpins the principle. Because of the number of
competing forces, the varying dynamics that contribute to or impede COIN outcomes
must be understood (Kilcullen, 2010). In Afghanistan, these outcomes are influenced by
three elements, each of which vies for popular support. As the below COIN model (see
Figure 3) shows, these elements include government forces, insurgent elements, and
external actors.

Figure 3. Counterinsurgency model. Adopted from Seth Jones’s report
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2008).
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Government Forces
Government forces are vital to COIN efforts, as these elements include
indigenous government actors such as the police, military, and specialized security
elements (Kilcullen, 2010). Collectively, the government forces not only fight against the
insurgents, but they also help the national forces extend central authority by meeting the
human needs of the people. According to Fearson and Laitin (2004), in Afghanistan, such
needs translate to healthcare, power, transportation infrastructure, and other basic
services. However, beyond extending human services and the reach of the national
government, these forces are important to suppressing the insurgents’ counteractions
because they are the legitimate representatives of the people (Hironaka, 1990). In a postcolonial period and an environment with visceral sentiment against foreign occupation,
the Afghan government’s indigenous forces are the only acceptable option when it comes
to stopping the insurgent threat (Fearson & Laitin, 2003). COIN theorists such as
Kaufmann (2005) observe that the Afghan government itself will play an important role
in the outcome, intimating that the more competent the government is in providing
services to its population, the greater its ability to counter support for the insurgents and
defeat them.
Independent qualitative research by the Rand Corporation (2008) underscores the
fact that poor governance is far more likely to contribute to insurgent wins. The same
research reveals that strong governance (e.g., extending human needs services and
ensuring public safety) is far more likely to result in victory against the insurgents. The
same Rand Corporation analysis also indicates that a government’s popularity is
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generally measured by two factors: first, its ability to extend means, services, and support
to the people - meeting their Maslovian human needs; and second, the extent to which it
is viewed as the legitimate caretaker of the people’s scarce resources. Figure 4 (below)
shows the relationship between government popularity and success against insurgencies.

Figure 4. Government popularity and success. Adopted from Seth Jones’s report
Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (2008).

Insurgent Elements
The competition for hearts, minds, and support of the indigenous population does
not end with the government stakeholders. Kitson (1971) writes that the ability of the
insurgents to gain popular support is directly proportionate to their success and gains.
Such support translates into wins over government forces in over half the cases studied
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since the Second World War (Galula, 2005). The same report indicates that those
insurgents with support from non-state actors lost nearly 70% of the time, and those
relying on their own resources won less than 20% of the conflicts. In Afghanistan,
support for the insurgents appears to come from non-state foreign governments and
Afghan or state groups that offer money, training, logistics, and sanctuary (Byman,
2005).
The rise of a transnational jihadist network has created particularly acute
challenges as organizations such as al Qaeda tap into local groups. These
challenges include the flow of tactics, weapons, fighters, ideology,
organization, and leadership into and among local insurgencies; the
increased resort to suicide operations; and the pivotal role of religious
figures in either fanning or opposing violence. (Byman, 2005, p. 53)
Given the numerical advantage enjoyed by the Afghan governmental forces,
recruits join the insurgency mainly for ideological reasons (Rubin, 2002). However, their
ability to present a serious threat to the government is in large measure due to the
government’s own weakness. According to Byman (2005), the government’s weakness
and inability to effectively extend the reach and authority of the national body has
resulted in some gains by the insurgents. Such gains result in continued support to the
insurgency by both state and non-state actors (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).
External Groups
The third component of the insurgency model is external groups. Indigenous
forces must develop the capacity to win against the insurgents for a variety of reasons.
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According to Fearon and Laitin (2003), while external forces can contribute to shifting
the conflict in favor of either the insurgents or the government, they are rarely able to win
the insurgency for either side. This is because the legitimacy of the government is at risk
if it is seen as unable or unwilling to fight the insurgents, relying instead on outside
forces and groups. This is an important distinction on a number of levels, and one of the
more important points to consider is Afghans’ hostility to foreign occupation, given their
painful and relatively recent post-colonial experiences. Also, given the duration of many
insurgencies, the national government is unlikely to receive external support for the
duration of the conflict (Little, 2007). Both issues suggest that the Afghan government’s
ability to win the campaign against the insurgents will be difficult.
An analysis of all insurgencies since 1945 shows that successful
counterinsurgency campaigns last for an average of 14 years, and
unsuccessful ones last for an average of 11 years. Many also end in a draw,
with neither side winning. Insurgencies can also have long tails:
Approximately 25 percent of insurgencies won by the government and 11
percent won by insurgents last more than 20 years. Since indigenous forces
eventually have to win the war on their own, they must develop the
capacity to do so. (Rubin, 2002, p. 81)
Throughout the Afghanistan counterinsurgency conflict, the focus of the external
groups (i.e., United States and the International Security Assistance Forces ISAF) has
been on strengthening the capacity of the indigenous Afghan security forces (Fearson &
Laitin, 2003). As such, the strategy as of 2013 has been to transfer the lead in the COIN
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fight to Afghan forces as soon as possible. According to Zisk (2004), after 11 years of
conflict, the indigenous force must be seen by the Afghan people as the de facto COIN
force of choice. Otherwise, the risk of delegitimizing these forces and the national
government is unacceptably high (Roy, 1990).
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Chapter 5
Theory
The literature, research, and participant narratives contained in and cited by this
study suggest that the Afghan lived experience and identity formations at pre- and postimmigration stages are multifaceted and shaped by many differences. According to Hall
(1990), these differences are the product of occurrences, conditions, and actions that have
emerged over time and have been facilitated predominantly by colonial forces. The
analysis of these events and their impact on the subject participant group is illuminated
and understood when explored in the context of three theoretical models: postcolonial
theory, international relations (or Islamic theory), and reactive theory.
Postcolonial theory provides a foundation from which to study and understand the
layered individual and national identity that is part of the Afghan Muslim interpreter and
translator immigrant narrative. Given the varied responses that have been observed
following the conflict ridden period that proceeded the postcolonial era, the Afghan
nation’s response was to shift towards its Islamic roots away from the political,
economic, and social ills presented by Westerners (Reyes, 2009). Moreover, Reyes
(2009) went even further as to characterize the resulting violence by native individuals as
a direct consequence of colonial actions. Additionally, other social scholars like Fanon
(2004) focus on the native Afghan response as reactive in nature to the colonial
oppression and experienced marginalization.
To fully understand the depth and scope of the colonial influence on the subject
population, this researcher focused on the international relations theoretical component.
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To that end, attention was given to the Islamic theory model under the much broader
international relations theory design. In order to better understand the Islamic model as
applied to the Afghan sense of self and identity, Proctor (1966) maintained that what is
needed is to understand the Islamic world on its own term’s vice through Western lens.
And, researchers like Mohammed Abo-Kazleh (2006) suggest that the utility of arguing
for Islamism in the sub-context of international relations theory is that it offers a clear
view through which to deconstruct the identities, roles, effects, and behaviors of those
involved in the national, regional, and global conflict. Nevertheless, it is not enough to
view pre-immigration or Islamism in the context of international relations if the aim is to
better understand lived experiences and identity formations for the subject group. To
achieve this end, the comprehensive view entails post immigration experiences as well.
To deconstruct post-immigration experiences and identity issues, this research
applies the reactive theory model. Achieving a comprehensive understanding of
immigrant experiences involves learning how immigrant groups mobilize in an effort to
reconstitute broken boundaries and restore or build social standing as minorities. This is
because the role of mobilization response gives meaning to the minority group’s own
distinctive identity, ethnicity, culture, and heritage. Additionally, reactive theory helps
unearth identity attributes with higher internalized value, as compared to those that are
less important to assimilation or native relatedness. Figure 5 that follows provides a
graphic depiction of Afghanistan’s modern history, timelines, and themes by period. It
also shows how this information correlates to postcolonial theory, international relations,
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Islamic theory, and reactive theory models in order to provide the reader with an
improved understanding of the native Afghan and country narrative.

Figure 5. Modern Afghanistan History and Timeline
Historical timeline of Afghanistan, PBS News Hour, May 2011, cited from
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan/

Post-Colonial Theory
According to Jamal (2008), postcolonial theory has provided a fertile ground for
the emergence of theories of identity that are relevant to migrants who have moved to
new regions and countries as part of the increasingly global diasporas and population
flow. In examining the modern history of Afghanistan, its culture and its narrative,
postcolonial theory stands out as a prominent instrument for critical inquiry into the
identity differences among Afghan immigrant citizens. Such differences, as observed by

95
Hall (1990), are the result of factors and actions that have occurred over time, have been
formed and shaped by events, or have been influenced by non-indigenous elements.
Before going forward, it is useful to address colonial influences and their impact on
individual and national responses.
The colonial impact on individuals, families and tribes in Afghanistan is
significant, deeply rooted, and the outcomes are manifested in a variety of ways.
According to Fannon (2004), a residual effect of colonial occupation is repression,
marginalization, emotional consequences, and psychological consequences. Furthermore,
the outcome of these conditions is often violence.
The colonizer is constantly inflicting violence upon the colonized, Fanon
argued - not only is colonization itself an act of violence, but for the
colonizer to maintain his power over natives, he must constantly assert it
through violent acts - not only physical, but through the infliction of the
neuroses which Fanon also considered an act of violence. (McCoy, 2011, p.
6)
In a conflict rich environment such as Afghanistan, the violence component is
further complicated by the religious undertones that frame the conflict and war. Thinkers
in this field, such as Zulfiqar (2009), observe that violent rebellion connects Muslims in
and out of Afghanistan with the struggle undertaken by the Islamic community. This
community in Afghanistan seeks to rid itself of the constraints of colonial oppression, but
it also provides meaning and purpose where none previously existed.
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In a context of oppression like that of Algeria, for the colonized, living does
not mean embodying a set of values, does not mean integrating oneself into
the coherent, constructive development of a world. To live simply means not
to die. (Fanon, 2004, p. 232)
Some scholars like Fanon (2004) and Reyes (2009) focus on the native response
as reactive in nature to the colonial oppression and marginalization being experienced.
These scholars view the resulting violence by native individuals as a direct consequence
of colonial actions. Exploring Fanon’s (2004) and Reyes’ (2009) work, this study
identifies the violence by the rebel groups in Afghanistan (e.g., Mujahedeen, Northern
Alliance, and Al Qaeda) as similarly reflective of a native people countering the forced
inferiority complexes, emotional burdens, and physical harm done to them. Just as in
Fanon’s (2004) and Reyes’ (2009) models, the anti-colonial Islamic forces in Afghanistan
respond to the occupation and repression through violence.
It is the violence of the colonizer that has created the colonized,” explains
Alvaro Andrés Reyes in his paper, “Can’t Go Home Again.” “It is through
their ‘bayonets’ and ‘cannon fire’ that they have destroyed the very the
social fabric of native life, i.e. economy, lifestyle, and modes of dress. … If
the colonists can say that the native is an animal it is because their violence
has reduced him to an animal-like existence. (Reyes, 2009, p. 108)
This suggests that there are both individual and national considerations to
colonialism in the Afghanistan conflict. Reyes (2009) observes that colonialism as a
response engenders life-changing reactions in many. And, such changes are evident in
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individuals who respond to the oppressive colonial dictates as opposed to suffer feelings
of inferiority, despair, and weakness. Fanon’s (2004) work informs this researcher that
the Islamic responders to the occupiers in Afghanistan are likely to feel emboldened with
each response and victory against the occupiers, with each victory building upon the
other, creating a sense of empowerment and contribution among those who previously
felt helplessness. In this instance, the occupied responder achieves his own mental,
physical, and emotional well-being. Fanon (2004) believes that this is due to the
colonized re-directing and coalescing his feelings of anger and dissatisfaction into a
single cohesive force. Further, Fanon (2004) states that this force is an anti-colonial
movement, wherein the colonizers are now openly incriminated as the source of all
grievances, whose elimination coincides with the reparation of those grievances. This
argues that the conflict in Afghanistan, like regions in Africa, Asia and the Middle East,
is undergird by the belief that the source of strife and conflict (e.g., the colonial
occupation) serves the individual’s wellness, spirit, and sense of self by re-claiming
identity through power and through rallying the oppressed under a single identifiable
cause (Zulfiqar, 2009).
A sense of wellness also characterizes the national response to colonialism, but in
a uniquely different manner, according to Sekyi-Otu (1996). As a consequence of the
struggle against colonial oppression, violence, and marginalization, nations or groups
find unity and collective purpose in their counter actions. Their group or national struggle
is strengthened by their singular cause. The thought of being “in the struggle together”
means that no one individual can claim success (Sekyi-Out, 1996). Instead, that claim and
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the national benefits that emerge belong to everyone equally who contributed to the
counter action. In Afghanistan, whether the group was the nationalistic forces fighting the
British colonial occupation during the nineteenth century or Mujahedeen fighting the
Russians invaders during the twentieth century, both groups benefited (Zulfiqar, 2009).
Zulfiqar (2009) further suggests that such benefits often extended to tribes, clans, or
groups. These benefits included increased power, land, and political standing among
other factors as a result of their fight to restore the integrity of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan. Also, Zulfiqar (2009) suggests that the national response against
colonialism demonstrates that an anti-colonial frame of mind exists among Islamic
Afghan militants. Additionally, this response extends itself to violence against other
Westerners (e.g., military coalition) who the militants view as working to impose their
own economic, cultural, or political will over Afghan-Islamic customs and traditions
(McCoy, 2011, p. 9).
The literature reveals that the anti-colonial violence theoretical model is not
without criticism. Detractors like Frazer and Hutchings (2008), while acknowledging that
violence is sometimes justified, challenged the theory as an inefficient and often an
impractical instrument of change. This is because such responses to violence are
frequently met with more intense levels of violence. These violent cycles feed on
themselves with reactions that frequently spiral out of one’s localized control. Frazer and
Hutchings (2008) suggested that those who cling to the view of meeting colonial violence
and oppression with counter violence fail to understand that the modern world is
intertwined and connected. This means that regional violence can easily engulf multiple
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nation states in affected areas and potentially spark unimagined and unintended
outcomes. As such, using violence as a weapon against colonization or political
oppression has inherently unpredictable and catastrophic risks not only the oppressed, but
for others who may not be directly involved in the conflict (Frazer & Hutchings, 2008).
Post colonialism theory is, therefore, useful in the study of modern Afghanistan’s
identity developments. This is because researchers and readers who apply the theory are
better able to understand the shifting dynamics and the effects these developments have
had on the Afghan people and tribal identities in a broad sense and gain insight into the
identity shifts observed in the Afghans’ sense of self. Discussions of postcolonial theory
that are relevant to immigrant experiences suggest new approaches to understanding
group identity, according to Bhabha (1994). These approaches move away from previous
conceptions of identity based on essentialist categories of ethnicity, race, or nationalism,
while gravitating to a more fluid and dynamic condition state (Gilroy, 1997; Hall, 1990).
The interpretation of pre-immigration and post-immigration life experiences
underscore differences and tensions as inter- and intra-conflicts in Afghan Muslim male
immigrants move to the West (Centlivres, 1976; Rubin, 1995; Jenkins, 1994). Some
researchers, such as Brah (1996), link the existence of these tensions and their current
manifestations to twentieth century diasporas and Afghan colonial experiences. Ashcroft,
Griffiths, and Tiffin (1998) noted that the fact and history of colonization in Afghanistan,
particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, resulted in millions of people who
were forcibly displaced from their homes and country. As a consequence of colonial
interactions, Afghan refugees moved throughout the South Asian region and to the West.
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Brah (1996) suggested that the concept of the diasporas is useful as "an interpretive frame
for analyzing the economic, political, and cultural modalities of historically specific
forms of migrancy" (p. 16), and it can be drawn upon to explore ideas of subjectivity and
identity. Such frameworks indicate that as a means to mitigate struggles and tensions
arising from identity conflicts, Afghan Muslim immigrants develop hybrid identities that
are pulled from a wide spectrum of identity categories (Lugones, 2003). Such efforts to
create a composite or hybrid identity gives this researcher a new way to conceptualize
how Afghan Muslim males negotiate their identity differences between their preimmigration and post-immigration sense of self. Lugones reviewed this re-negotiated self
or hybrid as a mechanism by which these immigrants navigate the differences and in so
doing “re-imagine themselves in their new landscapes” (2003, p. 23).
Diasporas
A product of colonial interaction in Afghanistan during the late nineteenth
century and throughout the twentieth century was the marginalization, oppression, and
mass displacement of Afghan individuals. What stands out, however, is the fact that
many of these displacements involved Afghan citizens who were not of Pashtun heritage
or origin (Hosseini, 2003). Such forced re-settlements underpin the diasporas
phenomenon, especially as it relates to the effects of war and conflict. According to Brah
(1996), the term diaspora originates from the Greek word meaning to scatter - evoking
notions of movements and journeys. In the social science paradigm and accompanied
discussions of diversity, the term diasporas is a relatively new concept. According to
Cohen (1997), its usage and purpose has evolved over the years to become consistently
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associated with the experiences of displacement, dispersal, and migrancy. The discerning
difference is that the contemporary term diasporas is no longer on the peripheral in
debated regarding human migration and mobility.
The diasporic condition has increased dramatically, indicating not only a
widespread and growing interest in phenomena associated with it, but also the
realization of the potential of the concept to serve as a theoretical tool for the
advancement of qualitatively different perspectives and outlooks in the study of
human migration. (Clifford, 1997, p. 225)
The diasporas phenomenon becomes less foreboding and complicated if evaluated
in the context of identity and ethnicity. Safran (1991) acknowledges that diasporic
communities not only form a collective identity in the place of settlement or with their
homelands, but also maintain a shared identity with members of the same ethnic
communities in other countries. And, it is this transnational character of a globalized
relationship undergird by an interconnectedness that distinguishes the disasporic narrative
and perspective from that of the refugee debate and discussion. Also, in terms of linking
the phenomena to communities or countries, Safran (1991) suggested that the concept of
diaspora hold other characteristics as well. These include a view that they will someday
return home and should maintain support for their native homeland through individual or
collective conscience efforts. Safran (1991) argues that this communal consciousness
offers solidarity and thereby further enables continued efforts and activities.
In contrast, to diasporas, the comingled term refugee has different origins and
contemporary connotations (Koser and Pinkerton, 2002). In terms of refugee, the United
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Nations High Commission for Refugees (2012) maintains that the term applies to any
person possessing a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country shall be considered a refugee.
According to Koser and Pinkerton (2002), the conventional notion of a refugee is
viewed as some ethnic, community or national group of individuals being randomly
dispersed and displaced across a territory. Because these groups are by definition
transient, the concept of belonging, or identifying with a home or place is problematic.
For the current research, the more contemporary term “diasporas” is applied and relevant
throughout this study because of the decisive shift from mobility, transient, and displaced
language that both diasporas and refugee terms share. This is in contrast to more focused
attention in this study that explores connections to others through shared ethnicity,
religion, or heritage (Tomlinson, 1999, p. 13).
In addition, what makes the phenomenon of diasporas an intriguing sub-text to the
Afghan lived experience story is the post-colonial context that served as the undergirding
framework for displacement. These same colonial consequences are viewed as directly
responsible for the shifts in identity negotiation for the affected Muslim population.
The journeys that bring migrants to a new land are not necessarily single
journeys, but possibly a series of journeys spread out over time and through
several regions before ending at a particular destination. One of the defining
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characteristics of a diaspora is a community that ‘maintains a memory,
vision or myth of the homeland’. (Safran, 1991, p. 312)
This may suggest recognition by the immigrant journeyman that despite the
emotional pain, a shift of one’s identity toward another definition is an essential renegotiation condition of “self-being.” Clifford (1994) argued that migrants often mourn
the loss of their identities as they look to their past and to their new homelands. Scholars
of Islam and Muslim experiences, like Rushdie (1991), observed that such reflection
helps the individual rationalize their new-conflicted being. Also, it appears that this new
or re-negotiated being is more coherent, acceptable, and infused with familiar ethnic,
cultural, and national symbols that offer emotional sanctuary and a sense of community
belonging. In this way, the Afghan pre-immigration identity and post-immigration
identity, while still at odds, carry less emotional impact and tension in the new cultural
environment or Western location (Rushdie, 1991). Regardless of the differences between
one’s pre-immigration and post-immigration identities, many immigrants successfully
navigate between their native homeland identity and that of their newly adopted settings.
Hall (1996b) stated that immigrants must learn to negotiate these differences in order to
resolve their inner conflicts and socially assimilate, a process he referred to a
“translation”:
This [translation] describes those identity formations which cut across and
intersect natural frontiers, and which are composed of people who have been
dispersed forever from their homeland. They are obliged to come to terms
with the new cultures they inhabit, without simply assimilating to them and
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losing their identities completely. They bear upon them the traces of the
particular cultures, traditions, languages, and histories by which they were
shaped. The difference is that they are not and will never be unified in the
old sense; because they are irrevocably the product of several interlocking
histories and cultures, belong at one and the same time to several homes and to no one particular home. (Hall, 1996b, p. 629)
What this says is that the Afghan Muslim immigrants to the West (i.e., United
States) will carry forth a reality that is fused by two distinct world communities. Scholars
such as Brah (1996) and Hall (1990) expanded on these community distinctions, noting
that a community composed of an original, homogenous, or fixed identity, yet
characterized by plurality, fluidity, and change, should be expected in the minds of the
Muslim immigrant to the West. This further suggests that actual displacement across
physical time and space boundaries from Eastern Islamic society to a Western democratic
land will likely be in a state of constant movement and alteration. To this end, applying
the postcolonial theoretical model to identity formation in the participant group must take
into account the re-negotiated identity(s) with regard to the adopted homeland, according
to Brah (1996). That is, as long as the diasporas’ phenomenon is also considered in a
context that avoids Afghan Muslim male identity definitions based solely on ethnicity or
culture. This is because such definitions are an indispensable focus of constructing the
subject’s sense of self (Clifford, 1994).
What unifies the Afghan postcolonial lived experiences and sense of self is the
notion that human identity changes and their consequences resulted from colonization
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and immigration efforts that occurred during the latter nineteenth century and throughout
the twentieth century. These efforts, as noted by Moore-Gilbert (1997), emphasized
plurality, differentiation, and hybrid-related compositions that were constructed through
historical processes involving physical space, time, and social interactions. Hall (1996b)
states that the evolving identity theoretical concepts are best understood through the
prism of the preceding identity theories, specifically the enlightenment concept, the
sociological concept, and the post-modern concept.
The key concept of enlightenment focuses on the Afghan individual, as opposed
to the family or tribal group. However, while individualistic in origin, it establishes a
foundation whose features and appearances give rise to the tribal group’s characteristics.
According to Moore-Gilbert (1997), the individualist view, in which the subject is
rational and autonomous, was replaced by the view of the individual as being
sociologically constructed in relation to others and through the culture and context of
everyday life. What this appears to say about the Afghan experience is that identity, while
a central core of the individual, is negotiated through their disparate social surroundings.
Mercer (1990) argued that this phenomenon further explains how a diverse society
created, to some extent, through colonial imprints, underpins the fragmented nature of
identities. These fragmented identities are indistinguishable in a post-modern context that
is dynamic, shifting, and not fixed, according to Hall (1996b). Mercer’s research remind
this researcher that, "identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something
assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable, is displaced by the experience of doubt and
uncertainty" (1990, p. 43). In addition,
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A stable and coherent identity may be part of a narrative we hold on to for a
sense of security, but from a post-modern view, identity is conceptualized as
being in constant flux – ‘a constructed process rather than a given essence’.
(Loomba, 2005, p. 148)
What the claims from scholars such as Moore-Gilbert (1997) and Mercer (1990)
suggest is that Afghan identity is anything but singular and unitary. Hall (1996a) went
even further with his analysis to propose that the best way to conceptualize Afghan
postcolonial identity is to view it uniquely as multiple and fragmented. Afghan identities
are conditions of the environment and the context in which they evolve is constantly
interacting and undergoing change.
Identities are socially constructed and relational, and undergo constant
transformation dependent on specific histories, contexts and locations.
Identities are always constructed through difference, based on the distinction
of what is included and excluded from each identity position. Additionally,
identities are always constructed and enunciated within discourse, produced
in specific historical and institutional sites within specific discursive
formations and practices. (Hall, 1996a, p. 4)
In exploring the postcolonial outcome in Afghanistan as related to human identity
and lived experiences in the context of the enlightenment concept, this researcher is
drawn to the conclusion that the power of discourse plays a pivotal role. Hall (1990)
observed that while immigrants often look back to their pre-migration identities with
nostalgia, their identity is not necessarily anchored to a time or a place to which one can
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return, but rather is always in a process of becoming rather than being. This means that
the Afghan Muslim body of experiences and individual identities are entrenched in
history, language, and culture, and is less about who they are and to which tribe they
belong than what they may become (Hall, 1996a). To enunciate the postcolonial impact
on the Afghan Muslim immigrant worldview requires an ability to offer as much
attention and analysis to the Afghan Muslim interpreter and translator migration journey
as to the nature and depths of the identity shifts themselves (Weeden, 1997).
International Relations / Islamic Theory
Emerging from the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the prevailing inquiry for
social science experts on Afghanistan and Islamic scholars remains fixed on helping
Western society understand the motivations of terror organizations and, further, to
examine why these motivations persist. In the literature review section of this document,
the researcher addressed Huntington’s (1996) “Clash of Civilization” theory, in addition
to other works that focus on cultural East - West fractures along identity, values, and
religious differences (Saroglou & Galand, 2004). What stands out among these
differences is the increasing role that Islam plays in these conflicts (Proctor, 1966). To
this end, Proctor (1966) maintained that what is needed is to better understand the Islamic
world on its own merits, not on Western terms. As these conflicts and struggles increase
in intensity in places like Northern Africa, and continue evolving in places like Iraq,
Syria, Egypt, and Afghanistan, the question continues to be what social theoretical model
helps deconstruct the nature and dynamics of the conflict. Researchers and scholars like
Mohammed Abo-Kazleh (2006) suggest that the utility of arguing for Islamism in the
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sub-context of international relations theory offers a powerful lens through which to
understand and crystallize the roles, effects, and behaviors of those involved in the global
conflict.
According to Proctor (1966), Islamic theory, as a sub-element of the broader
international relations theory, is a systemic theory that does not necessarily concern itself
with how states interact with each other or how the “system” affects the state. Instead,
Islamic-international relations theory more broadly explores the concept of world order,
focusing on the relations between the Muslim/Arab, non-Muslim/Arab, and the nonMuslim/Muslim spheres, and how these should be ordered (Abo-Kazleh, 2006). Proctor
(1966) acknowledged critics of the Islamic-international relations theoretical perspective,
noting that portraying Islam as working from a systemic level of analysis is intellectually
uncomfortable at best. This is because the Islamic theoretical approach and the umbrella
of the international relations theory rely heavily on the abstract concepts of community
and group emotions. The criticisms notwithstanding, both community and group link
essential elements to Islamic practice back to the ontological beginnings that are
universal in Islamic theoretical models and provide a theoretical framework that is
distinctive.
According to Proctor (1996), what defines the notion of Islamic theory and bonds
it to all manner of Islamism considerations is the view that the state’s engagement and
interaction with the world community surrounding it is paramount. That is, the state is a
sovereign entity unto itself and its behaviors are motivated predominantly by internal—
not external—considerations (Vatikiotis, 1987). Next, in the community of Islam, less
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importance and distinction are given to the existing variations, be they fundamentalist,
moderate, or conservative in nature. For Proctor (1966), what is more important is the
belief and commitment to the Islamic community or state as not only sovereign, but as
one indivisible Muslim entity bonded by an unshakable community of believers and
group feelings. Both Proctor (1966) and Vatikiotis (1987) placed emphasis on the
importance of this common ontology and unwavering faith to the Quran as starting
points, middle, and end positions to all Muslim existences. This suggests that while the
differences may be apparent, the inner and outer Islamic boundaries ensure a collective
Muslim response to any Islamic state or sovereign community threat. In the Afghanistan
conflict, this belief guaranteed a collective Muslim response to non-Islamic interference,
invasion, and occupation events during both the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
(Vatikiotis, 1987). As argued by Proctor (1996), the outcome is that not only does the
non-Islamic world community of sovereign states interact, impose, and interfere with the
Muslim state inner boundaries (e.g., the Afghanistan colonial model), but in much the
same manner, Islamism influences actions of outer boundary non-Islamic sovereign
states.
There is at once sovereign states and independent non-state actors who
operate around this principle of an all-encompassing concept of community
feeling, be it Islamic or Arab. Quite often and at varying intervals these
actors seek to be the dominant force in efforts to bring the community
together under its hegemony. Hence politics in the Muslim world are often
driven by this concept that has resulted in centuries of power struggles

110
between competing entities be they the imperialist, Arab nationalists, or
fundamentalists. (Proctor, 1966, p.2)
Put succinctly, the Afghanistan case model and supporting Islam-international
relations construct demonstrate the futility in observing Islamism in isolation with respect
to outer-boundary effects. However, the same premise demonstrates that Islam interacts
with, influences, and or shapes outer-boundary state experiences with equal effectiveness.
In this manner, it is important to remember that on the basis of self-help and self-interest,
Muslim states behave just as non-Muslim states in the international sphere (Vatikiotis,
1987).
Traditionalism
The nation state of Afghanistan is experiencing an ideological conflict and
struggle between two opposing Islamic factions. The factions include those who hold
tightly to the traditional teachings of Islam, or the traditionalist approach, versus those
whose interpretation is more moderate, open-minded, or the non-traditionalist approach.
According to Proctor (1966), the traditionalist school sees the world in a state of constant
turmoil and insecurity. At the core of these conflicts and tension are sovereign states with
governmental actors who may have as a primary concern their own self-preservation or
power over other sovereign entities. For the traditionalist, cooperation is difficult, as trust
is normally in short supply and his or her global mission is to spread the doctrine of the
ideology (Proctor, 1966). Vatikiotis’ (1987) position is that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan,
from the late 1990s to their ouster early in the twenty-first century, represented the more
radical wing of the Islamic worldview, and they held steadfastly to the traditionalist
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school of thought. Victory for Al Qaeda would be the manifestation of their traditionalist
doctrine across the globe - a place where the world (e.g., Western cultures) submits
unquestionably to the Islamic faith (Proctor, 1966). According to Abo-Kazleh (2006),
unfortunately, for much of the West, and for Afghanistan and all other peoples who are
caught up in this ideological conflict, the traditionalist actors leave little room for
compromise or dialog.
The traditionalist’s zealot-like adherence to the epistemological origins and
principles of the traditionalist approach focus on the literal text of the Quran (Proctor,
1966). Their strict interpretation and thought regarding the traditionalist view is centered
on and around the readings of the Quran. Proctor (1966) observes that traditionalists
perceive the Quran as sacred and perfect and, therefore, in no need of human
manipulation, as such intervention risks misunderstanding through failed interpretation.
According to Abo-Kazleh (2006), this is because traditionalist believers see the Quran as
the word of God, and that word is delivered through the Prophet Muhammad. Their
staunch defense of the Quran in its puritanical form, absent any amendment, strengthens
a belief that modern-day global events, time, and political conditions are so unstable that
alteration of the Quran to address current day needs is blasphemous (Cox, 1996). The
problem for the traditionalist is that even he/she reads and interprets the Quran in its
classic form - Arabic. According to Shalut (1999), these interpretations of texts to rulings
can be done from a number of positions, be they grammatical, historical, philosophical,
or legal, thereby imposing certain preconceived principles upon interpretation. It is the
refusal to surrender any traditionalist declared Islamic understanding of the Quran that
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puts them in violent opposition to any non-conformist, be they Westerners or moderate
Muslims. In Afghanistan, the traditionalist reminds the world through his/her actions that
the Islamic theory, as related to the international relations model, is superimposed by the
notion of jihad against all existential threats (Shalut, 1999).
Jihad
The nation state of Afghanistan has experienced the concept of holy war, or Jihad,
within its borders almost continuously since the Soviets were expelled in 1989. The
concept of jihad refers to a struggle against non-believers, maintaining a determined
effort in the way of Allah, according to Lewis (1988). This determined effort is
frequently synthesized in articles as a contrast between inner and outer struggles. Some
articles refer to jihad as a kind of moral self-improvement, or the modernist's notion of
political and social reform known as the inner struggle (Lewis, 1988). This greater
personal struggle demands obedience to religious practices and duties. However, there
seems to be a consensus among Islamic scholars that the concept of jihad does include
armed struggle against persecution and oppression (Streusand, 1997). This view, the
notion of the outer struggle or lesser individual war is at the center of violence in places
like Middle East, Syria, Northern Africa, and Afghanistan (Lewis, 1988).
Still, far more religious thinkers identity jihad in the context of war and
conflict.
The unmistakable predominance of jihad as warfare in Shari'a writing does
not mean that Muslims today must view jihad as the jurists did a millennium
ago. Classical texts speak only to, not for, contemporary Muslims. A non-
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Muslim cannot assert that jihad always means violence or that all Muslims
believe in jihad as warfare. (Streusand, 1997, p. 50)
Whether defined as a fight to improve lived experiences or fighting against
tyranny or oppression, the many perceptions of jihad are due largely to the diverse
communities of moderates, traditionalist, and fundamentalist that observe the Islamic
faith (Lewis, 1988). Unfortunately, more and more policy in the modern era is driven by
the fundamentalists who apply their interpretation of jihad more narrowly - that is, in the
context of war against all non-Muslims. Led by Osama Bin Laden, Al Qaeda’s global
assaults against non-believers used Afghanistan as a major flashpoint for its ideological
re-birth. In this instance, Lewis (1998) argues that global policy in the modern era is
driven by extremism and their violent jihad against the West (non-believers), or to some
extent those outside the traditionalist sphere.
Non-Traditionalism
Non-traditionalists and traditionalists hold differing thoughts regarding certain
aspects of the Islamic faith and structure. According to Cox (1996), they not only differ
on the nature and origin of their respective approaches, they also sharply disagree about
the Quran’s interpretations. Still, they view the Quran as the absolute guiding text and
authority for all social, political, and familial order for Muslim lives (Abo-Kazleh, 2006).
The non-traditionalist believes the potential exists that disparate interpretations could
result from diverse temporal conditions, particularly as related to time, place, intellect
and environment. According to Abo-Kazleh (2006), it is therefore possible that the socalled different understandings of the Quran may not be contradictory, but rather a
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consequence of one’s own contemporary existence. As such, it is not necessarily the case
that the outright divisions of the world exist, as argued by traditionalists and suggested by
Huntington (1996). If different interpretations of the Quran exist due to conditions, then
the potential for peaceful co-existence among Muslims can be achieved in places like
Afghanistan and elsewhere based on derived common understanding. For Cox (1996), it
is possible for non-traditionalists to arrive at such a judgment because they generally hold
to a position that is more accommodating of the state’s roles. Whereas the Quran dictates
social roles under the traditionalist approach per se, the non-traditionalist acknowledges
the nation state’s influence in shaping and influencing Muslim lived experiences.
Civilizations do not control states rather states control civilizations. They
claim however this does not mean the surrendering of Muslim principles.
They believe it is not a betrayal to the faith to be both modern and Muslim.
What emerges is a double faceted concept of sovereignty. They concede
they must accept the state’s reasoning but also insist the state adhere to
Islamic principles and hold to an eternal consciousness of spirit (assabiya).
(Abo-Kazleh, 2006, p.41)
What this suggests is a non-traditionalist belief that the radical response and use
of the jihad instrument of violence and terror is, by its nature, extreme, and the use of
such tactics as the means to achieving their strategic aims is misguided (Shalut, 1999).
Alternatively, the moderate view held by the non-traditionalist is that accepting temporal
misgivings allows one to make accommodations and sets the conditions for Muslims to
work constructively within the precepts of Islam to achieve desired goals. This is not to
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understate or in any way suggest a weakening of the importance and purpose of Islam in
societal existence. Rather, it is a realization that modernity is vital in an international
relations theoretical environment where East and West tensions and conflict prevail as the
norm against the exception (Abo-Kazleh, 2006).
Non-traditionalists make these arguments not for the purpose of
marginalizing Islam but rather with an understanding that modernity is
necessary and yet the Islamic world is not suited for Western style
modernity in absolution. What they suggest is needed is an Islamized
modernity that is capable of taking from the West without allowing the
Islamic world to mirror the West and weakening Islamic identity. (Shalut,
1999, p. 61)
Those who adhere to the non-traditionalist approach appear to be ardent defenders
of Islamist rights. This is particularly true in light of oppression, injustice, and violence
against them as an outcome of colonialism and bigotry against Muslims (Abo-Kazleh,
2006). To counter perceived neo-imperialist aims by the West, Shalut (1999) advocates
for the right of self-determination and freedom to practice their religion without
prejudice. It is this perceived global injustice that shapes the traditionalist and nontraditionalist Islamic communities’ responses under the international relations theoretical
design. According to Bukay (2004), Islam is a universal world construct that shapes
global politics and represents an all-inclusive global view. Despite the belief that this
religious world order means different things to different groups, it remains a complete
system influencing religion and state. While both traditionalists and non-traditionalists

116
possess different interpretations of the Quran, neither would disagree with the notion of
an Islamic ideal reinforced through an Islamic order framed by political and social
orientations (Shalut, 1999). These orientations appear to differ dramatically, depending
upon which belief one adheres to. For instance, a traditionalist would argue that the
source of all faith is Allah, and this unwavering belief represents the symbol of the
collective Muslim identity (Bukay, 2004). Also, they contend that criticism of this
worldview should be met with the harshest penalty, as any opposition is illegitimate and
amounts to heresy and blasphemy. For the non-traditionalist, achieving political stability
and community order is paramount. Shalut (1999) pointed out that for the nontraditionalist; stability is achieved through community inclusiveness and social contracts,
vice instruments of jihad and strict sharia law. Additionally, non-traditionalists argue that
as long as the community and social contract reflects Allah’s will, the spirit of the Islamic
faith is intact.
In Afghanistan, the notion of social contracts that feed cultural and ethnic conflict
underpins the divide among traditionalist and moderate Muslims or non-traditionalists.
Cox (1996) argued, “these cultural conflicts act as a catalyst for extremist who seek a
return to more familiar Muslim and Islamic values” (p. 17). It was the extremist element
(Al Qaeda) of the traditionalist school that evolved to strike a global blow against the
West on September 11, 2001 (Bukay, 2004). Al Qaeda demonstrated that the
international relations philosophy it followed and helped develop was a far more radical
ideology than even the fundamentalist advocates of the traditionalist school preached
(Shalut, 1999). What this suggests is that as a universal ideological theoretical study,
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Islam has emerged from Afghanistan and many other Muslim lands and is proving to be a
significant factor in the international relations global environment and world order.
Reactive Identity Theory
According to Aguirre and Proctor (1998), among the many factors that sustain
culture, ethnicity, and national identity formations in minority immigrant groups is
discrimination. Researchers such as Portes and Rumbaut (1996) supported this view,
concluding that intolerance represents an important ingredient in a unified theory of
ethnic and cultural relations, in addition to identity development. Also, Portes and
Rumbaut (1996) suggested that during the twentieth century in America, the social
response to discrimination among immigrant populations came to be known as reactive
identity theory.
Ethnicity, framed by the experiences of the first arrivals rather than class,
was to provide the fundamental matrix of American-based politics for
subsequent generations. Ironically, the class-consciousness of the more
literate immigrants faded away while ethnic consciousness, forced on the
peasant masses by native discrimination endured. Hence, ethnic markers
were redefined by reactive formation into symbols of pride and rallying
points for mass political participation. (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996, p. 102)
According to Aguirre and Proctor (1995), reactive identity theory refers to a
particular type of social identity that is characterized by opposition to mainstream values,
norms, and social groups, and it involves two key components. First, there is an
immigrant perceived, suspected, or actual ethnic and cultural boundary intrusion through
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some discriminatory act (Gonzales, 1994). According to Gonzales (1994), in response to
this intrusion, immigrant groups mobilize in an effort to reconstitute the broken
boundaries and restore or perhaps gain social standing. Critics of reactive identity theory,
such as Gallo (1974), maintained that it fails to fully appreciate other factors that
contribute to reactions to negotiated identity formations, such as social interactions,
economic strength, or pre-existing archetypes of self, group, or community or tribal
identification, or 9-11 environment. Still, the approach helped me better understand the
patterns, methods, and processes through which discriminatory judgments and labels are
used against minority immigrant groups, and how these groups internalize these
meanings (Portes & Rumbaut, 1996). In this research on the post-immigration lived
experiences and identity issues of Afghan Muslim interpreters and translators, reactive
identity theory helps unearth identity attributes with higher internalized value such as
trust and mistrust, as compared to those that are less important to assimilation or native
relatedness.
The reactive identity theory model has its roots in field study work in New Haven,
Connecticut, in the 1930s by Irvin Child, psychologist and researcher. Child’s study
focused on the second generation Italian-Americans who had difficulties integrating into
the mainstream as a result of social bias and discrimination. Child (1943) found that
immigrants who faced obstacles integrating into the mainstream demonstrate two distinct
characteristics. First, they are more likely to develop strong ethnic identities, while those
who encountered less resistance would find cultural assimilation and self-identify easier
to navigate in Western or American society. Second, the reactive element seems
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responsible for mobilizing a political response, as noted by Gallo (1974), who argued the
following:
The greater the feelings of exclusion among our respondents, the more they
will identify as Italian-Americans. To the Italian-American, being a member
of an ethnic group produces attitudes that have a bearing on his social and
political participation. He senses that he is part of a beleaguered social group
and is sensitive to his group's status. It also produces a desire for
respectability to be won by political recognition. (Gallo, 1974, p. 123)
During the twentieth century, an often-cited example of reactive identity theory
practice was the immigrant population that centered on the Italian-American groups.
According to Gonzales (1994), many immigrants who came to be identified as Italians
during this timeframe were primarily from the southern portions of Italy, near Sicily.
What serves as an important takeaway from scholars like Child (1943) and Gallo (1974)
is that these Sicilian immigrants had no pattern of describing themselves as Italians, nor
did they show any significant attachment to Italian identity. Further, the researchers
pointed out that the immigrants were illiterate and spoke in regional dialects, unable to
effectively communicate in English. Gonzales (1994) observed that despite their unique
cultural and ethnic identity markers, the immigrants were treated unfairly and singled out
as a group and confronted with prejudice and discrimination. Gallo (1974) suggested that
the group’s response to these judgments was to self-identify as Italian-Americans. In
doing so, they encountered less social resistance and began benefiting from mobilized
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and organized efforts (e.g., political, economic, social, etc.) on behalf of the structured
and better-known Italian-American community (Child, 1943).
From these reactive efforts, political mobilization stands out as providing a basis
from which Afghan Tajiks, Afghan Hazaras, Afghan Pashtuns, or Afghan Muslim
marshal diverse members of the Afghan immigrant community to be more responsive to
majority discrimination (Espiritu, 1992). Also, scholars like Stryker and Burke (2000)
remind readers that reactive identity theory’s recognition of the role of mobilization
responses gives public meaning to the minority group’s own distinctive identity,
ethnicity, culture, and heritage. Such recognition seems linked to how one responds to
questions that ask who you are, what you are, and what global community you belong to.
What this theoretical framework suggest is that the constructed selfidentity of the Afghan male Muslim interpreter and translator population in this
study may be infused with lived experiences that are defined and influenced by
cultural, ethnic and religion relationship interactions and their boundaries. Also,
these interactions are likely not rigid and fixed, but more correctly characterized
as multidimensional and dynamic. Undergirding all these factors and conditions,
the theoretical constructs describing post-colonialism, Islamic and international
relations, as well as reactive theory models each contribute in defining and
explaining the desperate influences that affect identity outcomes and changes
among the studied population. And, these identity changes and outcomes surface
at pre- immigration and post-immigration periods. Hall (1990) and Huntington
(1993) both argue that these differences are the product of occurrences,
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environment and events such as colonialism, rise in radical Islamic
fundamentalism, and post 9/11 attitudes. As such, the analysis of the study
participant’s identity change is best understood when examined and explored in
the context of postcolonial theory, international relations (or Islamic theory), and
reactive theoretical models.
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Chapter 6
Methodology
To understand the lived experiences and identity issues of Afghan Muslim
immigrants who went to the “West” (i.e., the United States) from the “East” (i.e.,
Afghanistan), qualitative narrative studies would be most suitable as a research
methodology. Many scholars observed that narrative research has had a profound impact
on qualitative studies. Ruby (1982) writes that the study of narratives has linked the
sciences with history, literature, and everyday life. This linkage also reveals an increasing
reflexivity that characterizes contemporary inquiry and furthers the postmodern
deconstruction of the already tenuous boundaries among disciplines and realms of
meaning (Ruby, 1982). Other scholars such as Polkinghorne (1988) add to this discourse,
maintaining that people without narratives do not exist and life itself might thus be
considered a narrative inside which we find a number of other stories:
As we make our way through life, we have continuous experiences and
dialogic interactions both with our surrounding world and with ourselves.
All of these are woven together into a seamless web, where they might
strike one as being overwhelming in their complexity. One way of
structuring these experiences is to organize them into meaningful units. One
such meaningful unit could be a story, a narrative. For most people,
storytelling is a natural way of recounting experience, a practical solution to
a fundamental problem in life, creating reasonable order out of experience.
Not only are we continually producing narratives to order and structure our
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life experiences, we are also continuously being bombarded with narratives
from the social world we live in. We create narrative descriptions on our
experiences for others, and ourselves and we also develop narratives to
make sense of the behavior of others. (Zellermayer, 1997, p. 56)
To help orient and understand our daily interactions and experiences, we add
order to events to ensure clarity and meaning. According to Zellermayer (1997), one way
of structuring these experiences is to organize them into meaningful units. These units are
presented in storylines and narrative forms, and these narrative forms help people retell
their experiences. Zellermayer (1997) maintained that not only are we continually
producing narratives to structure our life experiences, but we are also constantly being
bombarded with narratives from the social world in which we live. One can argue that
narratives serve a crucial role in our lives, not just an ancillary function. We use this
instrument to make sense and apply order to our surroundings. We create narrative
descriptions about our experiences for others, and ourselves, and we also develop
narratives to make sense of the behavior of others (Zellermayer, 1997).
The use of narrative methodology offers another important consideration, which
is the potential to hear from the silenced participant population themselves – or “giving
voice.” Bogdan and Biklen (2006) described giving voice as "empowering people to be
heard who might otherwise remain silent" (p. 204) or who have been silenced by others.
Many journalists, scholars, and military experts understand the important roles
interpreters and translators have played throughout the Afghan war. Yet, very few have
heard the voices of these people, know their narratives, or understand the depths of their
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internal conflicts and interpersonal struggles. Frequently, life stories are told about people
who have had their voices silenced, rather than by those people. Mazzei and Jackson
(2009) stated, "Qualitative researchers have been trained to privilege this voice, to 'free'
the authentic voice from whatever inhibits it from coming into being, from relating the
truth about the self " (p. 1). Too often, the emphasis is on the voice of the professional,
not the voice of the person who owns the narrative (Taylor & Bogdan, 1994; Biklen &
Bogdan, 2006). The goal of the narrative approach is to allow the individual stories to
come through in an authentic manner. This is done by adhering to established qualitative
control methods that ensure process integrity and stands up to best industry practices and
professional scrutiny.
The current study reveals a pattern in which some Afghan Muslim participants
report being silenced in multiple ways. Britzman (1989) stated, "A commitment to voice
attests to the right of speaking and being represented” (p. 2). The interpreter and
translator participants’ voices have been silenced through institutional practices as a
result of helping non-Muslim coalition forces defeat other Muslims in the war. Also, their
voices have been quieted within interpersonal spaces out of fear that their own safety and
that of their families and friends will be placed at risk should their work with the coalition
become known. Adding to this conundrum, the participants reported being silenced
during the post-immigration phase, as they were not able to self-identity as Afghan
Muslims given the post 9/11 environment and animus toward Muslims in the United
States. This researcher’s goal is to give a voice to their struggles. To this end, their
narratives become powerful and useful instruments that inform the research community
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of their ordeals, while at the same time returning power through discourse back to the
silenced participants themselves.
In addition to giving voice, narratives are important not only because they help us
to understand individual experiences, but also because they help others understand these
experiences in the context of the narrator’s own perspective. Heikkinen (2002) asserted
that these perspectives are important and cannot be viewed simply as “abstract structures”
isolated from their cultural, social, or even political contexts. What this construct offers is
the view that one’s experiences are connected with the environment in such a way that
once removed from that environment, the perspectives and experiences are significantly
altered. In this manner, individual attributes such as knowledge and identity continue to
evolve and re-construct themselves (Bruner, 1984). As part of this evolution, we find that
narrative inquiry can be applied broadly in order to understand both the social and
environmental conditions that underpin people’s lived experiences. At the same time, the
intimate understanding of experiences that empower people is delivered through narrative
methods. Marshall and Rossman (1999) wrote that among its (narrative) strong attributes
in qualitative study is the construction of multiple perspectives, the existence of context
bound and social realities that shape relationships and contribute to individual identities.
Combined, the effects researchers can have during the analytical phase of qualitative
design by leveraging narrative methods remain unique to this domain.
Still, Gudmundsdottir (2001) stated that narrative research is an elaborate
collaboration between both the interviewed participant and the researcher. The researcher
for the current project employed the qualitative narrative method because it helps to give
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shape, form, and substance to the interactions and relationships that support the rich
collection of experiences that comprise individual lives. Some researchers apply the endsto-a-means mindset, adopting the narrative approach as the primary method of inquiry
(Carter, 1993; Connelly & Clandinin, 1990; Gudmundsdottir, 1997, 2001). In contrast,
there are those in the field of qualitative research that maintain that the narrative approach
is not a method or means, but rather a frame of reference in the research process, where
life stories are seen as producers and transmitters of reality (Heikkinen, 2002). This
researcher believes that as opposed to competing constructs, the frame of references
discussed in this instance actually complements one another. Both constructs are
important to the narrative methodology and validate the importance of narrative research
in presenting the phenomenon and the methods used to uncover occurrences. In the
simplest form, narrative exploration helped this researcher gain an improved
understanding of the meaning(s) applied to identity by the participants by shifting voice
and focus to the participants themselves (Moen, Gudmundsdottir, & Flem, 2003). In this
manner, the chosen narrative method employed in this study closely follows the approach
used by Gudmundsdottir (2001). This approach concentrates on the kind of meaning(s)
culture and environment imposes on identity and events. Thus, this researcher explored
the storytelling methods that assist participants in recounting and creating order out of
experiences that began at the start of the Afghan War (2003) and continued through
various stages of lived existence.

127
Methodological Objective
This researcher used narrative methods to extract the rich life stories and eventful
occurrences that make up the participants’ experiences. The brilliance of narrative design
is in its ability to link current lived experiences, through contemporary inquiry and the
power of “story,” to ordered events in a coherent fashion. Existing research informs us
that narration constitutes a kind of a) causal thinking, in that stories are efforts to explore
questions of human agency and explain lives; b) historical understanding, in that events
cannot be explained except in retrospect; c) moral enterprise, in that stories are used to
justify and serve as models for lives; and d) political undertaking, in that individuals
often struggle to create new narratives to protest a perceived storylessness in the old ones
(Freeman, 2004; Rosaldo, 1994).
This researcher’s methodological objective was to both describe and explain how
study participants’ pre- and post-immigration lived experiences were shaped and
informed by their identity, and how these identities were influenced by the environments
themselves. Further, narrative study afforded the researcher the latitude to focus on
conditions that contribute to, or conflict with, the participant narrative. Polkinghorne
(1988) pointed to narrative lines of inquiry that informed the researcher’s analysis in
connecting the participants’ stories to the cultural context. Using Polkinghorne’s (1988)
approach, this researcher worked to crystallize the relationships between life’s episodic
events that contribute to assimilation outcomes among Afghan Muslim individuals
because of identity formation.
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Where narrative research draws its strength is the voice and story or the narrative
belonging to the participants themselves. As a method, it fully and completely embraces
the life and stories of the participants as the center of focus. Czarniawska (2004)
explained that narrative is understood as a written or spoken text giving an account of an
event/action or series of events/actions that are chronologically connected. As a method,
this research approach relied on the narrative model because it allows the participants to
tell their own story and communicate their own experiences, and in so doing, provide
meaning to what is important while placing other data into proper context.
Within the methodological approach strategies available to the qualitative social
scientist, narrative research offers advantages and perspectives concerning issues and
problems unlike other traditional qualitative methods. However, because the field of
narrative research is so broad, a narrowed application is necessary to ensure structure and
cohesion, in addition to problem focus. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) correctly explained
qualitative research as “a set of interpretative, material practices that make the world
visible,” and further suggested that, “qualitative researchers deploy a wide range of
interconnected interpretive practices, hoping to get a better understanding of the subject
matter at hand” (pp. 4-5). Taking the same logic and applying it to lived experiences,
Cole and Knowles (2001) argued that structuring data in such a manner as to analyze it in
chronological terms enhances analysis.
To ensure the narrative methodology was accurately applied, this researcher
turned to biographical narrative methods to add focus and clarity, as well as to work
towards research trustworthiness and validity. Hiller (2010) suggested that biographical
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narratives occupy a prominent position within the qualitative research spectrum. Just as
qualitative research has evolved encompassing a broad array of sub-specializations,
methods, and techniques, so too has the field of narrative research. Deferring to Creswell
(2007), he maintained that biographical narratives researchers distinguish among the
following: (a) biographical studies, where an individual’s life story is studied through
research of archival documents and records; (b) autobiographies, where persons write
their own life stories; (c) oral histories, which focus on personal recollections of events,
their causes, and their effects, from the perspective of one or more individuals; and (d)
life histories, which reflect socio-cultural, personal, and institutional themes in an
individual’s life. This researcher relied heavily on biographical methods. However, the
researcher employed features of oral histories, life histories, and chronological processes
to give fuller meaning and context to life experiences explored in this study. This
researcher concentrated on both pre-immigration and post-immigration lived experiences
to ensure context, breadth, and scope of narrative understanding. However, to prevent the
scope of this study from being too broad (or narrow) and to ensure focus, preimmigration analysis began in 2003 (at the start of the war), as opposed to when the
United States special immigration visas were first allowed (National Defense
Authorization Act, 2006).
At its core, biographical research furthers human understanding through social
scientific methods. This is done through data collection methods, analysis, and
interpretation of the lived experiences of the participant study group. The appeal of
biographical research is that it explores, in diverse methodological and interpretative
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ways, how individual accounts of life experiences can be understood within the
contemporary cultural and structural settings, and thereby helps to chart the major
societal changes that are underway (Roberts, 2002). Bryman (1988) focused on the
empirical contribution of biographical studies, noting qualitative researchers tend to
espouse an approach in which theory and empirical investigation are interwoven during
or at the end of fieldwork, rather than being a precursor to it. The current research was
informed by the positions that one can derive meaningful theoretical approaches through
the deliberate and careful application of biographical methods.
The current researcher’s use of biographical narrative as the qualitative research
method was driven by the desire to understand structural and seismic shifts in social,
ethnic, and cultural environments. This researcher also sought to unearth the impact such
changes had on self-identity. Such an understanding is particularly important in regards
to East and West interactions and relations. Also, such seismic shifts can be well
understood through the lens of Eastern and Western participant experiences, along with
careful analysis of perceived identities. Using biographical narrative as the research study
model imposes minimum limits on the participants and, according to Roberts (2002), is
undergirded by both belief and practice that individuals are the creators of their own
meanings. Such meaning forms the basis of daily existence and helps participants
interpret and make sense of their social existence. Moreover, by studying pre- and postimmigration experiences in identity, structural shifts in social, ethnic, and cultural
environments (e.g., East and West) can be understood within space and time dimensions.
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Lastly, this researcher does not fully subscribe to the belief that employing
biographical narrative models alone are sufficient for learning about the authentic stories
of the participants. According to Becker (1970), biographical research is viewed as not
measuring up, as compared to established reliability and validity criteria. In research on
personal and social context, Hiller (2010) compensated for this perceived shortcoming by
introducing chronological mapping to support and enhance the biographical narrative
model. This researcher believes that such an approach helped elucidate the narrative facts
and biographical images presented by the study participants. And, to further the
theoretical soundness of this research and to enhance research understanding and
visualization, this researcher examined chronological mapping and its use as a possible
tool to help the participant narratives take form and maintain a sense of continuity. Others
have similarly used chronologies and chronological mapping to support their research.
According to Creswell (2007), the approach is often used to uncover life-course stages or
seminal actions or experiences involving childhood, marriage, employment, place of
residence, and sibling interactions, for example. Also, because narrative-structured
inquiry involves large volumes of data, one can easily become overwhelmed by the
magnitude of the analytical process. In capturing the life events that shape individual
experiences, this research provides a wide girth of information and material. The
objective was careful synthesis and management of data, transforming collected
information into a framework for effective analysis. The key to these considerations is the
focus on data visualization that facilitates and enhances, not detracts from, the
biographical narrative analytical process (Marshall & Rossman, 2010).
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Restated Problem Statement
The trajectory from the Eastern migration experience to the Western assimilation
process causes interpersonal struggles and intergroup conflict for this population. Afghan
Muslim male interpreters and translators experience interpersonal struggles and
intergroup conflict as they migrate from the East to the West. In yielding to Western
assimilation and acculturation pressures, interpersonal tensions emerge between and
within native family units who seek to honor and hold on to traditional tribal and ethnic
beliefs, values, and customs. Additionally, intergroup conflict arises as Afghan Muslim
male interpreters and translators attempt to reconcile those native traditions and
associated identities with the customs, values, and beliefs of their new host land. The
problem is defining and understanding the disparate identities for this population group
during their immigration to the West. To this end, are the identities the same and or static
across both pre- and post- immigration periods? Also, does finding the right balance
between bridging the native social, cultural, and religious constructs matter? Research
needs to be conducted to better understand the identity issues of this Afghan Muslim
male group and the nature of their interpersonal and intergroup conflict. The aim of such
future research must be to design more constructive methods that help participants
mitigate this problem as well as enhance cross-cultural awareness.
Restated Research Questions
To explore the rarely-researched issue of the Afghan Muslim male interpreter and
translator “conflict and change” issue of identity, the primary research question of the
current study is the following: “What are the lived experiences during pre- and post-
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immigration of Afghan Muslim interpreters and translators who migrated to the United
States during the Afghanistan War (2003 - 2012)? Supporting research questions include
the following: 1) How do these Afghan Muslim males conceptualize identity? 2) How do
these experiences shape, inform, and affect their developed identities, and 3 How does
intergroup conflict shape experiences and influence identity dilemmas within the study
group?
Data Sampling
In grounded theory, a range of 20 to 30 participants may be used for interviewing
purposes (Creswell, 2007). By contrast, case studies may involve a single event, program,
or activity (Creswell, 2007). According to Patton (1990), as compared to quantitative
inquiry, “qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively small samples and
even single cases (n = 1)” (p. 169). As in any qualitative study, the ultimate goal of
sampling is to obtain cases deemed information rich for the purposes of study (Creswell,
2007). To ensure validity and credible research outcomes where small samples are
involved, the purposeful sampling method becomes a useful instrument. Purposeful
sampling involves selecting study participants ‘‘based on a specific purpose rather than
randomly’’ (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003a, p. 713). In the current qualitative narrative
biographical research study, the researcher used a purposeful sample range of five Afghan
national Muslim males who emigrated from their native Afghan land to the United States
during the Afghan War (between 2003 and 2012). In addition, the study sample included
participants who have resided in the United States for at least one year. Having a
minimum period of residency in the United States was intended to ensure proper
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orientation and experiences that contrast participants’ pre-immigration activities with
their post-immigration activities. And, while a small sampling size of five participants
does not achieve diversity or population representation, selecting participants who were
among Pashtun, Hazara, and Tajik groups serves as an ethnically distinct research group.
This is because the majority Pashtun participants and minority Hazara and Tajik
participants would each hold different self-identity references and contrast based on their
ethnic grouping. Thus, this researcher’s aim in utilizing this sampling approach was to
select an ethnically distinct group (e.g., Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, etc.) of Afghan
interpreters and translators for study. And, for this study, nine participants were initially
considered, and five interviewed based on the sampling approach and rationale stated
above. Three of the subjects were of the Pashtun tribal majority, one subject was a
member of the Hazara tribe, and the last subject was a minority Tajik member. Also, the
subjects were from geographical areas from the east, south, and center (capital) of
Afghanistan. In terms of their post-immigration domicile in America, western, eastern,
southern, and northern states were identified as home.
Those who were granted asylum in the United States began to settle in
California (mainly the Los Angeles-Orange County area and San Francisco
Bay Area) and in the Northeastern United States, where large Muslim
community centers keep them closely bonded. Fremont, California, is home
to the largest population of Afghan Americans in the U.S. Smaller Afghan
American communities also exist in the states of Texas, Illinois, Florida,
Washington and elsewhere. According to the United States Census Bureau,
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there were approximately 65,972 Afghan-Americans living in the country in
2006. By 2011, this number grew to 89,040. According to the Embassy of
Afghanistan in Washington, DC, the over-all Afghan population in the
United States in 2011 is around 300,000. While 30,000 reside in Northern
Virginia, approximately 65,000 Afghans comprise the diaspora community
based in the San Francisco Bay Area. Some figures estimate that there may
only be about 80,000 Afghan-Americans but the actual number may be
200,000 to as high as 300,000. (Mujahid, 2007, para. 2)
Marshall and Rossman (2010) maintained that such purposeful sampling approach
not only strengthens research and, ostensibly, the body of knowledge, but it also provides
rich data that in this case defines and characterizes the eclectic cultures and populations
that comprise the heterogeneous Afghan nation. Moreover, in this qualitative, small
sample, such ethnic richness offers some guard against threats to quality. A key to this
sampling approach, as noted by Patton (2002), is the selection of participants who
possess “case rich data” for in-depth study and analysis.
Thick description of the phenomenon under scrutiny requires detailed
descriptions. Detailed description in this area can be an important
provision for promoting credibility as it helps to convey the actual
situations that have been investigated and, to an extent, the contexts that
surround them. Without this insight, it is difficult for the reader of the final
account to determine the extent to which the overall findings ‘ring true.’
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 69)
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Researchers have stated that population sizes for narrative research are
significantly smaller and sometimes involve only one or more participants in narrative
biographical research. As previously stated, this narrative biographical study contains a
research sample comprising five participants. To draw a rich comparison and contrast
between pre- and post-immigration experiences, the researcher sought participants who
were born in Afghanistan and migrated to the United States during the war (2006-2012).
This researcher sought volunteers for the study via two methods. The first method can
best be described as “word of mouth.” That is, this researcher reached out to the local
translator and interpreter center and office in Kabul, Afghanistan. The researcher did not
seek interpreters and translators who are currently in Afghanistan working for the
coalition because this could present ethical conflicts. However, members of this office
and visitors who learned of the study and were in contact with interpreters and translators
passed the information along. This process resulted in nine separate lines of inquiry from
individuals who migrated to the United States and who generally fit the researcher’s
selection criteria. To that end, the researcher provided the office with flyers and posters
(see Appendix B) about the research with the researcher’s contact information (i.e.,
phone and email). The flyers provided information concerning the purpose of the
research and asked members of the office to reach out to any interpreters and translators
currently in the United States who may be willing to participate in the research. Those
who requested further details and had additional questions were provided a letter (see
Appendix A) about the goals, intent, purpose, and aims of the research. The letters were
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sent either through email and US mail delivery to that person’s place of residence and
business address in the United States.
The second method for seeking participants for the study was through centers in
the United States with strong Afghanistan populations and communities. According to the
U.S. Census Bureau report (Hoefer, Rytina, & Baker, 2012), there are some 90,000
Afghan immigrants living in the United States. The San Francisco Chronicle (Miller,
2010) stated that Fremont, California holds the largest American-Afghan community,
with approximately 30,000 Afghans. Additionally, the City Journal reported that smaller
Afghan populations are found in Texas, Illinois, Florida, and Washington (Oeppen,
2011). Because a goal of this research was an ethnically distinct and data-rich participant
sample, Fremont, California was used as the primary source to seek volunteers for the
study. This narrowed the interview sites and preserved limited research resources. To
reach out to volunteers for this study, the researcher sent the letter, along with a flyer (see
Appendices A and B), to Afghan-American publications, Afghan-American cultural
organizations, Afghan-American organizations, and Afghan-American community
outreach agencies. Again, as in the word of mouth process, the researcher asked
interested individuals who met the baseline criteria to contact him via email or phone.
In addition to the purposeful sampling as described above, this researcher used
criterion sampling to focus on the design and make-up of the participant group. Patton
(2002) defined criterion sampling as using a sample that meets predetermined
characteristics. This approach allowed the researcher to formulate criteria that facilitated
data development and analysis. The developed criterion included the following identity

138
attributes: native Afghan male interpreters and translators who are practicing Muslims
and migrated to the United States between 2006 and 2012 and who also remain in contact
or in relationships with family, friends, or colleagues in Afghanistan. This researcher
sought Afghan Muslim men who are either single or married and between the ages of 28
to 48 years of age and who arrived in America via the special immigrant visa law
(Congress, U.S., 2006). The age criteria ensured that participants were adults at the time
of their mission work with the coalition. The special immigrant visa status ensured that
they were properly vetted by the US Department of State as an interpreter or translator
for the coalition.
This researcher chose to study the Afghan Muslim male population because
researchers are rarely able to apply qualitative narrative methods to analyze life
experiences in an authentic, real-time manner, especially when actual conflict and war are
involved. Because the Afghanistan war is so current in historical terms, much can be
learned about immigrant Muslim experiences and the complexity of identity issues and
effects across a non-Western, non-secular population group. Further, this participant
group is particularly intriguing as a study sample because some of these men appeared to
suffer identity conflicts as they sought balance in honoring cultural traditions in their
conservative Muslim country while striving for acculturation and assimilation in their
new secular Western host home. Only men were selected for participation in this study
because in Muslim society, interaction among non-married men and women is a violation
of traditional cultural taboos. And, while such research related discussions and meetings
could reasonably take place in the West, traditions and practices in Afghan culture even
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today make such actions restrictive and frowned upon. What the literature informs the
reader about this population of Afghan Muslim men is that they demonstrated great
courage and commitment by assisting the Western military coalition in a war against
other Muslims. This commitment to stand against other Muslims came at great risk and
resulted in a wide array of conflict and subsequent identity issues that this researcher
sought to unearth and bring to light. Not only were identity conflicts found in the preimmigration stage, but conflict identity issues were observed during the post-immigration
phase, as well.
Data Collection
This researcher used narrative methods to extract the rich life stories and eventful
occurrences that make up the participant group’s experiences. To ensure the narrative
methodology approach was optimally applied with focus and clarity, the researcher used
biographical narrative methods. As previously mentioned, this researcher’s use of
biographical narrative as the qualitative research method is driven by a strong desire to
understand structural shifts in social and cultural environments and the impacts these
cultural changes have on identity. And, as mentioned earlier, biographical research is
viewed as not measuring up, as compared to established reliability and validity criteria
(Becker, 1970). In research on personal and social context, Hiller (2010) addressed this
issue by introducing chronological mapping to strengthen the biographical narrative
model. The current researcher believes that such an approach could help readers better
understand the narrative facts and biographical images presented by the study
participants. The key to these considerations is the focus on data visualization that
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facilitates and enhances the biographical narrative analytical process (Marshall &
Rossman, 2010). Finally, this researcher used face-to-face or the direct interview process
as the data collection method for the study. Each initial interview lasted from one to two
hours, depending on the subject’s desire and willingness to proceed to conclusion during
one interview, as opposed to multiple sessions. No more than two interview sessions with
each participant were used. The interviews had two parts. Part one focused on preimmigration experiences and identity. The second part focused on post-immigration
experiences and identity issues, as well as additional questions or clarifications from part
one. The interviews were conducted in safe, private yet public spaces, such as university
environments, libraries, and cultural center offices. The locations were conducive to the
interview process and were selected by the participants because they were safe and had
minimal distractions. To ensure clarity, full disclosure, and participant understanding, the
researcher provided each participant with an informed consent form (see Appendix D),
which addressed their rights throughout the research process. Participants completed and
signed the informed consent form prior to the interview (Mauthner, Birch, Jessop, &
Miller, 2003; Patton, 2002). The interview sessions were recorded via a digital audio
device. No real names were ever used or recorded, only pseudonyms and subject titles,
such as Participant #1, Participant #2, Sir, Subject #1, or Subject #2. To ensure security,
the digital device was in the researcher’s possession at all times and when not in use for
the interview, was secured in a locked combination file container in the researcher’s
private quarters until the device was used. Further, only the researcher had the container
combination, and the recordings will be kept for one year from the day and month the
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data was collected as per IRB protocols. Finally, all interview sessions were conducted in
a one-on-one semi-structured format.
During the initial interviews, a hybrid of open-ended and probing questions (see
Appendix C), based on the approach prescribed by Patton (2002), was presented to each
participant. The questions were structured in this fashion to solicit thoughtful and focused
responses involving pre-immigration and post-immigration periods: during the Afghan
war, during the migration process, and during cultural assimilation into the United States.
Also, the questions were designed to engender trust and make the participants initially
comfortable with more general questions. The initial questions were crafted to solicit
participant responses about their native lived experiences during the pre-immigration
phases. Gradually, the questions became more focused and targeted on disparate identity
types (e.g., ethic, cultural, and Muslim or Islam religious factors) that were at the center
of the current research. Finally, descriptions involving identity formation between preand post-immigration conceptualization and about their own sense of selves was
presented. Minimum interruption of the participant responses was made by the
researcher, and only when necessary to solicit amplification or clarification to a provided
response. Through these open-ended questions, the participants were better able to
provide fuller information and richer descriptions about their own lived experiences
(Patton, 2002). This effort was further served by providing the participant’s with a copy
of the questions prior to the interview. The pre-immigration focused questions (see
Appendix C) were followed by post-immigration focused questions, and possibly
additional clarification questions based on information presented by the participants
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during part one of the interview. Once the data from the initial interview was collected,
reviewed and analyzed, a time for follow-up questions and closure was offered to each
participant. The questioning, interviewing, and follow-up data collection process
continued until information data saturation occurred; meaning, when the researcher began
hearing the same themes, patterns, and responses to questions. At this point, the
likelihood that significant additional gains would be made was not expected. (Saumure &
Given, 2008)
Prior to face-to-face meetings, the interview questions were field-tested. Field
testing the questions helped to ensure, a) the questions made sense to like-minded
representatives, and b) buttress the data collection strategy and rationale for the study, as
encouraged by Sampson (2004). The field test also helped this researcher by providing
mitigating techniques for deconstructing barriers that could surface during the actual
face-to-face interviews with the Muslim male participants. To accomplish the field tests,
this researcher asked three interpreters and translators who are currently in Afghanistan
working for the coalition to review the questions and provide feedback on their
soundness and sensibility, as well as to provide recommendations for changes. Aside
from their current post in Afghanistan rather than the United States, all other selection
criteria were met. The strong pool of existing interpreters and translators in the Kabul
base made this process relatively easy. Based on the field test, no changes were made to
the questions, but the researcher did note that one or two of the pre-immigration
questions engendered emotional responses from 2 of 3 field test participants. As a result,
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the research interviewer’s questioning technique was modified and part one questions
were slightly re-sequenced.
The intent of the field test was to ensure the best possible question set that
allowed the participant’s lived experiences and stories to evolve through story inquiry.
The questions centered around “family history, their family’s individual move to the
United States, their experience in education, war, and conflict, and their views on culture,
ethnicity, religion, gender, and immigration” (Aryan & Guzman, 2010, p. 72). While a
connection between interviewer and interviewee may be established during the interview
process, Patton (2002) suggested a significant connection is created as one examines the
world of the participant through an explorative process of mining narrative data. It is at
this point that critical meanings and themes are exposed that help orient and give
perspective to the participant’s world. Once the actual interviews were completed,
participants were presented with a copy of their transcripts, and at that time, the
researcher afforded them the opportunity to review the transcripts and make changes.
According to Creswell (2007), this approach helps ensure accuracy of
information, as well as maintain contextual integrity and security of participant data.
Upon completion, follow-up interviews were made available to each subject.
Additionally, a final meeting and discussion was offered to each participant. These
sessions were available via Face-Time, Skype, or telephone. The researcher used
whichever method was available and most convenient to each participant. The goal of the
final session was to close the interview process, answer any lingering questions the
participants may have had, and give the participants an opportunity to discuss their
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feelings about the process. As Aryan and Guzman (2010) suggested, this was also an
opportunity for the participants to raise themes or concepts that were not previously
explored. As also noted by Rubin and Rubin (2005), this process adds depth to the
interview activity and helps ensure a richer body of data is carried forth. Three
participants took advantage of this closing activity.
Data Analysis
The approach used to conduct data analysis involved interpreting narrative data
by unearthing patterns, occurrences, metaphors, and meanings of each participant’s
biographical story. The researcher’s goal for this study was to explore the individual
biographical narrative case and then examine the data across all five cases or groups. To
this end, this researcher used qualitative data analysis (QDA MINER) software to support
manually discovered frequencies of information, sequences, and established relationships
that emerged. Because of the expected volume of data, the researcher used, but did not
completely rely upon, the QDA MINER computer-assisted software. The software is
labor intensive and required a significant learning curve in order to achieve a basic level
of proficiency. Still, the limited use of the software did help identify or confirm manually
selected topics and other relevant factors that exist within single interview data fields and
data information that extends across other narratives. This approach helped identify how
the five participant Afghan Muslim immigrants conceptualize their identity and
understands their life experiences. The use of QDA MINER technology did add to the
analysis activity by showing clusters, co-occurrences, and patterned sequences that were
captured in biographical interviews.
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In an attempt to understand how people conceptualize identity and view their own
lived experiences, the researcher followed the constant comparative model (CCM;
Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This model calls for the deconstruction of data - breaking it
down into smaller units through coding techniques in an effort to make thematic sense of
the story. The CCM was originally designed to serve as an analytical tool that would
yield theory formation in grounded methodological research. However, today it is more
widely accepted as a method of analysis within the qualitative research framework.
According to Maykut and Morehouse (1994), CCM requires the researcher to take one
piece of data (e.g., an interview, a statement, or the theme) and compare it to all other
pieces of data that are either similar or dissimilar. At that point, the researcher can begin
to contrast the data, seeking ways in which the data are either alike or different to other
pieces of collected information. Comparing and contrasting data underscores the
inductive nature of the approach and it can result in discoveries of new meanings and
interpretations. These new discoveries and the analysis process used exposed unique
differences between the constant comparative model and narrative methodology. The
constant comparative model attends to the smaller components or elements of a story,
whereas the narrative method is theme-oriented and focuses holistically on the elements
that contribute to the participant’s life events and experiences.
For the current study, the researcher draws upon Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) CCM
as it originally related to grounded theory data development. Tesch (1990) found
relevance in the CCM well beyond grounded theory. Roberts (2010) observed that an
important element in contrasting and comparing data is in presenting collected data
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through broad lenses and carefully sifting through or synthesizing the data in a logical
manner. At the conclusion of this process, salient positions are represented and linked as
appropriate through coding comparisons to other fragments of data. In advocating the
CCM, Tesch (1990) evolved to a position that the CCM can also serve effectively as an
intellectual framework that underlies many other qualitative theoretical designs:
The main intellectual tool is comparison. The method of comparing
and contrasting is used for practically all intellectual tasks during
analysis: forming categories, establishing the boundaries of the
categories, assigning the segments to categories, summarizing the
content of each category, finding negative evidence, etc. The goal is to
discern conceptual similarities, to refine the discriminative power of
categories, and to discover patterns. (Tesch, 1990, p. 96)
By comparing discrete units of data, as well as through categorizing, coding,
creating sub-categories, and connecting them through patterns, this researcher arrived
inductively to the discussions, discoveries and conclusions in this study. Further, the
CCM approach assisted in offering more complete and thorough analytical work through
constant reflection on the collected data. The technique of an applied cycle of frequently
comparing old and new data was used not only as it relates to a single participant, but
also as that single-source data was then compared to another participant’s information.
Finally, as suggested by Boeije (2002), this approach delivered rigor within this study,
while simultaneously strengthening the study’s validity and findings.
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This researcher’s objective was to apply the principles of both narrative research
methods and the CCM in the current study. This approach provides greater definition to
participant meanings while offering even more granularity to developed categories and
the relationship between the two factors. The researcher encountered complex, multilayered data that led to multiple, if not competing, interpretations. By advancing narrative
methods and the CCM, this research offered greater depths of understanding regarding
lived experiences and identity properties and meaning. Such understandings, according to
Boeije, Bromberger, and Duijnstee (1999), are reflected in the relationship to elements of
each single interview and the distinctiveness of these elements, as compared to other
participants’ data. In terms of the interview procedures, the current study follows Taylor
and Bogdan’s (1984) work that captured comparative elements of a qualitative research
study on Multiple Sclerosis patients. Similar to Taylor and Bogdan (1984), this researcher
used first-cycle coding at the beginning of the interview process as a technique for
comparisons of a single interview. In order to fully understand what was said, the
researcher examined individual passages for analysis by comparing different parts of the
narrative with other elements. By comparing different parts of the interview (fragments),
the consistency of the interview as a whole was examined (Boeije, 2002). The objective
during this process was the creation of a thorough summary and delivery of a set of
comparisons that serve the internal analysis process. Again, this analytical process leads
to established categories that helped identify and contrast salient data for meaning and
interpretation.
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Once the comparison coding and interview analysis was complete for the first
interviewee, the researcher followed the same procedures in comparing the narrative data
of the second interviewee. Once two sets of separately analyzed data became available,
the researcher was able to compare and contrast the first set of data against the data from
the second interview. This resulted in an exploration and analysis of the lived experiences
and identity formation from within a participant source, followed by a rigorous
evaluation across two participant narratives. The strength of this model is in having
access to narrative data belonging to individuals who share the same Afghan preimmigration and U.S. post-immigration experiences. Eventually, all study participants’
and group’s narrative data was analyzed in the same manner. Boieje (2002) advised that
once several interviews and coding analysis is on hand, subsequent participant interviews
can be selected based on responses and answers to questions by the comparison process.
Among other considerations, comparing fragments of data allowed the researcher to use
triangulation and confirm information, events, and activities that contribute to the
researcher’s own understanding, interpretation, and meaning definition. The purpose of
this step is to produce clusters from generated codes and further develop the
interpretation and conceptualization of data by seeking out indicators that re-enforce
themes (Boieje, 2002).
In terms of process mechanics, the researcher began this analytical stage by
listening to the recordings of the direct interviews, followed by re-reading the related
transcripts, making notes, and repeating these steps many times. During this stage, the
researcher focused on interview patterns, themes, speech, non-verbal communications,
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storylines, and emotions, among other factors. Such observations were captured in the
researcher’s notes taken immediately after, and in some cases during the actual interview
session. A copy of these notes will be maintained with the transcripts in the secure locked
box mentioned previously and destroyed in accordance with IRB protocols for this
research (see Appendix D). At this point in the interview process, suppositions were
formed about the transcript’s meanings and experiences taking place. Also, at this stage,
the researcher considered what gaps exist in the transcripts and what additional questions
were needed in order to fill these gaps in the follow-up interviews. Because large
amounts of data were collected from the participants during the narrative interviews,
managing the data became an important concern. To mitigate this problem, this
researcher adopted the approach by Chaitin, Linstroth, and Hiller, who cautioned, “not to
lose sight of the forest for the trees" (2009, p. 16). The researcher followed their approach
by selecting no more than five major themes and three to five minor themes in each
biographical narrative.
The next stage in the process entailed listening (again) to the recording of the
interview session and re-reading transcripts. Developing a time event chronology
followed this step. Adopting the methods used by Chaitin et al. (2009), this research
proved to be an exploration of the biographer’s experiences in life: birth, education,
occupation, marriage, employment, war, immigration, and peace. Biographical displays
enhance individual narrative experiences by adding clarity, understanding, and linkages
through a linear account that depicts social, political, individual life events expressed
chronologically (Roberts, 2002).
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Data Coding Methods
Coding is among the variety of instruments available to researchers to analyze
data qualitatively. Coding allows researchers to combine, differentiate, and reflect on data
through the creation of themes and patterns (Coffey & Atkinson, 1996). When this
researcher began to reflect on the qualitative research method, the problem statement and
research question of the current study, he dealt with the issue of selecting the appropriate
coding design. Patton addressed this issue, stating “because each qualitative study is
unique, the analytical approach used will be unique” (2002, p. 433). Dey (1993) held to
the view that prescribed methods of coding are altogether futile and purposeless. He
recommended becoming more absorbed in the data as opposed to coding that frequently
resembles shorthand note taking. However, other scholars, including Saldana (2009),
have taken the position that depending on the nature and goals, a single coding method
may be insufficient in revealing the complex phenomenon at work in one’s data. Also,
the issue of when to decide on the coding methods must be acknowledged. Conversely,
there are those who believe heavily in coding, but delay selecting a method until the
initial data collection and review process are well underway or complete before making a
decision on a coding method. For the current study, the researcher decided on the coding
method early in the process. In so doing, the researcher believes he was best able to
harmonize the study’s theoretical design, analysis, and research goals, as suggested by
Saldana (2009). This researcher’s coding method goals included giving the silenced a
voice after years of conflict dominated by tribal, ethnic, cultural, and institutional
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oppression; capturing their overarching identity beliefs, values, and sense of self; and
providing rich details through thick narrative stories about lived experiences.
This researcher used descriptive coding as a means to ensure detailed
descriptions. Saldana (2009) stated that the purpose behind descriptive coding is to
provide summaries or short phrases about a narrative segment or passage. Tesch (1990)
stated that descriptive codes identify topics, as opposed to being content focused. The
topic is what is talked or written about; the content is the substance of the message. This
researcher used descriptive coding methods because they allow readers to share in the
research experiences. This was accomplished by offering a sense of what the researcher
observed and heard through the direct telling of the participant’s narrative story.
When complex social issues interact, solitary unit coding may not offer adequate
understanding of what is occurring. Glesne (2005) and Saldana (2009) suggested that
coding is most effective in deconstructing complex issues when two or more codes
overlap and are combined to strengthen one’s understanding. To this end, this researcher
used “value” codes in addition to descriptive coding. Applying value coding supported
the discovery and emergence of beliefs, values, and the sense of self that belong to the
study participants. Simply put, value codes reflect the importance participants place on
people, things, and events. Saldana (2009) explains that value codes are applied in
qualitative data to reflect a participant’s values, attitudes, and beliefs representing his or
her perspectives on worldviews. Saldana (2009) further stated that value is reflected in
the priority placed on oneself, others, and ideas. Conversely, attitude is how we feel about
the same set of factors. Wolcott (1999) stated that beliefs are included in our values and
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attitudes in addition to our personal knowledge, experiences, opinions, prejudices,
morals, and perceptions of the world.
Value coding served the current research because, when combined, each of the
associated value elements (e.g., values, attitudes, and beliefs) comprises who one is in
terms of their individual and collective identities. The interest in the participant’s identity
connects back to this researcher’s original research questions: How do experiences shape
and inform identity? What role does identity play in pre- and post-immigration
outcomes?
The third and final coding or “first cycle” coding method used was In Vivo codes.
The researcher used In Vivo codes to give voice to the silenced and honor those who
emerged from an environment of prolonged war, conflict, and oppression. The primary
goal of In Vivo coding was, “to frame the facilitator's interpretations of terms that
participants use in their everyday lives, as opposed to applying terms derived from the
academic disciplines or professional practices" (Stringer, 1999, p. 91). The strength of
this method is the literal coding that is applied to prioritize and respect the participant’s
own thoughts, meanings, and interpretations.
Developing Thematic Text
The final analytical coding step involved creating data themes. In this step, the
researcher conducted analysis of extended data with longer statements that explained
paragraphs and passages with thematic text. This approach differs from the CCM where
smaller fragments of data are analyzed. DeSantis and Ugarriza (2000) refer to data
themes as, “abstract entities that bring meaning and identity to a recurrent [patterned]
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experience and its variant manifestations. As such, the theme in these findings captures
and unifies the nature or basis of the experience into whole” (p. 362). In the current
study, the researcher performed two key thematic coding tasks. First, the researcher
sought out the major themes that emerged from each individual biographical narrative
interview (Chaitin, Linstroth, & Hiller, 2009). With these developed themes, the
researcher then conducted a cross-sectional analysis of the thematic patterns and
frequency of occurrence that were common to each of the five participants. Exploring the
developed patterns and the frequencies helped improve understanding of participants’
holistic experiences while offering suitable depth and insight into the shaped identities
that were pivotal to this study. To help accomplish these steps, the researcher used
technology and employed qualitative data analysis (QDA Miner) mining software to help
retrieve, code, and assist in combing through the mounds of data to ensure thoroughness
and accuracy of findings.
This type of research technique moved from shortened phrases and nouns that
captured descriptive and value codes, to In Vivo codes that frequently unearthed broader
interpretative themes across narratives. These narratives generally reflected much larger
meaning and analysis. Boyatzis (1998) stated that a theme, “at a minimum describes and
organizes possible observations or at the maximum interprets aspects of the phenomenon.
A theme may be identified at the manifest level that is directly observable in the
information” (p.139). The researcher’s goal for any themes that emerged in the current
study was to unveil recurring descriptive and value patterns and identify the common
experiences across studied groups: Afghan Muslim males who had immigrated to the
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United States. In this way, providing well-developed data themes helps readers better
understand the lived experiences of the participants and identity issues that occurred
during their immigration process.
The same factors that make data collection appealing to researchers also serve as
potential pitfalls during coding and thematic text development and design. This
researcher was reminded that researchers need to collect extensive data about the
participants and ensure a clear understanding of the context of the individual’s life
(Creswell, 2007). Stern (1985) stated that researchers need to be able to identify the
critical material associated with the participant’s experiences, separated from the
researcher’s own experiences. Stern (1985) also commented about the importance of
uncovering what he called the “figure under carpet” that explains the multilayered
context of life. Also, active collaboration is necessary between the participant and
researcher, but such activities can lead to shaping how the researcher conveys the story.
Still, it is vitally important that collaboration occurs because such activity undergirds data
credibility. The goal was to reach and maintain proper balance of roles as researcher and
participant. To this end, data checking directly enhances a research study’s credibility.
Guba and Lincoln (1985) recommended that member checking and verification should
take place as often as necessary:
Checks relating to the accuracy of the data may take place ’on the spot’ in the
course, and at the end, of the data collection dialogues. Informants may also
be asked to read any transcripts of dialogues in which they have participated.
(Guba and Lincoln, 1985, p. 69)
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The basic aim of this verification effort was to use member checking as an
instrument to ensure what had been captured correctly reflects not only what was spoken,
but the intent, as well. Guba and Lincoln (1985) suggested that recorders can be very
helpful making sure the words match the participant’s narrative. Also, in this method of
probing into the biographical interview data of the participants, the researcher can
effectively use the interviewee’s own story to analyze meanings, and such meaning can
be unearthed by coding (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1996).
Ethical Considerations
This researcher’s approach throughout this project has been to develop and ensure
an environment that both honored and respected the privilege afforded to him by those
who volunteered to participate in this study. Honor and respect begins with the
recognition that participants entrust to the researchers that which cannot be returned and
can be misused: their time, story, and voice. By devoting time to this research, the
participants allowed the researcher to take part in their narratives, albeit briefly. This
researcher returned their commitment with respect and beneficence.
Marshall and Rossman (2010) cautioned that a researcher should refrain from
using participants as a means to an end. Instead, this researcher’s approach respects the
participant’s ownership of their narrative and the researcher’s role in conveying their
voice and analyzing their lived experiences in an authentic and truthful manner.
Throughout this process, ensuring the participant’s anonymity and safeguarding the data
was a constant priority and focus. Thus, the researcher used every possible measure to
protect participants’ privacy by not divulging any data with names, addresses, telephone
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numbers, or social media contact data in any form that could possibly be linked back to
the participants and reveal their identities. Among a researcher’s most crucial
responsibilities, along with adhering to established ethical practices, is the protection of
research participants (Patton, 2002). To this end, this researcher used pseudonyms to
conceal and protect the identity of the participants in this study. Further, the interpreter
and translator organizations and institution names were not provided as an intentional
measure to provide added protection and promote confidentiality. Also, another issue that
factored into the concern for the participant’s protection and confidentiality was the
publicized use of chronological mapping data in this study. In the data collection section
of this document this researcher addressed Hiller’s (2010) chronological mapping
technique as an enhanced method to display biographical data. However, during the
quality assurance final review, this researcher concluded that the published use of such
data could potentially link a subject to a location, and job / occupation, and family, etc.
Further, if such connections were established, the participant’s identification could be
determined. While the risk remains low given the density of interpreters and translators
who immigrated to the United States, caution prevented me from including the
chronological mapping data into the final published study.
The other component to this researcher’s ethical methods involved beneficence,
or the notion of doing no harm. In this regard, it was the researcher’s obligation to
respond to cues from the participants when they were unable to continue. Further, it was
the researcher’s responsibility to take the required steps and pull back from an interview
or line of inquiry when he sensed the interview was intruding in an area that the
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participant was not yet ready to address. This approach was important because after more
than a decade of war, and an extensive occupation at the hands of the Soviets (in the
1980s), many Afghan people have suffered obvious physical wounds and deep-seated
emotional scars. Following this foreign occupation, the Afghan people suffered under the
brutal dictates of internal forces jockeying for power, such as the Mujahedeen and
Taliban. Due to these circumstances, this researcher’s experiences in Afghanistan have
made him aware of the possibility that one or more study participants could or may
harbor images of a relative, friend, colleague, or even a neighbor who witnessed violence
upon them. Knowing when and how to pull back if these images emerged during the
interview process was vital in doing no harm.
While respect and beneficence served as hallmarks of this researcher’s ethical
approach, other considerations included openness and transparency. Steps taken to satisfy
these objectives involved obtaining permission and approval to contact participant
volunteers and refraining from deception to elicit interviews (Creswell, 2007). Also,
being forthcoming about the motives for this research and sharing how the collected data
would be used was a commitment this researcher honored. Another step, noted
previously, was to share the transcripts of the narrative data with the respective
participants. This ensured accuracy and thoroughness with respect to what was captured
and understood during the interview and transcription process. This act also served to
establish trust with the interviewees by letting them know the researcher honored their
voices and narratives. In fact, in two instances changes to the final transcriptions were
made as subjects addressed transcription corrections and or modified their initial
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statements. Explaining the purpose, goals, and intent of the study also helped to develop
trust while easing apprehensions surrounding the interview process and anxiety over what
was communicated. Finally, this researcher worked to ensure integrity in the project. This
was done by not only presenting the information in an unbiased fashion, but also by
ensuring trustworthiness and by communicating both positive and negative information,
as presented by the participants during the data collection process. Trustworthiness
during the current study’s data collection phase was important, as this researcher’s goal
was to treat negative data with the same neutrality with which he handled data that
seemed to affirm expected discoveries and findings.
Research Quality
Trustworthiness. The trustworthiness of qualitative research is often an issue
because prevailing validity and reliability concepts are not as easily addressed as in
quantitative research study methods. In qualitative research, one must identify the risks
and threats and implement mitigations that guard against these threats to research
trustworthiness.
Qualitative researchers, on the other hand, rarely have the benefit of formal
comparisons, sampling strategies, or statistical manipulations that “control
for” the effect of particular variables, and they must try to rule out most
validity threats after the research has begun, by using evidence collected
during the research itself to make these ‘alternative hypotheses’ implausible.
(Maxwell, 1998, p. 240)
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The view taken in this study is that research without rigor is doomed at inception
and will not be accepted into the governing body of literature due to having failed to
achieve acceptable standards of practice in qualitative research processes. Due to the
challenges inherent in qualitative methods, Altheide and Johnson (1998) recommended
applying reliability and validity techniques in research methods as a way to ensure
research thoroughness. According to Meadows and Morse (2001), strategies that ensure
both reliability and validity of data include ensuring methodological coherence, sampling
sufficiency, and thinking theoretically.
To accomplish these strategic aims, this researcher sought to link the method to
the research question, thereby connecting the data and the analytic methods. Morse,
Barret, Mayan, Olson, and Spiers (2002) called this “methodological coherence” and
stated that it ensures congruence between the research question and the qualitative
methods used, but also helps the process unfold in a linear fashion. In the current study,
the researcher used the narrative research approach to unearth the participants’ stories.
Further, this researcher adopted narrative biographical methods that are more fully
capable of capturing and translating the rich narratives into image form.
The next strategy involves sampling. The goal was to interview study participants
who had rich lived experiences and represent the research topic (Creswell, 2013).
Throughout this process, the researcher remained mindful of reaching data saturation,
which cautions researchers of the futility of continuing when the information ceases to
add further amplification to the line of inquiry or investigation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).
As such, the aim of this approach was to account for all aspects of the phenomenon. This
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was accomplished by developing information from the participant’s narrative interviews
that facilitates the model’s development (Creswell, 2013).
The third strategy adopted in this research was the concept of “thinking
theoretically.” According to Meadows and Morse (2001), ideas emerging from data are
continuously affirmed and give rise to new data and ideas. In the current research, this
approach was exercised through constant member checking and re-validation of collected
data. Thinking theoretically requires remaining open to new abstract ideas and
demonstrating a willingness to make cognitive leaps, achieve information saturation, and
use as many interviews as needed to validate and confirm new ideas.
Triangulation. The lived experiences of the study participants were examined in
this study from a wide vantage point. That is, the researcher used a diverse collection of
resources, including articles, books, published studies, journals, and the participant
narratives and stories as a framework that provided balance and, in some instances,
offered an assessment of the theories and ideas themselves. According to Fielding and
Fielding (1986), this approach works to mitigate the risk of chance associations and
systematic biases due to over reliance on a specific method, and it facilitates better
assessments of the developed explanations.
Triangulation was used to serve this research, as it helped to apply and practice
the premise of drawing from multiple perspectives as an investigative technique. Not
surprisingly, the narrative approach itself supported this aim, as the individual stories of
the lived experiences contributed to theoretical underpinnings, discoveries and findings.
The triangulation technique strengthens the quality assurance efforts. According to
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Maanen, “individual viewpoints and experiences can be verified against others and,
ultimately, a rich picture of the attitudes, needs or behavior of those under scrutiny may
be constructed based on the contributions of a range of people” (1983, pp. 45).
Moreover, some practitioners go as far as encouraging researchers to seek out ways to
verify elements of study participant information via other participant narratives as a
means of comparison, corroboration, and validation (Dervin, 1983). This researcher used
this approach as thematic codes were developed within each individual narrative.
Additionally, verification and validation of information was conducted through analysis
of derived common patterns and themes found as cross-sectional threads in the study.
Transferability. Transferability is the ability to apply the findings of one study to
another and the extent to which a study invites readers to make connections between
elements of the study and their own experiences (Merriam, 1998). Firestone (1993)
cautioned that while no two studies are alike, researchers must provide adequate
contextual data to allow others to make transfers. The current research provided sufficient
details while avoiding inferences and supposition, enabling contrast and comparisons to
other research studies of Muslim immigrant experiences and identity development. This
researcher’s goal was to give other researchers and readers sufficiently thick descriptions
of the phenomenon to enable proper comparisons and analysis. This approach generally
aids trustworthiness and enhances research reliability, acceptability and validity
(Merriam, 1998).
The challenge with transferability is in the prevailing concern that the results of
research cannot be “readily” applied to other studies (Merriam, 1998). One approach used
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in the current research was to offer adequately detailed descriptions surrounding the
contextual information. Even with these mitigating steps, researchers acknowledge
situations and populations are too dissimilar to draw total comparative meaning from one
study to another. It is difficult to demonstrate that the findings and conclusions are fully
applicable to other situations and populations. Scholars believe that, in practice, even
conventional generalizability is never possible, as all observations are defined by the
specific contexts in which they occur (Erlandson, 1993). However, this view is opposed
by the belief that while the current study of Afghan Muslim male interpreters and
translators’ migrating to the West is unique, it is also representational of interpreters and
translators supporting the coalition in Afghanistan. According to Stake (1995) and
Denscombe (1998), the sub-group’s reflexive nature of the broader group can set the
conditions and establish the potential for transferability.
Credibility. A study's credibility is threatened by errors in which research
subjects respond with what they think is the preferred social response; that is, data is
based on social desirability, rather than on personal experience (Kirk & Miller, 1986). As
such, the researcher for the current study sought to demonstrate that the integrity of the
data is based on the research design aims. Krefting (1991) stated that prolonged
engagement assists in detecting response sets where informants consistently either agree
or disagree with the questions. Further, Krefting (1991) recommended enhancing
research credibility by using numerous interviews and observation periods. The
researcher for the current study adopted prolonged engagement methods, better enabling
the researcher to strengthen the study’s integrity. Other activities the researcher used to
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defend against this risk involved peer reviews, member checking, and adherence to the
tenants of trustworthiness and reflexivity.
In the introduction section of this document, the researcher use reflexivity to
inform readers of his background and considerable time spent in Afghanistan working in
a coalition environment that relied heavily on Afghan interpreters and translators. This
researcher’s reflexive approach sought to enhance his research goals by acknowledging
his participation and understanding of the phenomenon. Kielhofner (1982) supported the
importance of intense participation, suggesting that it enhances research findings through
intimate familiarity and discovery of hidden fact. Agar (1991) noted that the researcher's
background dictates the framework from which he or she will organize, study, and
analyze the findings. For example, in the researcher’s experiences in Afghanistan, he
directly observed and interacted daily with interpreters and translators working in support
of the coalition. These experiences were based on interactions across a myriad of events,
activities, and contextual settings. These experiences both serve the researcher’s
credibility goals, while guarding or mitigating the issues involving creditability.
Just as prolonged researcher engagement can be a benefit to one’s research study
credibility, paradoxically, it can also be a detractor. Marcus and Fischer (1986) warned
that a major threat to the truth-value of a qualitative study lies in the closeness of the
relationship between the investigator and the informants. Here, the concern is the loss of
researcher neutrality. The researcher’s bias could be injected into the analysis process
and, subsequently, impair the findings. Thus, throughout the process, the researcher
focused on not becoming so engaged with the participants’ narrative stories that it
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becomes difficult to separate their experiences from his own (Marcus & Fischer, 1986).
To prevent this from occurring, the researcher used reflexivity and member checking as
useful tools to guard against this potential threat (Good, Herrera, Good, & Cooper, 1985).
Confirmability. A key consideration throughout the current study was the
concern of maintaining the researcher’s own objectivity. The researcher’s goal was to
deliver findings that were rooted in the ideas and experiences of the informants, rather
than the researcher’s predilections. Krefting (1991) stated that the concept of
confirmability is the qualitative investigator’s comparable concern to objectivity. Guba
(1981) gave several strategies that help the readers determine how far the data diverges
from the informant’s constructed experiences. One such strategy encouraged this
researcher to admit his own predispositions. Beliefs, underlying decisions, and methods
adopted should be acknowledged within the research report, the reasons for favoring one
approach when others could have been taken explained, and weaknesses in the techniques
actually employed admitted (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Confirmability techniques used in the current research included triangulation in an
attempt to minimize the researcher’s own bias by comparing data against other
participant reference points. In providing details that defined all aspects of this research
process, the researcher aimed to show the linkage between the research questions and the
succeeding work. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested employing reflexivity to uncover
emerging theories and information that were not developed from the data. A different
approach used to ensure confirmability is auditing. This strategy allows an observer to
trace the course of the research methods from collection, analysis, and findings through
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the decisions made and procedures described (Guba, 1981). This strategy involves an
external auditor attempting to follow through the natural history or progression of events
in a project to understand how and why decisions were made. In addition, auditability
suggests that another researcher could arrive at comparable conclusions given the same
data and research context (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The researcher for the current study
ensured that notes, records, and all manner of documentation were maintained and
available for key and contributing aspects of interpretation and discovery.
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Chapter 7
Par ticipant Nar r atives
Explanation. To help readers better understand how the individual summaries in
Part One and shared themes in Part Two were derived, the following descriptions and
explanations are provided. Although the participant narratives and accompanying
transcripts are not part of the main body of this research report, coding data taken from
these narratives will assist readers in understanding the process used by this researcher.
Sharing the coding data also strengthens research quality by lessening concerns about
how outcomes, findings and conclusions were arrived at. To the same end, including the
participant narrative transcripts at Appendix F serves to better inform the reader and
researcher.
First-cycle coding methodological techniques were used to extract meaning,
elicit discovery and to ensure sound interpretation and analysis of narrative information.
This researcher used “descriptive” coding (DC) as a means to ensure detailed
understanding of the narratives. The purpose behind its use was to provide short phrases
about what was happening (Saldaña, 2009). The descriptive codes focused on topics in
the stories, as opposed to the content. The second code applied was a “value” code (VC).
This supported the discovery of beliefs, attitudes, and the sense of self that belonged to
each of the participants. The last code applied was the “in vivo” code (IVC). The in vivo
codes were used to give voice to the silenced while prioritizing and respecting the
participant’s own thoughts, meanings, and interpretations. After the narratives were
transcribed, topics that captured the narrative text were listed chronologically for
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referencing purposes, and to connect them back to their narrative source.

Once all coding was complete, the data was captured in paragraphs in the
first cycle coding section. This section lists each of the three codes separately,
along with their corresponding DC, VC and IVC topic number listing. Also,
observations made during the interview process along with the narrative data
enabled theme development in addition to framing the individual summary
analysis of each of the five participants’ stories. This process facilitated the
creation of shared and common themes found in Part One. The same parallel
process resulted in the development of patterns and supported the overarching
analysis in Part Two.
This process and the research quality control techniques used allow the
reader to better understand what text was identified for coding and the rationale
for coding it. The process also shows the links between the actual coding and
participant meaning. Further, it demonstrates the connections between the
individual summaries and shared themes, and the discoveries or findings
themselves.
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Part One
Themes, Codes and Analysis
Participant One:
A. Themes: Pashtun ethnicity, Tribalism, Islam religion, Muslim, Family, Afghan
Nationalism
B. 1st Cycle Coding:
Value Code (VC): VC1. Lived experiences; VC2. Afghan citizen; VC3. Differences;
VC4. Hollywood misperceptions; VC5. Not paying attention; VC6. Not understanding
the west; VC7. Pashtun history; VC8. West not knowing Afghan ways; VC9. Good or
bad conduct; VC10. Pashtun customs; VC11. Elders and Jirgas; VC12. Protecting
welcomed guest; VC13. Meaning of guest; VC14. Differing perspectives; VC15.
Understanding people; VC16. American helping others; VC17. Policy changes; VC18.
One Afghanistan under Pashtun beliefs; VC19. Pashtun as defacto ethnicity; VC20. Only
Pashtun narrative; VC21. Pashtun worked for country; VC22. Die a Pashtun; VC23. Die
an Afghan; VC24. Western media misrepresents Pashtun people; VC25. Controlling
minds VC26. Afghan and Muslim condemnation; VC27. Working with the people;
VC28. Know Idea; VC29. Misunderstanding each other; VC30. Questioning cultural
awareness; VC31. Normal life; VC32. Life’s effect; VC33. Immigrant; VC34. Keeping
religion and Culture; VC35. Freedom of speech; VC36. Everyone is proud; VC37. Not
judging; VC38. Proud Muslim Afghan; VC39. Her choice; VC40. Male roles; VC41. My
woman; VC41. Male escorts; VC42. Afghan identity; VC43. Cultural protection; VC44.
Freedom of practice; VC45. Strength.
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Descriptive Code (DC): DC1. War; DC2. Refugees; DC3. Returning home; DC4.
Silenced; DC5. Working with the coalition; DC6. Picked Chicago; DC7. Assimilate
culturally; DC8. Growing up in Afghanistan; DC9. Multiculturalism; DC10. Different
religions; DC11. US in Afghanistan; DC12. Tribal men; DC13. Tribal laws; DC14.
Infidel; DC15. Tribal code; DC16. Osama Bin Laden; DC17.British (colonial)
perspective; DC18. Cultural understanding; DC19. US’s intention; DC20. Mixed groups;
DC21. No ethnic differences; DC22. Taken as terrorist; DC23. Taken as killers; DC24.
Careful divulging Afghan identity; DC25. Tough fighting the media; DC26. Changing
their minds; DC27. Complete difference; DC28. American schools; DC29. Can’t speak;
DC30. How it works; DC31. School bombing; DC32. Dying; DC33. Stress; DC34.
Detained; DC35. Limitation; DC36. Deception; DC37. Different language; DC38. 99
percent Muslim; DC39. Only Islam; DC40. Nice Muslim; DC41. Whole religion; DC42.
Knowing Afghanistan; DC43. Women; DC43. Law; DC44. Security; DC45. Practicing
religion; DC46. No different Afghan ethnicities; DC47. Shared identity; DC48. Fear;
DC49. Religious identity; DC50. Source of misinformation.
In Vivo Code (IVC): IVC1. Changes; IVC2. Differences; IVC3. Not being heard; IVC4.
Mixed Chicago; IVC5. Cultural awareness; IVC6. Third World; IVC7. American way;
IVC8. Afghan meaning and reference; IVC9. Pashtun majority; IVC10. British history of
Afghanistan; IVC11. Dispute settlements; IVC12. Seeing events differently; IVC13.
Pashtun vs Islamic laws; IVC14. American invasion; IV15. Proud Pashtun; IVC16.
Working for country; IVC17. Asian identity; IVC18. Sometimes tough; IVC19. Careful
identifying oneself; IVC20. Knowing the people; IVC21. Family background; IVC22.
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Mistakes; IVC23. Mission; IVC24. Listening; IVC25. Not caring; IVC26. Growing up in
the war; IVC27. Coming home alive or not; IVC28. Peace; IVC29. Drones; IVC30.
Insurgents; IVC31. No concept of living; IVC32. Reborn; IVC33. Trust; IVC34.
Mistrust; IVC35. Proud American; IVC36. Freedom; IVC37. Muslims kill; IVC38. Know
the religion; IVC39. Muslims not terrorist; IVC40. Terrorist and bomber; IVC40. Will
not allow her…; IVC41. Culture with him; IVC42. Community focus; IVC43. He is
Afghan; IVC44. Hazaras; IVC45. More proud of Pashtun; IVC46. Stronger in faith;
IVC47. Fear of losing faith; IVC48. Conquering fear; IVC49. Deeper into Islam; IVC50.
Beep, beep, beep; IVC51. Understand each other; IVC52. Better person; IVC53. No
Afghan choices.
C. Summary analysis: During our pre-interview phone call, I sensed that this subject had
minimal opportunities to speak about his lived experiences. He had been silenced and left
without a voice. As it turns out, a pattern of being silenced, powerless, marginalized and
not recognized or respected was an undertone throughout the interview; in his words, “No
one listened to me, people had to listen to me, and I couldn’t say anything.”
What stands out during his story is the sense that until 2003 and 2004, all life
experiences were described as normal in Afghanistan for this subject. In his world, peace
was abnormal and war, violence and conflict were part of the routine fabric of society. He
stated that under the Soviet occupation he had seen so much violence that he had become
numb to it. As a consequence of foreign presence in Afghanistan, he and his family were
often forced to move. Understandably, he projects blame for the conflict on outsiders,
mainly the Soviets, British and Pakistan. In addition, he frequently denounces the media
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portrayal of Afghanistan, to which he attributes internal strife and tensions. These
images, he maintains, are often spread by people who do not know Muslims or
Afghanistan: “These people willfully follow false narratives written by colonial actors.”
To this end, he observed that much of what is written about his country was framed by
“those British”. And he goes further, commenting that “given the multiple wars with the
British [19th and early 20th centuries], there is a hatred they [the British] have for Pashtun
people.” This animus appears deeply lodged into his being. He quickly works to counter
the narrative and regain power by responding that “The real history of the Pashtun people
and Afghanistan can only be captured by Afghans themselves.”
The participant views his identity as constructed internally and externally in a
Pashtun existence. Moreover, this view of Pashtun existence extends above all else and is
underscored by a belief that the tribe is most important. This is evident in his preimmigration identity reflection. The only tribe worthy to hold such claim are the Pashtuns
who have sacrificed repeatedly throughout history for the nation of Afghanistan. In the
more than 13 thousand words of his narrative, there are but nine oblique references to the
minority Tajiks and Hazaras. Conversely, there are more than 60 direct references to
Pashtuns.
Pashtun tribal heritage, culture, and his Muslim being underpinned his preimmigration sense of self. The Pashtun code of “guest”, honor and respect are frequent
occurrences, focus and comments. His motivations to work with the coalition forces
appear rooted in altruistic aims, namely, to help the West understand Afghan culture,
traditions and people in addition to ethnic/tribal practices and beliefs. These factors
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contributed to his pain and trepidation over the loss of Afghan and specifically, Pashtun
lives during the war.
In terms of his post-immigration sense of self and experiences, Afghan
nationalism, family and tribal belonging emerge as key identity markers. As for Afghan
nationalism, this identity characteristic surfaces from interactions and responses with
Western individuals. He states, “I am proud of being an Afghan, but I would be careful to
represent myself as such.” This view is underpinned by his feeling that the West has been
influenced, if not corrupted by false narratives and images of the Afghans as warlike
people, killers, extremists and terrorists. In response to this false narrative, he aligns
himself to the larger group of Southwest Asians or at times to a Muslim identity.
Identity concerns notwithstanding, I noted that the participant wore jeans, a
colored shirt (Western clothes), and a large blue topaz ring on his right ring finger. This is
typical of the kinds of jewelry and native stone found in Afghanistan. He also wears a
black-and-white checkered scarf around his neck, customary wear for Afghan males.
A key post-immigration theme is his religion - the practice of Islam. His
commitment to Islam guides and shapes his authentic self: a Muslim, Pashtun, family
person, and an Afghan. He communicates his fears over these core beliefs - losing his
identity was a recurring issue. And, in his worldview, the first step toward losing his
identity would be to fail as a Muslim. Remaining true to his religious convictions by
going “deeper into his Muslim faith” enables him to remain aligned and true to his
history, culture, ethnicity and ancestry.
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Participant Two:
A. Themes: Tribe, Hazaras, Freedom, oppression, violence and marginalization, family,
freedom, enlightenment, culture
B. 1st Cycle Coding:
Value Code (VC): VC1. Against my religion; VC2. Mixed feelings; VC3. Ethnic pride;
VC4. To live free; VC5. Don’t care; VC6. Hazaras culture; VC7. Blended identity; VC8.
Family; VC9. Two cultures; VC10. Maintain a cultural link; VC11. Keeping cultural
links; VC12. Be a good cultural model; VC13. Education.
Descriptive Code (DC): DC1. Lived experience; DC2. Family worrying; DC3. Danger;
DC4. Help people; DC5. Working with coalition mentors; DC6. What can be done; DC7.
No options; DC8. Hazaras treatment; DC9. Different life now; DC10. American; DC11.
American experience; DC12. Assimilation; DC13. No religious freedom in Afghanistan;
DC14. Struggling to belong; DC15. Integrating into society; DC16. Fitting in; DC17.
Don’t care about tribal identity; DC18. In Kabul some mixed communities.
In Vivo Code (IVC): IVC1. Normal; IVC2. Nervousness; IVC3. Life good, but…,; IVC4.
Take of your country; IV5. Proud of some gains; IV6. Being targeted; IV7. Home; IV8.
Different selves; IV9. No full Afghan identity; IV9. No full Afghan identity; IV10.
Mixed cultures; IV11. Religious freedom in the west; IV12. Children not comfortable
with native language; IV13. Feeling safe; IV14. Tension; IV15. Better life.
C. Summary analysis: This participant seems desensitized to war and the associated
violence. He speaks generally about life and his lived existence as being “alright, even
normal” until 2005. The questions of values and identity are assessed as undergoing
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significant change within a relatively brief period. His pre-immigration self was
characterized as a practicing Muslim, proud of his Hazara family heritage and tribal
belonging. It is this affiliation to his tribe that appears most strident among his identity
beliefs/traits. He states that his focus in working with the coalition was to bring relief to
his people. By “his people” he means the Hazara tribal family, rather than the wider
Afghan people. This distinction underscores a connection to a minority and his thoughts
on surviving marginalization, oppression and physical violence at the hands of the
majority Pashtun tribes because of their ethnic differences. While his pre-immigration
self is framed by his relatedness to the Hazara group, it is equally surprising to hear his
adverse views regarding the majority tribe in Afghanistan, and for that matter, the
country itself. As such, it was not a major revelation to hear him describe his current
identity as a Hazara, or American, not as an Afghan.
He communicates a passion for and a deeply rooted connection to the West (i.e.
the United States) and suggests a feeling of indebtedness for his freedom and welcome
after a harsh lived experience during his pre-immigration phase. While it is possible that
he has come to terms with his pre-immigration self, conflicting comments give way to
doubts. What is evident is that separation from his native Afghanistan has not shaken his
feeling of belonging to his tribal community. This seems to satisfy his need for belonging
and connection to his native home, as he maintains awareness of and devotion to the
traditions, cultural practices and customs that frame Hazara identity.
What is less certain in his post-immigration self is his acceptance of either Eastern
or Western identities. Instead, this subject describes a feeling of being between two
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different cultures. He comments on the use of English at home with his children while
attempting to honor the language of their past (Dari). The feeling of religious freedom
surfaces as another thematic pattern, with subtle references to religious oppression during
pre-immigration, and some indications of pain/trauma. More significant is the belief that
his identity is a hybrid between two distinctive cultures: East (native) and West
(adopted). This hybrid at least sets the conditions that enable safe negotiation between
two cultures.
The last theme that emerges in his narrative and appears to offer insight into his
self-identity is enlightenment. To this end, the family serves as a key instrument as he
and his wife ensure that the children grow up without discriminating against or judging
others simply on the basis of looks or differences. This is particularly important as the
subject made subtle references to being targeted by others in his pre-immigration past
simply because he looked like a Hazara, and not part of the majority. This issue is further
bolstered by a comment that “people should be allowed to marry whoever or whichever
tribal members they wish”. For Afghans in rural villages, such open-minded thinking is
likely to carry penalties inside and outside of one’s own tribe.
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Participant Three:
A. Themes: Fear, Tajik tribe, western values, Family, openness, freedom of religion
B. 1st Cycle Coding:
Value Code (VC): VC1. Connecting to Afghans; VC2. Seeking out other Afghans; VC3.
Religious meaning and practice; VC4. Chooses universal values; VC5. Universal value is
good; VC6. More freedoms in the West; VC7. Modifying your views.
Descriptive Code (DC): DC1. Experience; DC2. Work with troops; DC3. Helping
NATO; DC4. Introduce one’s self; DC5. Ethnic identity; DC6. Help from westerners;
DC7. Religious values; DC8. Challenging Afghan values; DC9. East – west value
differences; DC10. Speaking to Afghan or Western identity and values.
In Vivo Code (IVC): IVC1. Fear; IVC2. Our nation; IVC3. Being human; IVC4. Don’t
care; IVC5. Freedom to practice religion; IVC6. Feeling free in the west; IVC7. Islam is
not only for Afghanistan; IVC8. Religious choice; IVC9. US identity; IVC10. Feeling his
western freedom; IVC11. Going with the flow; IV12. Dual selves; IVC13. Leaving
mother behind; IVC14. Live in peace.
C. Summary analysis: This subject’s post-immigration self appears uncomfortably
positioned towards a non-Afghan, pro West self-identity. He defines Afghanistan in the
abstract, centered on cultural, historic and national meanings. His posture throughout the
interview presented an individual struggling with words, tense, uncomfortable and with
defensive body language: fist closed, facial muscles tightened at times and constantly
looking away, avoiding eye contact. His responses appeared measured, somewhat
guarded and shrouded in reflections of what Afghanistan should be. In these descriptions
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he referred to a society and culture forced to conform to an identity “others” defined as
correct or acceptable. Freedom of choice surfaced as an issue with regard to both
religious practice and societal norms.
The theme of the pre-immigration phase was identity: “Most Afghans,” he says,
“do not care who you are.” His closed, defensive body language underscored his
membership of a minority Afghan group - the Tajiks - targeted and harshly treated by the
Pashtun majority. His responses seemed conditioned to minimally acknowledge his
ethnic, cultural and national being, including his ancestral heritage. Whether his response
served as an outright rejection of his old self, or defensive mechanism that allows him to
negotiate it with a new identity, the language (e.g. verbal and non-verbal) demonstrated a
level of anxiety, discomfort, and perhaps even guilt. Negotiating his identity, conflict and
guilt seemed evident when he stated, “I felt bad leaving my mother in Afghanistan.” This
seems to frame his internal conflict with the fact that his departure meant leaving much of
what he felt was connected to his being. Negotiating his pre-immigration and postimmigration self seems unresolved.
The comment “With non-Westerners you get less help”, reveals at worst a level of
frustration, antagonism and struggle, or at best a past disappointment during a preimmigration lived experience or body of experiences. Given his minority Tajik status
during the height of the war, the potential difficulties are easy to conceive. As such, not
getting help from non-Westerners could mean that Afghans, or even broader groups of
Muslims, did not offer help to him or his family when it was most needed. In his belief,
such help can only come from the West and, more specifically, from Americans. Placed
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in context, such responses seem to explain a pro-Western and seemingly anti-Afghan
stance.
Regarding post-immigration values, religion and being accepted are recurring
themes, along with freedom of choice. While expressing feelings regarding freedom to
practice Islam as he chooses, he emphasizes the importance of Islam over the state. His
view appears more expansive regarding Islam. Alternatively, his view could reflect an
overt or subconscious distancing from his native Afghanistan. This observation is
underscored by the participant’s comments such as, “Islam belongs to the Muslim world,
it is a religion and that religion is not in Afghanistan.” Further, the subject views those
who self-identify as Afghan Muslims as limiting themselves or diminishing their own
value. To this end, he comments, “But, if you call yourself Afghan, you give yourself a
definite value… and that value is limited.”
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Participant Four:
A. Themes: Religious fundamentalism, violence and oppression, freedom, fear and anger,
Pashtun, Islam, family, honor and respect, freedom, tradition, nationalism
B. 1st Cycle Coding:
Value Code (VC): VC1. Among his own people; VC2. Pride; VC3. Hope and aspirations
for Afghanistan; VC4. Tribal responsibility; VC5. Tribal and family honor; VC6.
Responsibility is important; VC7. Family and Tribal pride; VC8. Focus on the group;
VC9. Pashtun values; VC10. Relationships are important; VC11. Reverence for elders in
Pashtun culture; VC12. Equality; VC13. Dishonor; VC14. Family and tribe; VC15. Live
as we choose; VC16. Ethnic traditions; VC17. Individual responsibility; VC18. Core
identity values; VC19. Maintaining relationships; VC20. Respect for religion.
Descriptive Code (DC): DC1. Forced to grow a beard; DC2. Taken into custody; DC3.
Detained like others; DC3. Driven away by authorities; DC4. Knowing the imprisoned;
DC5. Imprisoned for 3 days; DC6. Walking to freedom; DC7. Being mistakenly shot;
DC8. Getting out of Afghanistan; DC9. Lived experience in Afghanistan; DC10. Living
under extremist laws; DC11. Not measuring up; DC12. How things get done; DC13.
Maintaining tribal connections; DC14. Achievement; DC15. Clinging to old ways; DC16.
They relate to their own; DC17. Pashtun stay together; DC18. Equal social status; DC19.
Hardest decision; DC20. Cannot go back home; DC21. Hard time; DC22. Burdens of
carrying for the family; DC23. Freedom; DC24. Suffering; DC25. Our space; DC26.
Friendly people; DC27. Don’t interfere; DC28. Not in Wardak Village; DC29. Family
members correct.

180
In Vivo Code (IVC): IVC1. Bound; IVC2. Leave Afghanistan; IVC3. Not being heard;
IVC4. Being helped; IVC5. Fear of being stopped; IVC6. Never harmed anyone; IVC7.
Importance of God; IVC8. Do not mix ethnicities; IVC9. Marginalized; IVC10.
Overwhelmed emotionally; IVC11. Easier life in the west; IVC12. Not in Afghanistan;
IVC13. Being ignored; IVC14. Cannot acclimate oneself.
C. Summary analysis: This subject demonstrates what appears to be an authentic
commitment to a sense of self that reflects tribal (Wardak), religious (Islam) and national
(Afghan) identities. Remarkably, his sense of self-identity appears consistent at both preand post-immigration phases. The condition is realized despite fear, verbal abuse and
physical detention, along with more overt threats to his life by Taliban officials. What
stands out is his seemingly authentic and deep relatedness to tribe even through war and
conflict. Recurring themes for this participant include honor, respect, family and
freedom. Of these values honor, respect and family are particularly important attributes as
they represent non-negotiable identity traits for the tribe. In the subject’s view, even at a
time of deep emotional distress the tribe is what you have, and it was they who helped
him when it was most needed. He recounts that when he was forcibly detained by the
Taliban for not obeying sharia law (i.e. facial hair not long enough), the response from a
tribal member was “I will try and help you out.” In the end, tribal relations are most
important.
Above all, ensuring honor and respect are critical values for the family. Not
harming the family name or bringing shame is a valued principle. More importantly,
these values extend beyond the family to the tribe. For this subject, the tribe and the
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family are connected. To underscore this point, his 7200-word narrative contains 68
references to his tribe and 35 direct references to tribal relations and/or connectedness.
At the post-immigration phase, identity value is intertwined with his tribal self,
his Pashtun self, and his Afghan self-being. What connects him to other native Afghans is
not only these traits, history and customs, but also the violence from which the Pashtun
group emerged. The participant often refers to the collective suffering “we” have
undergone, meaning that Pashtun and tribal members like him have suffered and
sacrificed for their country.
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Participant Five:
A. Themes: Pashtun ethnicity, tribe, respect and honor, belonging, Islam, family, war and
conflict.
B. 1st Cycle Coding:
Value Code (VC): VC1. Respected family; VC2. Pashtun family; VC3. Mind and soul;
VC4. Pashtun heritage; VC5. Keeping this identity; VC6. Pashtun; VC7. Islam and
family; VC8. Shameful acts; VC9. Identity; VC10. Have to live; VC11. Don’t have
respect; VC12. Own culture; VC13. Keep tribal identity; VC14. Pashtun and Afghan;
VC15. Rest of my life.
Descriptive Code (DC): DC1. Government collapse; DC2. Fighting starts; DC3.
Pakistan; DC4. Germany; DC5. Mujahedeen Mind and soul; DC6. No food; DC7. Father
displaced; DC8. Soviet work; DC9. Killed by Mujahedeen; DC10. Killed bunches of
people; DC11. Mother; DC12. Lose respect; DC13. Keep away from bad cultures; DC14.
Doing bad things; DC15. Sister; DC16. Love New York; DC17. Felt bad; DC18.
Watching the news.
In Vivo Code (IVC): IVC1. Avoiding conflict and war; IVC2. Unknown; IVC3. War
closing in; IVC4. High school destroyed; IVC5. Tribal reflection; IVC6. They killed him;
IVC7. Free country, an illusion; IVC8. Wives taken; IVC9. Torture; IVC10. Mother
disrespected; IVC11. Called different names; IVC12. Waiting on news; IVC13. Life
destroyed; IVC14. Very hard; IVC15. Going back home; IVC16. Passed away; IVC17.
Terrorist; IVC18. World; IVC19. Doors slammed; IVC20. Respectfully; IVC21. Keep
your identity; IVC22. Afghanistan; IVC23. Forced to move.
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C. Summary analysis: The pain and scars of surviving a war are evident with this subject.
As Pashtun tribal members, he and his family found themselves running from house to
house in an effort to avoid mujahedeen fighters battling over territory in a place that
could be described as ground zero: Kandahar province. Nothing underscores the trauma
and terror more than the subject’s own words: “As the government collapsed and an
insurgent bloodbath occurred, we ran from place to place to protect my mother and sister
from rape. They killed my father because he refused to join them… I remembered days –
two and three at a time – when we didn’t eat and barely drank water.”
Through the struggle of war, strength emerged and - most importantly to the
participant - his identity, girded by honor, dignity and respect served and guided him and
his family. For this participant, honor, respect and dignity form the core of his identity
and characterize his sense of self. In terms of his identity representation, his Pashtun
ethnicity is a source of pride and belonging. Surprisingly, the traumatic events he
experienced were at times committed by his fellow Pashtun, albeit different factions
within the larger tribal group. Even an apparent awareness that Pashtun were responsible
for acts of oppression and violence against other Pashtun people brings no condemnation
of his fellow Pashtun. Instead, there is displaced and projected anger against colonial
influences for disturbing the tribal customs and practices of the majority Pashtun. Also
subject to his anger and disdain are members of minority tribes: Hazaras and Tajiks. He
repeatedly intimates that the problems of Afghanistan ignited as tribes began to mix and
integrate. Such references are underpinned in his own words: “There was once an
educated majority (Pashtun) in Afghanistan. Now, people are uneducated, and everything
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has changed.” The contextual implication is that minority groups are to blame for much
of the decay the country has experienced, and that the decay began once different cultures
and tribes starting mingling.
As a majority tribal member, his identity is evident as he asserts that his name,
family, honor and place in society were achieved on the backs of his father and
grandfather. He views his legacy as intertwined with carrying on that heritage. Losing
respect and honor is equated with not adhering to his Islamic traditions, which define and
frame the family, tribal and Afghan national meanings, beliefs and values. Another
component to this participant’s self-being is the narrative that speaks to the importance of
land and family/tribal heritage. To this participant, land represents value and worth, and
this is undergirded by his comments about the land’s importance to the family. This is
evident as he describes his time as a refugee in Pakistan and later in Germany as
“emotional torment. I missed my land, it was hard, my life was destroyed and my soul
was in Afghanistan.” In many ways, land represented not only who they were, but what
they are and the legacy that was passed along to them. He indicates that a successful lived
existence is in Afghanistan, honoring his ancestors by passing what he was given down to
others.
Post-immigration, he exhibits a conflicted sense of self. Negotiating the West, he
tolerates slammed doors, piercing stares from neighbors and whispers from others as he
walks to and from his apartment. He admits to feeling disrespected and intimates that he
feels that he does not belong, admitting that no one talks to him. Loneliness is a factor
and contributes to not feeling connected to his new home. He shares how he was stopped
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in Maryland by the police, and questioned about the car he was driving. In his words,
“Everyone thinks I am a terrorist here.” Partly out of survival, and to counter loneliness,
he and his family moved to a multi-cultural community in New York. He wants to fit in,
but admits that as his family becomes adjusted to New York, that presents conflicts. He is
proud that his children speak and understand their native Pashtun Dari language, but
shares concerns that their competing Western lived experiences will overcome any pull
vis-a-vis the language, customs and practices of his native land. He states that a big fear
is keeping his identity: Pashtun, the Muslim religion, and Afghan nationalism. This fear
is underscored by an internal conflict as he works to assimilate and fit in to his new
home.
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Part Two
Overall Themes, Patterns and Analysis
In terms of common or shared themes and patterns, five attributes/values routinely
surfaced across each of the five study participants. These include family, ethnicity/tribe,
religion, marginalization/voicelessness, and Islamophobia. These patterns reflected deepseated beliefs, attitudes and cultural orientations that were evident through the narratives
during the pre- and post-immigration periods.
Family. Identity issues surrounding and involving family conflict emerged in both
pre- and post-immigration timeframes. This common Afghan identity value is not
surprising to this researcher because literature cited in this study found that the core of
Afghan society, culture and individual identity is the family. According to Canfield
(1986), the Afghan social structure can best be understood by analyzing and
deconstructing the family units, traditions and societal customs. However, even with the
family established as a fundamental value and attribute of Afghan culture and society, the
manner in which “family” was interpreted and the beliefs and values these participants
attached to it were remarkably dissimilar and wide ranging. These differences extended
to individuals, families, and ethnicities/tribes, in addition to inter-group boundaries. For
instance, the narratives of the majority Pashtun members focused on the family in the
context of a more holistic body structure and an integrated unit. In other words, their
individual identities are intertwined and comingled into the family identity construct.
Moreover, the family’s own identity is further nested into their respective tribal identity.
This integration is so established and socialized that the participants’ narratives each

187
underscored their existence only in contextual terms as members of their family groups,
not as individuals. Further, the narratives suggest that individuality and/or uniqueness of
personality is less important and even frowned upon by these Pashtun participants.
Furthermore, the comments about the family support a larger narrative that was shared
across all Pashtun ethnic participants involving the family gender roles. This narrative
speaks subtlety to inter-group conflict issues between the Pashtun majority and the
minority Hazaras and Tajiks. To this point, Participant One stated:
Afghans, especially Pashtun, they’re more protective of their families and
especially the women. In America, and other Afghan groups, it’s totally
different, where men and women are equal. If a woman is 18 or 21, she
goes to get her a job or has certain independence. She does what she
wants. She gets married. She finds her own husband or boyfriend or
whatever. She lives with her boyfriend and does stuff her own way –
whatever she chooses to. But in Afghanistan, it’s different. My sister
wants to get married. As a brother, I have to know whom she’s marrying.
Is he able to provide for her? Is he able to protect her? If he is able to
provide protection, and all that she needs, would she be able to bring that
happiness in her life? That’s why a kind of man gets control of her. It’s
kind of the task and duty of being the elder of the family or being the elder
of our tribe. We are very protective of women, especially with women –
they’re able to be accompanied by a male whenever they go somewhere.
In general because I see different ethnic groups and family different
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standards and everything. But if you go to downtown Kabul, you will see
girls walking in jeans – the same way that they do in America in different
towns. You wouldn’t see this if you go to Pashtun areas, their stuff is
different. I won’t allow my woman to go outside by herself. It’s not
because I don’t trust my sister or my wife. It’s because I don’t want other
groups or anybody to harm her. I need to be with her. I want to be the
brother. I want to be the cousin who will be able to provide security when
she needs it. That’s why whenever there’s a Pashtun woman going
anywhere; a male escorts her. It’s not because we don’t give her freedom
to do whatever she wants.
This belief is contrasted by personal struggles and family tensions as subjects
sought to maintain a balance between identity changes stemming from pre- to postimmigration transition and its impact on second-generation family members. Participant
Two stated:
We are between two cultures. It is getting mixed between two cultures. At
my home and every Afghan’s home in America, you cannot say you are
completely Afghans. I will give you a small example. When I am talking
to my family, my kids answer me back in English. So in that case you feel
that you are mixed because your children are going to school where they
are talking in English. With daddy they are not comfortable. They cannot
answer you in the correct way that they want. They are looking for words
from like, “OK dad, what do you mean?” I just gave you a small example
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to understand what it is being Afghan-American. You are already mixed
and you are between two cultures, two languages and two different
societies. So it is my life experience being in America. That is why I
mentioned that everything is changed when you move from Afghanistan to
the United States. Even if you want to try to keep everything, you can’t
because if you are living in a society you will observe, if not today
tomorrow, you will see the difference in your family. You will start to
think differently.
This conflict of two worlds and cultures is further evident in the voice of
Participant Two:
Right now, my wife and me are always talking and trying to teach them
Dari. Whenever the kids are around, we are not talking in English because
we want to teach them Dari. Somehow, we still have a link and family in
Afghanistan that we want our kids to communicate with them in Dari
because nobody in Afghanistan can speak English like them. So there will
be a language barrier problem. So we want to teach them Dari. We are
talking to them in Dari but their response sometimes is in English. So, we
are like, “In Dari, they call these words this.” They are trying to learn. In
the future, they might appreciate us, but right now they are not feeling
comfortable because in school they are communicating in English. So they
are more comfortable in English.
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Participant Three also shared the difficulties he and his family experienced as they
sought to honor their heritage, while undergoing a societal pull toward Western culture.
He comments:
It’s very hard. We celebrate more Christmas than New Year. We celebrate
Thanksgiving than different culture in Afghanistan. It is just because the
environment, it’s just because your kids goes to school. They talk about
the things they received, what you got for Christmas? That’s kind of so,
and we, no matter what, what you can do, when you live in a society, you
follow the – you’re going to the flow. It’s just like you’re driving the
freeway. When you drive on the freeway, everybody drives 65 miles. You
go 65 miles. You’re following the flow. So, it doesn’t matter when you go
over there, you can’t separate yourself from the society. You’re going to
society and there’s nothing wrong with it. It’s nothing wrong with it to
celebrate certain things that are not on your culture. But just because of
you are raising kids and your kids thinks of you that way. It’s pretty tough
to show your kids do this one. You are an Afghan. The kid says, Dad, I’m
born in the US. I’m an American. How can I be an Afghan? I can’t speak
Dari. I can’t speak Pashtun. I don’t know the language. I never wear
Afghan traditional clothes. How could I be an Afghan? I’m a US citizen.
I’m an American. I’m in New York.
Ethnicity/tribe. The next most pervasive theme that emerged is ethnicity/tribal
identity. This attribute seemed to underscore beliefs and values related to the participants’
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need to belong. Factors such as nationalism and marginalization demonstrated value
differences between Pashtun and Hazaras, or Pashtun and Tajik participants. The shared
belief and values relative to the respective ethnicities and tribal attachments appeared
strong. The narrative comments seemed to suggest that nothing is more synonymous with
this group of participants than their concept of identity framed in ethnic and tribal
connections. Participant Five stated:
What is important for me and my family while we are here in the United
States is to keep our identity. So, of course, they don’t have a problem, but
still they are looking for each other what they are doing. They’re watching
each other if they kept their identity or not. So, right now I have two
daughters, eight years old and four years old. If somebody comes to my
house on special occasions like holidays and that, and they see my
daughters, they were born in America and they raised here, and they are
talking to me Pashtun and to them also, they are surprised. You keep your
identity.
This view supported by another participant (Four) who addressed ethnic and tribal
meaning. He commented:
As a Muslim, love my country, as a Pashtun. I’m proud of that ethnicity as
well. I am a Pashtun – very much Pashtun, and proud of my history and
hoping for the people of Afghanistan, and our own tribe, and our own
people, and my own family to be something others see as good. I am

192
proud of being a Pashtun Afghan – to be a person having a family that has
pride. That I am able to provide economically for my family is important
to me. This is my sense of identity too. This is what I like, to always work.
I hope that my hand stretches not to another person in anger. In fact, if
somebody asks me to help, I will be able to help them. This is the
expectation from me, and this is what I hope my family and children
become. At the same time, I expect from the tribe that I am part of to be a
good tribe at the same time; I expect my country to be a country like that
of our history. I expect my country to be a country that we are proud to
say that I am from Afghanistan and a country with a good name and a
good reputation.
Shared sacrifice was introduced by some participants, and this attribute appeared
to underscore and help explain the strong identity bonds and connections among ethnic
group and tribal members. Participant One declared:
If you go deep into Pashtun history, what we did for this country, for the
land, for the people – you will understand the whole thing about being a
Pashtun or being an Afghan. If I am among different people, I would say
I’m proud of being a Pashtun because I knew my history. I knew my
background and who I am and what I did for this country. We did
military-wise, economically, from these points of view. The Pashtuns or
Afghans did a lot. But throughout the Cold War era and after that,
everything is misrepresented to different things. I was born as a Pashtun. I
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am Pashtun, and I will die of a Pashtun – regardless of where I am,
regardless of my citizenship, as I’m an Afghan citizen or US citizen. But I
am Afghan. This is something that cannot change. It is in my blood.
Finally, being a member of an ethnic group carried for each of the participants
certain responsibilities, which some even termed duties and obligations. Many of the
subjects seemed incapable of separating themselves from their ethnic and tribal
orientations, and equally incapable of divesting themselves of their duties and roles of
their ethnic or tribal groups. Participant Four commented,
This where we keep our way. Let me say it this way. Like I’m the
protector, the savior of my family – the little bigger of the village sub-tribe
– of the bigger tribe, which is Wardak. And this way goes to the Pashtun
tribe. Our relation is the closest start from the very small of the degree –
this way go up and up and up and up. This is something like traditionally
we feel a responsibility or obliged to remain committed to your family,
this is an obligation. And this is – if you are a person that everybody look
down on – you cannot support your family. Or if you have a family of
children going in things, you are looked down. And everybody at the little
tribe and also the village and also – is pointing towards you. Why you
cannot look after your children in your family because we look down on
you. If you say this is my children and my family – you cannot because we
are connecting the smaller family and a bigger and bigger things like this –
we are connected. If your children are doing bad, God forbid, bad thing,
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that is bringing a bad name to our family. People will say this is from that
tribe. So this where our relation goes down – connected like the parts of a
tree – everybody’s either talking for himself. But here, is not like this.
Here you go to the – you know – the tribe. And you are responsible
towards the tribe. The tribe is also having a responsibility towards you.
The tribe even protects you. The tribe tries to protect your children. But
then in this country – and see why you’re not doing this – cannot see it. I
don’t want to do – don’t care. You cannot say this because the family, the
tribal, the sub-tribal and the tribal relation – you know – they’re all kind of
interconnected with one another.
Religion. Religion emerged as the third shared theme and identity designation
among all the study participants. As cited in this study, 99% of Afghan citizens are
Muslim and the practice of the Islamic religion is ingrained and institutionalized at all
levels, including public and private entities of the nation state. Islamic religious selfidentity across the participant narratives is unique in this study as it is the single common
pattern that permeates all identity definition through pre- and post-immigration
timeframes. In this regard, no native conflict surfaced through the participant narratives
during the pre-immigration phase. Tapper (1984), cited in the literature in this study,
suggests that this is due in a large part to the non-secular atmosphere that acknowledges
and accepts public demonstration of the Islamic religion in addition to traditional Islamicrelated practices. The conflict for these participants surfaced in the post-immigration
period as the subjects resisted the cultural and societal tendencies of their new Western

195
environments. To these participants, such secular practices, norms and traditions
sometimes clash with their non-secular Islamic orientations, ideals and beliefs. To this
end, Participant One stated:
I had no idea what the American society would look like. All I knew was
based on the few Hollywood movies that I watched. In the beginning, it
was still that I was going to a different part of the world. What I was
concerned about was my religion, and the most important thing with my
culture. I was going to a different part of the world. Would I be able to
keep my religion? Would I be able to practice what I believe in? Would I
be able to do my cultural stuff that I believe is good for me if I go there?
But when I arrived, the most important thing that I met people from my
religion all over the world. I saw Americans. They were white and
Muslim. I saw black Americans… I saw people from the Middle East. I
saw people from Canada. You name it. I saw people from Europe. They
were all practicing the same religion that I was practicing. When I saw
that, I was real happy. At the beginning, I thought that in Afghanistan, I
practice my religion with my own people. But going to the US, and you
are practicing the same religion with the people that speak different
languages, they come from different cultural backgrounds in countries and
different cultural background systems. It’s kind of really the feelings that
make you really happy and be proud of being part of an American society.
That’s what America is about, and that’s what makes me real happy that I
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am really proud of being. People in here – in general because there are
some stereotypes that Americans have about Afghans, and Afghans have
about Americans. When you go there, you have to do whatever Americans
do. If you want to practice religion, you have to practice their religion.
Islam is totally out of the concept of America. That’s what Afghans
believe. When you go there, you see all those things – the freedom of
religion, freedom of speech. All those constitutional rights that you would
be able to have in any other part of the country, you have in America.
These are my feelings – you are really proud and happy of being part of
such a society and community.
Sometimes comments also addressed the universal nature of religious identity.
Participant One stated:
99 percent of the people are Muslim, and everybody practices. The 1percent minority are Hindus that we have there in Afghanistan. The only
religion that we are exposed to is Islam. Everybody is Muslim. I am
Muslim, my cousin, my father, my grandmother – everybody is Muslim.
The whole village in the tribe – we practice the same religion. Going into
America, when you see a synagogue, mosque, a church on the same street
– you realize that there are different people in this world and how they
could be together in the same place, worshipping. Everybody is proud of
their identity, who they are. Everybody is proud of their religions and who
they are. But at the same time, they practice their religion, and they have
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that love to share with each other – not to harm each other. That’s one of
the things that I went in there. I was born and raised in a Muslim family.
I’m a Muslim, and I practice my religion.
The comments sometimes addressed the issue of religious choice. Participant
Three stated:
From when you were a child and even if you’re not practicing, it’s still
with you. Your name, when you have your name, it just shows them from
which ethnicity you are. Which religion do you have? But something to
me, religion is always for me. Religion is something that’s you. It’s inside
of you. That’s you practice religion for yourself, not for the society, not
for your environment. Religion is something inside you. If you practice it,
you practice on yourself.
Marginalization/voicelessness. While the previous shared identity factors existed
during pre- and post-immigration periods, marginalization was most evident from the
narratives as a pre-immigration condition. While the factors contributing to
marginalization were presented in the literature and theory sections of this research, the
phenomenon was due in large measure to colonial intervention in Afghanistan during the
19th and 20th centuries. However, it is likely that the events, activities and conditions that
contribute to group marginalization existed much earlier, as alluded to by Participant
One:
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I say everybody lives in Afghanistan – they are a mixed ethnic group.
They’re called Afghans by the new standard. But back then, the term
Afghan was first used by the Persians for Pashtun tribes who were
attacking the Persian Empire at that time. Before even the Pashtuns knew
they were given the name Afghans. During the 18th century, the Pashtun
king – he brought all those different ethnic groups from, Tajik, Hazara,
Pashtun, a small Arabic tribe. It didn’t speak Arabic, but they were
immigrants from their long time ago. He brought all those tribes together
under the name of Afghan. Right now, everybody here in Afghanistan is
called Afghans, but that day – just the Pashtuns were called Afghans. For
me, being an Afghan is to be a person who likes this country, who loves
his country, who works hard for improvement of his country.
On the same subject of Afghan identity, Participant One lamented:
The people who do not understand the Afghan culture so far. If there are
things that have been written about Pashtun people, these are either by
British people who were involved in the war that we had back then. Those
British – whatever they saw, write those histories. There’s a little bit of
hatred toward the Pashtuns because there was fighting going on. The real
history of Pashtuns was written by Pashtuns and was recorded by Pashtuns
– by Afghans who have not been studied or been understood by
Americans or Europeans or in general the Western countries. The Afghans
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have their own way of life. They have their own culture. That’s why they
are different.
In contrast to these majority views, Participant Two addressed the minority beliefs
regarding the effect of marginalization on identity. He stated:
When you are born with a tribe you don’t have an option to change that.
First of all, I am proud of being a Hazara in Afghanistan, but if you are in
such a community that is among the minority people in Afghanistan.
Actually, seeing the news back then, especially during the Taliban and all,
it was hurting to see how they are treating you. But, nowadays, everything
has changed in there. As a Hazara, now, I am feeling very good. We do
have opportunities to go to school now. We have a Hazara, like in, Vice
President of Afghanistan. You have a Hazara as a government officer at
state, especially women. We have doctors, we have engineers in there.
That actually makes me feel much better because we cannot say if there
was injustice with us but there was a situation back then that being a
Hazara you had to worry all the time about what is going on when you
were stopped somewhere because it was easy to recognize your face there
to some people. Now I am really happy for my brother Hazaras there.
They are living freely and have more opportunities there. So I am feeling
good about being a Hazara now.
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And finally, in regard to feeling both marginalized and silenced, Participant One
expressed his frustration in attempting to assist and inform the coalition regarding Afghan
customs and traditions. His desire to help them be more effective and thereby diminish
the by-products of war and conflict was repeatedly ignored because of his identity and
position. He commented,
I have to help people. The only simple reason for that is not understanding
each other, not understanding the culture. That was one of the things that I
went in there and I joined the federal contract to come there and turn those
people – “Hey, this is how this stuff is done.” I was able to avoid a lot of
incidents in general and different areas. Here I sat – or the coalition forces
were doing stuff differently in their own ways – American ways or
Western ways. But because I was in a position, I was in the rank in the
position that people had to listen to me. This is a stuff that needs to be
done. As I said about that DLI (Defense Language Institution), those
people that were working for DLI – those are people, as I said, Americans.
Because of my position, I couldn’t say anything. I said – sir, this is my
thing to do it, but if you want to do it, we can do this. He said he wanted to
do it. He knows the culture, and he knows the religion. I told him okay. He
did the class and everything. After the class, I asked him how do you
know about the religion of Islam? How do you know about the culture? I
asked him if he was deployed to Afghanistan. He said that, no, he was not
deployed to Afghanistan at all. I said how do you know about the culture
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better than I do? You decided to give the class and teach the class – not me
because you thought you knew better than that. He said because his wife’s
family background is Afghan. His father-in-law and mother-in-law were
Afghans. He thought that he knew somehow the culture and everything of
Islam better than I do. That’s one of the things that I try hard to tell the
people that – this is why. This is what I do. This is my message for you
guys. This is how we work. This is how stuff works there. In a lot of
places, people listen to me, and they change the stuff.
Islamophobia. The only shared identity attribute that consistently emerged in the
participant narratives was the perceived dislike, fear or even hatred felt by the immigrants
themselves during the post-immigration period. Participant One commented that:
In Afghanistan, I am proud of being a Pashtun. But in America, the
American media complex – it represents the Pashtun specifically in a
different way. In America, if you say that I am a Pashtun, then you are
taken – or if you are an Afghan in general. If you say “I am Afghan,” you
are taken as a terrorist because that’s what the media put it into the people.
What they said – if you can control the media, you control the mind of the
people. The media is controlled by people who represent these people as
we are bad people, people who like to kill, people who are extremists and
like that. But here, I’m proud of being an Afghan. But when in America, I
would be careful to say that, or represent myself. When I was out, people
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ask where do you come from? I would say from South Asia. If you see
from the geographic point of view, I am Asian. I would say I’m Asian.
Participant Five recalled:
For two years, we moved away from New York because I got married, and
my wife didn’t like to stay in Queens. She said let’s go to Maryland. It’s
close to New York. Anytime you can come back. That time I didn’t have
any kids so we went there. For two years, we lived there. You know why I
left Maryland? Everybody was looking at me as a terrorist, as a bad guy.
Whatever happens in the world, I felt like I did it and actually I didn’t do
anything wrong. Even my neighborhood, every morning I was going to
work, and I left the apartment, everybody looked like they slammed their
door, and I decided to come back to Queens.
In closing, this small qualitative research sample does not allow one to draw
sweeping conclusions about other male Muslim interpreters and translators migrating
from the East to the West. It does however contribute to the wider body of research and
knowledge by helping social scientists better understand the multiple layers, complexities
and dimensions of these shared/common patterns and themes that emerged from this
participant group’s lived experiences. At first sight, these themes of identity, values and
beliefs appeared to differ according to majority or minority group values and
social/cultural orientation. Once deconstructed, the overarching themes and patterns were
found to be common across the entire studied populations.
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Chapter 8
Discussion and Discover ies
The discoveries from this research suggest that while not constant, fixed, or onedimensional, the self-identity formation of this Afghan Muslim male interpreter and
translator population is complex, multi-layered, and adaptable. The adaptable nature of
their sense of self emerged as a pattern and an important personal strength, particularly
during their migration to the West. This strength is supported by a determination that
helped them self-navigate the challenging social environment and ethnic circumstances
that developed during pre- and post-immigration. Additionally, the participants, in order
to better understand their environments and to accommodate their own beliefs and
attitudes, used dissimilar identities in the context of their sense of self. Both minority
members of the participant groups shared this distinction. Research suggests that the
Hazara and Tajik minority participants reflected attitudes with seemingly deeply-rooted
and developed ethnic identification, beliefs, and values. More often, their postimmigration identity was 1) Hazara, 2) Tajik, or, least often, 3) Hazara or Tajik from
Afghanistan. The shared responses by two separate minority sub-groups appear to be an
attempt to nurture the need to belong to a common ancestral community, and the identity
responses demonstrate a belonging to a specific tribal or ethnic group. What is more
significant in both participant groups is not simply that they self-identified as ethnic
members of their respective native lands, but that neither necessarily related themselves
to the dominant “Afghan” identity national sense of being. Rarely was their identity
defined as that of an “Afghan” - their birth home and origin. In other words, they each
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viewed themselves as ethnic group members first, and tertiary linkages to their Afghan
sense of being, if they considered themselves Afghan nationals at all. While it is beyond
the scope of this research to determine what motivates these responses, exploring the
themes can enhance the reader’s understanding regarding beliefs, attitudes and lived
experiences that emerged in the respective narratives.
The participant’s narrative themes reflect identity definitions that while shared
across all study subjects, are not necessarily equal to one another. The lesser or less
strident identity definition is nationalism, and issues of trust and Islamophobia impact it.
The more significant shared identity themes resonate around re-negotiated and hybrid
self-identity, religion, and ethnicity. And, each of these factors appears to be influenced
by, and impact social connectedness and relationships. However, before examining the
layers embedded in their respective responses and deconstructing the common threads
and patterns, the researcher for this study addressed the majority identity differences.
The minority participants’ self-identification was framed in their ethnic sense of
self. The Hazara-Tajik attitudes contrast greatly with the majority responses from Pashtun
tribal participant attitudes. Here, the three Pashtun study participants unequivocally
identified themselves as Pashtun first, but unhesitatingly acknowledged their Afghan
heritage in language, dress, and cultural manner. The identity, sense of self, and lived
experiences of both the majority Pashtun and minority Hazara and Tajik participants
showed that taken as a whole, self or national identity designs for these groups are not
straightforward, nor can overemphasis in stability or fluidity be drawn as suggested in
some social scientific studies about identity development (Cornell & Hartmann, 1988).
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Additionally, what this research shows is that the way that this specific studied
population self-identifies is variable and adapting, and these adaptations are 1) driven by
social conditions and individual interactions with outsiders, and 2) uniquely different
across other group members depending upon their identification with the majority or
minority population within their native Afghanistan. The reason behind these differences
in self-identity definition is important because collectively, it can speak to why members
of a whole group see themselves differently (Cornell & Hartmann, 1998). Further,
Cornell and Hartmann (1998) described that the differences in self-identity explain how
people view their environment and how they may respond to changes in their social
circumstances. On the individual level and as reflected in most of the participant
narratives, trust and mistrust are major factors in these social issues and areas of concern,
as well.
At a micro level, the ways in which people identify themselves and one
another has important implications for whom they trust and whom they don't
and the ways in which they interpret social interactions. Decades of research
on in- and out- group dynamics by social psychologists show that people are
more likely to trust others who they believe to be members of their social
group and to hold them in greater esteem than group outsiders, who are
routinely regarded with greater suspicion. At a macro-level these
associations help us understand social solidarity and its limits, to identify
potential fault lines along which social conflicts might emerge and make
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sense of how people respond to appeals to their group values and interests
(Brown, 1986, p. 9).
The results of this study suggest that trust and mistrust were important boundary
factors for the participant group, as identified in Brown (1986). In one narrative, the
participant told of meeting another Pashtun member in Chicago and being asked for help
via a monetary loan. Given their shared ethnicity and common Pashtun experiences, as
well as being an Afghan countryman, the participant chose to trust the other Pashtun and
loaned that person the money easily. In another narrative, a minority tribal member
(Tajik) subtly referred to the mistrust he had for the majority Pashtuns, given the kinds of
mistreatment his minority ethnic group received by the Pashtuns during the war, and
decades of conflict in Afghanistan that followed. Another participant’s narrative told of
not trusting post-colonial nations (e.g., England) to tell the story of Afghanistan, insisting
they held bias because of the wars fought between the nations during the 19th and 20th
centuries.
For this studied group, it appears that trust and mistrust are best understood in this
context if viewed through their post-colonial theoretical lens. As described in Chapter 5,
tensions, friction, and conflict were created among and between the tribes during the
colonial period. During this time, Pashtuns were deemed by the British as more suitable
to carry out the governance roles over all other ethnic tribes and groups. This action
caused competition among the tribes and resulted in conflict. Seeking favored land, or
land that had been taken away, rights and other privileges often pitted one ethnic group
against another. The remnants of these tensions exist today in the narrative undertone by
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some participants referring harshly to another ethnic group. These narrative tones became
even more deliberate and vocal when two Pashtun participants commented in their
narratives that the country’s social problems began to develop when the tribes began to
mix and interact with each other.
Challenging the narrative orthodoxy seemed a major recurring pattern and an
issue for the majority Pashtun participants, and a lesser concern for the minority Hazara
and Tajik participants. Still, all participants seemed keenly aware of the environment and
media images depicting Afghanistan, Afghans themselves, and Muslims, at large. Also,
the awareness of the Muslim religion and social perceptions, particularly following 9/11
in the United States, seemed to dictate different identity-related behaviors, beliefs, and
attitudes. As such, most participants demonstrated a concern for the way the Western
media manipulates the public and project related images and stories.
According to several narrative stories, media images that denote Islamic
experiences and Muslim identities are often one-sided. Predominantly, such images play
on the fears and stereotypes of Westerners, particularly in the post-9/11 era. As noted by
Cesari (2004), the media presents a view of Islam that exploits events in the Muslim
world, characterized by vague terminology, language differences, violence, and
fanaticism. Consequently, the Western perception considers Islam dangerous and
synonymous with terrorism, giving those who need little reason to hate more justification
to do so (Huntington, 1996). Unfortunately, the actions and emotions by a few in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attack demonstrated unbridled intolerance for all Muslims.
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One of the most disturbing manifestations of bigotry today is Islamophobia
– a new word for an old phenomenon. The Crusades and colonialism are just
two examples of a poisoned past in which Muslims were first portrayed as
hostile or dangerous, and then subjected to aggression and domination. In
more recent decades, some have viewed Muslim countries as culturally
unsuited to democracy… Since the 11 September terrorist attacks on the
United States, which were condemned throughout the Muslim world, many
Muslims, particularly in the West, have found themselves the objects of
suspicion, harassment and discrimination. And, too many people see Islam
as a monolith, and as intrinsically opposed to the West – when in fact
Western and Islamic peoples have a long history of commerce, of
intermingling and inter-marrying, and of influencing and enriching each
other’s art, literature, science and much else besides. Despite a discourse of
centuries, caricature remains widespread, and the gulf of ignorance is
dangerously deep (Kofi Annan, as cited in Haddad & Golson, 2007, p. 487).
In this study, the researcher observed instances through narratives and participant
stories that seemed to coincide with the findings on Western migration patterns of
Muslim males relative to how immigrant identity formations are affected. More broadly,
the post-9/11 environment in the United States created conflict and tension among the
majority Pashtun ethnic participants over Afghan Muslim identity. Frequent responses
from the majority Pashtun study participants reflected tensions and apprehensions
involving self-identifying as an Afghan during post-immigration. This is contrasted with
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the discovery that the minority study participants (i.e., Hazara and Tajik), while not
necessarily self-identifying as an Afghan, showed no such tension or apprehension. The
participant interviews and analysis seem to demonstrate that while the present Western
environment influences Muslim identity, the native Afghan land serves as the lynchpin
from which the participants sought to make sense of their non-Muslim interactions. In
this regard, much like family, tribe, and ethnicity, factors and circumstances constantly
affect the sense of self-identity and lived experiences. In terms of these differences, the
minority Hazara and Tajik participants’ narratives showed that their developed identities
do not appear to be exclusively reflective of their native experiences or new Western host
experiences. This is because these participants appear to have developed re-negotiated
selves. These re-negotiated self-identities indicate a connection to their heritage, culture,
and religious and ethnic past. But, at the same time, both minority participants convey
unmistakable reverence and ownership of their “American identities”. This position may
explain the appearance of a kind of disconnection from their birthplace’s national sense
of being and identity.
Throughout the narrative interviews, a pattern emerged regarding the way each of
the participants used or referred to their own ethnic being and sense of self. Collectively,
the majority Pashtun members referred to their ethnic heritage with verbal and non-verbal
language and cues denoting pride, favored status, and ancestral legacies. In their preimmigration discussions, the description “Pashtun” was almost always linked to their
Afghan heritage or nationalism. In contrast, in narratives and stories from the minority
Hazara and Tajik participants, communications and non-verbal indications were
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strikingly different. While both minorities revealed a sense of oneness and solidarity with
their respective ethnicities and cultural heritage, the tone and language was more somber
and downhearted. When they used the terms Afghan or Afghanistan, they seemed to
project these identities onto others, as opposed to owning the descriptions themselves as a
“Tajik-Afghan or Hazara-Afghan.” In exploring their responses and revisiting the
literature contained in this research and other materials, the burdens of a beleaguered
social group takes shape and the narrative responses among this participant group seemed
in concert with previous research findings.
The greater the feelings of exclusion among our respondents, the more they
will identify as Italian-Americans... To the Italian-American, being a member
of an ethnic group produces attitudes that have a bearing on his social and
political participation... He senses that he is part of a beleaguered social
group and is sensitive to his group's status... It also produces a desire for
respectability to be won by political recognition (Gallo, 1974, p. 123).
Appearing content, one of the minority group members found it difficult to
contain the joy and pride that Hazaras now represent prominent roles in key
governmental positions. He went further, proudly noting that there are now engineers and
doctors in Afghanistan who belong to the Hazara ethnic tribal community. When this
response is taken in the context of a majority Pashtun group member who suggested that
much of the social problems in Afghanistan can be traced back to minority inclusion and
their member’s ignorance and lack of education, then the reactive theoretical model
addressed in the chapter 5 (Theory) takes on greater shape and meaning. More
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specifically, sub-group solidarity as related to self and national identity is found to be
largely a function of imposed boundaries when discrimination, hostilities, prejudice, and
social categorizations are applied. This unique understanding offers powerful insight for
social conflict mitigation approaches. This is particularly important when exploring the
lived experiences and identity development at varied immigration stages for this study
population and potentially for similar groups, as well.
Suleiman (1994) argued that such identification among Afghans immigrating to
the West is not uncommon and is a response to the needs of these individuals. Further,
Suleiman (1994) suggested that whether in response to past marginalization, oppression,
or being silenced and without voice, they seek something from the West, eagerly looking
to their new identity even in the multifaceted and confounded pluralist, Western society
for normalcy, belonging, and acceptance.
For this small Afghan Muslim male participant group, sanctuary and emotional
balance appear to have been achieved as they have integrated cultural and social elements
of both worlds. From this discovery, this researcher concluded that the debate about
Muslim ethnic and cultural identity seems more complicated and complex than
previously argued by Canfield (1988) and Cornell & Hartmann (1988). The nature of this
complex orientation is evident in the contrasting narratives belonging to the majority
Pashtun participants as compared to the minority study participants.
In this study, the minority participants appear to have arrived at a re-negotiated
self-identity, while the majority Pashtun participants demonstrated a consistently strong
attachment to their national identity. This self-identity attachment is in addition to the
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more common cultural, ethnic, and religious identity priorities. In this case, the majority
participants seem to have assumed a hybrid identity—encompassing elements of their
nationalistic past, but sensitive to and adopting certain cultural and social identifiers
found in their new adopted homeland. Hechter (1974) suggested that, in this instance, as
identities become more influenced directly and indirectly by family members and others,
it is reasonable to expect identities to become more reflective over time of the new
cultural environment. However, for this participant group, tensions and conflict were
reflected in the stories and narratives as these majority members attempted to reconcile
their hybrid lived existence. According to Lugones (2003), Afghan Muslims use
composite identities as a means to settle conflicts arising from post-immigration
activities. As a result, struggles can emerge as they seek to resolve these identity conflicts
with their surroundings. In response to and in an attempt to mitigate the conflict, they
often select from a wide array of identity categories.
Recognition by the Muslim immigrant and journeyman that despite the emotional
pain, an identity shift toward another definition is an essential condition of an
uncomplicated “self-being,” according to Rushdie (1991). Rushdie (1991) and Canfield
(1986), scholars of Islam and Muslim experiences, observed that such reflection helps the
individual rationalize their new, conflicted self. Regardless of the differences between
one’s pre-immigration and post-immigration identities, many immigrants successfully
navigate between their native homeland identity and that of their newly adopted settings.
Hall (1996b) stated that immigrants must learn to negotiate these differences in order to
resolve their inner conflicts and socially assimilate.
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Identity differences could be found among the participants in this study, and the
researcher found categories that connected and bound the disparate groups. Family,
ethnicity, culture, and religion are the main areas of the shared identity likeness between
the participant groups. However, even though there are attributes that intersect around
shared values and beliefs, for a variety of reasons, the divergent constructs cannot be
overlooked. Most importantly, among these reasons are the boundary differences that
result in a kind of self-identity social struggle. While the struggle and related tensions
seem most apparent among the Pashtun majority ethnic participants in this study, this is
not to suggest that the minority study members did not experience similar conflict and
distress. Rather, the minority study participants appear to have acquired different and
perhaps more effective coping strategies. These strategies helped them mitigate identity
conflict struggles and tensions. While these conflicts do exist, the participants’ abilities to
compromise and employ other coping techniques reduced concerns within the respective
Hazara and Tajik narratives.
According to Canfield (1986), self-identity among Afghans is complex and the
essence of these identities is grounded in their social existence. Canfield (1986) pointed
out that it is correct to view self-identity among Afghan immigrants as a social struggle,
creating tensions between reality and their sense or understanding of what is real.
According to Canfield (1986), identity entails a confrontation between the ideal and the
real and affects both the construct and the contextual situation within which it is used.
These constructs sort events into something familiar, understandable, and, therefore, less
threatening to the individual. To this end, Canfield (1986) pointed out that the actual
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circumstances intercede and interrupt what has been shaped into the familiar. Over time,
the construct is accommodated and re-shaped to fit the kinds of situations that occur
during human interactions.
Another discovery that surfaced as a shared response among the participants is
their awareness and response to narrow-mindedness and intolerance. This issue
accounted for the reluctant and or veiled identity responses when confronted in various
social settings. Repeatedly, participants shared the lengths to which they went to conceal
their Afghan, Islamic, and Muslim true self. Such acknowledgement to non-Afghans or
Muslims typically came well after social bonds had been established in the community,
social setting, or work place. This reaction demonstrates that Muslim immigrants, as
members of a minority population facing greater outside pressure, prejudice, and
discrimination, would likely respond by experiencing greater solidarity with one another
and identification within their minority identity (Bradford, 2008). Whether driven by
media portrayals of Afghan Muslim extremists, bias, discrimination, or simple
discomfort, this researcher found that for this group, identity disclosure to other
minorities who shared similar cultural, religious, and/or ethnic bonds was uniquely
different, as compared to disclosures made to Westerners. According to Bradford (2008),
Muslims in America frequently live and socialize in communities defined by ethnic
attachments and boundaries. And, the establishment of ethnic institutions, as well as
religious and cultural practices, often reinforces these boundaries and drives their social
interactions.
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The last significant discovery involved religion. The research findings from this
small participant sample suggested that for these Afghan immigrants, their shared selfidentity and orientation as Muslim males was supported by their commitment to the
Islamic faith. According to Borchgrevink (2007), for this Afghan group, their religious
identity is vitally important and an essential element of who they are, and in many
instances, crucial to their primal orientations and lived experiences. Anderson (1983) and
Hinde (1999) indicated that for the diverse tribes and ethnic groups of Afghanistan, Islam
is particularly relevant for identity formation. Even though the country is deeply divided
along tribal and ethnic positions, the single unifying denominator above all other factors
is Islam. As such, Islam and tribal customs and practices work together, according to
Anderson (1983), to strengthen and support individual and cultural identity. In this study,
the participant narratives revealed eclectic views and beliefs across ethnic, cultural, and
familial lived experiences. Even with these differences, the participant stories indicated
that the senses of unity, purpose, and social connectedness that link these incongruent
Pashtun, Hazara, and Tajik study participants involve their belief in and commitment to
Islam. Additionally, this characteristic serves as a shared experience, which develops
formations that seem higher in priority, and importance among this participant group, as
compared to other discovered identity attributes. According to Robson (2002), this
group’s identification with other attributes and characteristics, such as Afghan
nationalism, is of lesser importance to their sense of being and belonging. Consequently,
Islam emerges as an essential self-identity characteristic during pre-immigration and is a
key attribute and self-identifier during post-immigration. This is because the Islamic
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identity and faith appears to help these individuals navigate secular social conflicts and
ensure their own temporal, emotional, and psychological well-being during their
adjustment to the West (Hinde, 1999; Piedmont, 1999).
Research Contributions
It must be reiterated that the relatively small sample in this studied population
does not reflect ethnic/cultural diversity, nor is it necessarily representative of the Muslim
male population at large. As such, it cannot stand alone as a basis for definitive academic
or social comparison. In terms of its limited contributions to the accepted social scientific
body of knowledge, the researcher considered how this study’s findings may inform
analysis, research, practice, and teaching in the field of conflict analysis and resolution.
In an attempt to address this, three primary areas stand out as possible contributions.
First, it is important to understand the nature and intensity of the pull from one’s home of
origin relative to cultural, ethnic, and the national sense of self for this population. The
key to position is nested in the determination and belief that a pull toward native identity
may override identity formation from the new host land. Left unresolved, these issues
could emerge as internal conflicts that adversely affect identity definition and meaning.
Second, at what point in the immigration process does self-identity conflict actually
begin? From this area, researchers may be better able to discover the optimum point at
which to inject cross-cultural intervening measures. Finally, research contributions may
help better define Islam identities and the problem’s Muslim men face in Western
assimilation and acculturation processes.
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Limitations of the Current Study
The focus of this research was Afghan Muslim men who immigrated to the West
(United States). The studied sample was small and not totally reflective of the true ethnic
and cultural mosaic comprising Afghanistan. Future and more in-depth research must be
conducted with a larger, diverse population. Future research must also include Westernimmigrating Afghan Muslim women, utilizing the same or similar research question(s)
and problem statement that drove this investigation of Afghan Muslim men. In this study,
the cited literature often refers to the role and impact women have in the Afghan Muslim
experiences. Future research should seek to uncover the lived experiences and identity
issues facing Afghan Muslim women and how, if at all, these beliefs, values, and identity
outcomes affect Afghan Muslim male/female identity. Further, sampling Afghan Muslim
women will serve to validate and test the reliability of discoveries and findings regarding
gender identity formation, and lived experiences of Afghan Muslim men, women, and the
core family unit. Also, while Muslim assimilation in the West was not a primary focus of
this study, understanding how assimilation processes affect identity development serves
the greater social scientific good. While this research underscores the immigration
experiences to the United States, uncovering and learning why some Afghan Muslims
choose to return to their native land, as opposed to continue to live and experience
Western culture, should be a major area of future research. In this instance, the
opportunity exists to learn more about the negative aspects of cultural assimilation and
identity formation by this population. Also, is this formation design the same across age
differences? Meaning, are older Afghan immigrants more likely to self-repatriate to their
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native Afghanistan, as compared to younger Afghan immigrants? Lastly, additional
research is needed to learn more about this population, as compared to the discovered
outcomes in other, broader explorations of Western nations. These studies include, but are
not limited to Saroglou and Galand’s (2004) study of identities, values, and religion
among Muslim immigrants; Bisin, Patacchini, Verdier & Zenou’s (2007) study of
Muslim immigrant differences in terms of cultural integration; and Alba’s (2005)
examination of Muslim barriers to inclusion in Western Europe.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The researcher for this study examined the lived experiences of an Afghan
Muslim male participant group, exploring their immigration from a Southwest-Asian,
highly non-secular society to a Western-style, liberal, secular nation-state. This research
was an examination of Muslim male identity as an attribute that is closely related to lived
experiences, environment, and cultural assimilation. Additionally, the researcher looked
directly at the meanings that this Afghan Muslim male immigrant group attached to
identity through their own perspectives, and explored their unique story narratives during
pre-immigration and post-immigration timeframes. The research objective particularly
focused on how this select group of Afghan Muslim males conceptualized their own
sense of identity and how their notion of identity was further influenced by their pre- and
post-migration life experiences. To this end, the researcher for this study sought to
explore the migration experiences in the context of defined self-identity. As the
discussions and findings in this study indicated, identity, sense of self, and lived
experiences of these participants reflect that when taken as a whole, self-identity
formations for this population are not uncomplicated, nor can overemphasis of stability
be taken as absolute truth.
This researcher was reminded by Canfield (1996) and Saroglou & Galand (2004)
that for an Afghan, identity is not a simple proposition, rather it can be found to be
complex, dynamic, and enduring all at once. More specifically, the nature of the identities
for the majority group (e.g., Pashtun members) appears more blended, embracing certain
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aspects of the cultural, ethnic, and social elements of both their old native home and their
new host environment. This phenomenon is contrasted by this analysis that finds that the
nature of identity development in the minority group (e.g., Hazara and Tajik members)
has assumed a “non-blended,” somewhat disconnected or re-negotiated identity
formation. Put differently, an identity that is newly created and takes on more of their
adopted homeland, a unique phenomenon for first generation immigrants (Hall, 1996b).
The aim of this study was to become better informed about the construction of
identity and its outcome in human interaction among this study group. To achieve this
goal, understanding how their immigration experiences affected the study participants’
sense of being and identity was important. Additionally, as suggested by Hoare (1991),
learning more about the constructed relationship between religion, culture, ethnicity, and
environment helped frame the entire research undertaking. This framework was regularly
referenced and applied in an effort to learn more about the associated concept of identity
for several reasons. Least among these reasons was the examination of the underinvestigated notion of identity related to the studied population: Afghan Muslim male
interpreters and translators who immigrated to the West from their native land. Equally
important, if not more so, this researcher looked closely at how identity has holistically
informed their Muslim experiences in the West and the static or the flexible nature of the
self-identities of this studied group. Understanding the function and interaction of identity
is essential to learning more about the multiplicity, types, complexities, and nature of
Afghan Muslim identities of this research population. In addressing these issues, this
study was guided by the following research question: How do Afghan Muslim male
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interpreters and translators who immigrated to the United States during the war (2006–
2012) reconcile pre-immigration and post-immigration ethnic, cultural, and Muslim
(religious) identity conflicts? This is important, as the notion of conflict arises as this
studied population attempts to reconcile those native-born traditions and associated
identities with the customs, values, and beliefs belonging to their adopted Western land.
As established in the sampling section in the methodology portion of this study,
researchers acknowledge the viability of a sampling size with as few as five participants
in a narrative methodological design. However, while this research study’s population fits
within the established criteria range for the design method, this researcher took a cautious
approach, resisting generalizations from this small, non-diversified, single study’s
discoveries and findings.
The existing body of literature and this study’s results demonstrate that identity
for an Afghan Muslim male is not homogeneous, rather more heterogeneous in nature
and being. Canfield (1986) argued, Afghan identity is complex, dynamic, enduring, and
multifaceted, all at once. This research supports the social scientific argument that when
descendants of immigrants leave their ethnically-homogenous areas, they may assume an
ethnic hybrid, while at the same time, their identities become influenced and shaped, and
over time, begin to reflect more of their new cultural environment. In fact, this hybridism
involves more than gradual assimilation into one’s new environment. How the
immigrants negotiate their past social practices in relation to the new processes influences
the nature of the conflict and tension they experience. Arguably more important, and an
intriguing and insightful discovery, was the understanding that the minority studied
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participants appear to have taken on a “new” renegotiated sense of self and identity, one
that is less connected from, and committed to their land of origin: Afghanistan.
The fundamental reasons for exploring this topic were twofold: first and more
narrowly, to give a voice and platform to those interpreters and translators who provided
so much during the war by partnering with the West and the coalition. Their sacrifices,
like those of the coalition, resulted in violence and threats of violence, retribution, and
risk of ostracism by fellow Muslims, family, and friends. Second and more broadly,
examination of these consequences and the effect on identity emerged as intra- and interconflicts. It is the nature of these conflicts that compelled this research. Beyond these
points, Braibanti (1999) argued that Muslims themselves can be a force behind the way
the West understands and views Islam. Immigrant Muslims may fit that role much better
than any other Muslim representative because this population left lands embroiled in
conflict while also constrained by economic, social, and ethnic conditions and realities.
Their arrival in the West offered freedom from these conditions.
As immigrants who fled from both economic and social tribulations of their
native lands, they are liberated from many of the less favorable behaviors of
their birthplace. They also become aware of the social deficiencies of the new
home, even though it provides unparalleled economic opportunity and
personal liberty. Thus experiencing Islam from a liberated perspective, they
can see its pristinity separated from the cultural modifiers, which have
distorted it elsewhere (Braibanti, 1999, p. 28).
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Adding to this view, the opportunity for improved understanding and increased
respect between and among the Christian and Islamic groups is a possible outcome of the
Muslim immigrant shift from East to West. These are not abstract or overly idealistic
constructs, as some suggest. Countering these views, Arkoun and Bowden (1995) argued
that the potential for Muslims in the West presents an enormous opportunity for better
religious cooperation through mutual understanding and trust. Such opportunity can usher
in the realization that improved understanding between the East and West and between
Christianity and Islam is not unrealistic. Rather, such conditions are achievable and
ensconced in the shared belief in mutual respect and dignity for all people.
As the discussions and findings in this research suggest that if identity is
malleable, fluid, multi-dimensional, and context-dependent, then why should theorists
and social scientists be overly concerned? Doing so is important because understanding
how populations identify themselves offers greater insight into their individual
orientations. What was learned from the discoveries in this research was that these
orientations are frequently established around trust, or mistrust where Afghan Muslims
are concerned. Further, as other researchers have pointed out, people are more likely to
trust others from their own social group, cultural, religious, ethnic, and or national
background, while regarding non-members of these groups with apprehension (Brown,
1986). This phenomenon speaks to the importance of shared history and boundaries and
how non-members of a group may be perceived as violating group values, beliefs, and
interest. This dynamic is important to understanding self-identity structure, complexities,
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and development, particularly for Muslims immigrating to the United States and the
West.
Finally, at a macro level, social scientists should be concerned with how Muslim
immigrants to the West perceive their new host land. The United States and its Western
partners hold important interest in critical Eastern and Muslim regions. The newly arrived
Muslim immigrants in America and the West can serve as an effective bridge, helping to
diffuse East-West tensions. According to Izeltbegovich (1984), America’s relationship
with the Islamic world suffers greatly from misunderstanding and a trust deficit. To this
end, Muslim immigrants in the United States can help bridge this divide through various
outreach strategies in Muslim societies and by shaping domestic and foreign policy.
Helping ensure said policies are clearly understood in the Muslim world, less incendiary
and serving constructive universal aims could be promoted by Muslim immigrants.
Finally, improved understanding of the Afghan Muslim immigrants’ identity issues will
aid their assimilation into the West. At the same time, this improved understanding helps
the Muslim population maintain desired social practices (e.g., cultural, religious, and
ethnic), while adapting to a considerably different social environment. For America and
the West, these actions can support the successful integration of Muslim cultures into
modern society and work to fuse cultural fractures that, according to Huntington (1993),
have inflamed violence and conflict between the world communities for centuries.
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Appendix A. Invitation Letter to Participate in Research Study
Hello:
My name is Michael Solomon; I am currently working on my dissertation research for the
PhD in Conflict Analysis and Resolution at Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. This summer, I will be conducting a research study on the lived
experiences and identity issues of Afghan Muslim Interpreters and Translators (IT) that
migrated from Afghanistan to the US during the war. My study uses the narrative
research method and I will interview 5 to 7 Interpreters and Translators for this project.
Please accept my invitation to participate in my dissertation research study.
In this study, I will be conducting two face-to-face interviews; each will run approximately
one to two hours. I will record participant’s lived experiences during of the Afghan War
and pre immigration to the US, and after the war during post immigration in the US. The
focus of my narrative study will be based on the analysis of participants’ individual
stories of their lived experiences and how these experiences shape and impact identity
development.
Please be assured that there will be no intrusive questions asked of you during the
interviews. All interviews will be audio recorded and transcribed by me, and all
documents, including the interview recordings and transcriptions will be securely stored
and kept confidential throughout the research process. This proposed research project
has been thoroughly reviewed for approval by the Nova Southeastern University
Institutional Review Board – the Board enforces ethical standard in research and
ensures the safety and fair treatment of research participants.
It is my hope that you will consider my invitation to participate in this research study. A
small monetary payment will be provided for your participation in the study. If you are
interested in becoming a participant, or have further questions regarding this research
study, please contact me by email at: ms2165@nova.edu
If you chose to participate in this study, I will contact you directly to discuss further
details of the study and requirements to sign a voluntary consent form that fully explains
your rights as a participant, including the right to discontinue participation in the study at
any time with absolutely no repercussions to you.
Thank you for your consideration to participate in my dissertation study, and I look
forward to further communications with you soon.
Yours Truly,
SOLOMON.MICHAEL.T
YRONE.DR.1072260186

Digitally signed by
SOLOMON.MICHAEL.TYRONE.DR.1072260186
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=DoD, ou=PKI,
ou=CONTRACTOR,
cn=SOLOMON.MICHAEL.TYRONE.DR.1072260186
Date: 2016.06.11 12:19:15 +04'30'

______________________
Michael T. Solomon
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Appendix B. Flyer Seeking Volunteers to Participate in Research Study
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Appendix C. Research Questions

Based on the approach prescribed by Patton (2002), the initial set of open-ended
and probing questions include the following:
1. Please tell me about your lived experiences from your native homeland (2003
until departing)?
2. In terms of your sense of self, describe what it means to you to be an Afghan?
3. How do you think of your own self-identity?
4. Describe your lived experiences during the war and how these experiences
impacted your identity?
5. Please describe your immigration experiences from Afghanistan to the United
States?
6. Describe your feelings, emotions and or thoughts about the immigration process?
7. Describe your Muslim sense of self? Is there a difference between your Muslim
being in Afghanistan, as contrasted to your Muslim self in the US?
8. If you were talking to an American, how would you self identify? And, if you
were talking to an Afghan man or woman? And, if you were talking to your boss?
9. Describe your cultural identity as reflected in your post immigration experiences?
Is there a change from your pre immigration cultural identity?
10. Please tell me about your community experiences in America and how these
experiences impact your sense of self?
11. Regarding your assimilation experience, how did you resolve your identity issues
as related to your ethnic sense of self?
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Appendix D. Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study
Using Qualitative Research Narrative Methods to Examine Pre and Post Immigration
Lived Experiences and Identities of an Afghan Muslim Male Population During the
Afghan War (2003–2012)
Funding Source: None
IRB protocol #
Principal Investigator:
Michael Solomon

Co-Investigator:
Toran Hansen, PhD

For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: Human Research Oversight
Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB) Nova Southeastern University
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790
IRB@nsu.nova.edu
What is this study about?
You have been asked to participate in a research study. The goal of this study is
to understand the lived experiences during pre- and post-immigration of Afghan
Muslim interpreters and translators who migrated to the United States during the
Afghanistan War (2003–2012). This study explores the tensions that emerge
between and within native Afghan Muslim males and their family units as these
men seek to honor and cling to traditional tribal and ethnic beliefs, values, and
customs. The intergroup conflict arises as this population attempts to reconcile
those native traditions and associated identities with the customs, values, and
beliefs belonging to their new host land. Understanding these conflict dynamics
serve as a primary goal of this research.
Why are you asking me?
You have been asked to participate in this study because you have been
involved in the Afghan conflict, and while in support of the coalition you
immigrated from Afghanistan to the United States. You are invited to participate
in this study because you meet the selection criteria. The selection criteria for
participants will be:
- Adults between 28-48 years of age
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- Afghan national Muslim males
- Immigrated from their native Afghan land to the United States during the Afghan
War (between 2003 – 2010)
- Interpreters and Translators working for the coalition
- Individual with at least one year residency in the United States following
Department of State VISA acceptance and migration to the US
- Remain in contact or in relationships with family, friends, or colleagues in
Afghanistan
- Married or single
- English Speaking / reading
- Civilian
- Proposed subjects are willing to participate in the study
The number of study participants will range from 5 to 7.
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study?
If you agree to participate in this study, the researcher, Mr. Michael Solomon, will
interview you face to face and he is a PhD candidate from Nova Southeastern
University at Fort Lauderdale, Florida. He will be asking you questions about your
lived experiences during the war before you immigrated to the United States. He
will then ask about the lived experiences during the time after you arrived in the
US. Related to these questions are inquiries that address how Afghan Muslim
males view and conceptualize identity. And, how do these experiences shape,
inform, and affect their developed sense of selves. And, what values, beliefs and
attitudes do you reflect. Once an agreement on the research is made (e.g.,
signed consent form) the researcher will provide you with the questions in
advance of the interview for your study, and consideration. This approach will
hopefully allow more reflected thought on your part and ensure that when we
meet face to face that you are able to fully and thoroughly respond. The aim of
this approach (e.g., questions in advance and translated copy) is to make sure
that you fully understand the questions and your response best represents what
you intended to say during your interview. Mr. Solomon will be interested in
hearing your stories, your narrative and your voice regarding your pre- and post
immigration experiences. There will be two face-to-face interviews and each will
take from one to two hours depending on your availability and comfort. Questions
will be organized based on pre immigration timeframe while you were in your
native Afghanistan from 2003 at the start of the war. The next series of questions
ask about your immigration experiences and identity(s) issues while in the United
States. You can choose not to answer questions, but if you stop the interview any
questions answered and information provided may be used as part of the
research analysis, and you will not receive the monetary payment unless you
conclude both interviews. Our meeting can occur in a location that is convenient
for you and mutually agreed upon. The requirement is for a meeting area that is
both conducive to the interview process, quiet with minimum disturbance, and in
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a private safe setting. Alternative settings can be colleges, universities campus
areas, libraries, and cultural centers, as examples. If during the interview Mr.
Solomon learns that you are unable to continue with the interview for whatever
reason, he will end the interview. Following the second interview Mr. Solomon
will check the transcripts for accuracy and validity. If you agree to consent, he will
provide a copy to you for accuracy checking.
Is there any audio or video recording?
This research project will include audio recording of the interview. This audio
recording will be available to be heard by the researcher, personnel from the IRB,
and the dissertation chair, Dr. Hansen. Mr. Solomon will transcribe the recordings
into his private password protected computer and he will use earphones during
transcription to guard your privacy. The recording will be stored securely in Mr.
Solomon home office in a secure safe box that is locked inside a locked cabinet.
After 36 months from the end of the study, the interview recordings and
transcription will be destroyed. You will be identifiable by anyone who hears the
recording; as such your confidentiality for things you say on the recording cannot
be guaranteed, although the researcher will try to limit access to the recording as
described in this paragraph.
What are the dangers to me?
The risks to you by participating in this research are minimal, however, due to the
fact that the interview will be recorded your confidentiality while a primary
concern cannot be fully guaranteed. Also, sharing your opinions about personal
lived experiences during the Afghan war may evoke unpleasant memories that
may cause anxiety or nervousness. If this happens, this researcher will make all
efforts to be helpful and supportive. Should you need further help, he will assist
you by providing referral sources for counseling, but you will have to pay for that
yourself. Even though confidentiality for things you say on audio recording cannot
be fully guaranteed, all documents and recordings from your interviews will be
safely stored in a safe box inside a secured locked cabinet in Mr. Solomon’s
home office - the recordings will be deleted and all documents will be shredded
36 months after the completion of the study.
If you have questions about this research, your research rights, or any issue you
would like to discuss regarding the research, please contact Mr. Solomon at
(678) 625- . You may also contact the IRB at the numbers indicated above with
questions about your research rights.
Are there any benefits to me for taking part in this research study?
Potential benefits include developing better understanding of past experiences
that may enhance both cross-cultural awareness and conflict management skills.
Also, better definition of identities and the problems Afghan Muslim men face
during Western assimilation and acculturation processes can be expected.
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Will I get paid for being in the study? Will it cost me anything?
There will be no cost to you and the monetary payment for participating is
$100.00. This gift will be provided at the conclusion of the interview or follow up
questions process. The gift will be via an American express check. The gift will
be presented no more than 14 days after the PI analyzes the participant
responses. All gifts will be sent to the participant’s specified addresses.
How will you keep my information private?
Your responses to the interview questions and the transcriptions of the recording
will be kept secured in the researcher’s home office. Confidentiality is maintained
unless law requires disclosure. As noted, all recordings and information obtained
in this study will be destroyed 36 months after the study ends. The IRB,
regulatory agencies, and Dr. Hansen may review research records.
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study?
You have the right to discontinue participation in this study at any time. If you
decide to discontinue your participation, you will not experience any penalty or
any negative consequences from the researcher or anyone associated with this
project. If you chose to terminate participation, any information collected about
you before the date you leave the study will be kept in the research records for
36 months from the conclusion of the study and may be used as part of the
study. However, if you decide to terminate the interview you will not receive the
monetary payment.
Other Considerations:
If this researcher learns of any new information that may affect your decision to
continue participation in this study, you will be notified of this information
promptly.
Voluntary Consent by Participant:
By signing below, you indicate that
• this study has been explained to you
• you have read this document
• your questions about this research study have been answered
• you have been told that you may ask the researcher any study related
questions or contact him in the event of a research-related injury
• you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB)
personnel questions about your study rights
• you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it
• you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled “Using Qualitative
Research Narrative Methods to Examine Pre and Post Immigration Lived
Experiences and Identities of an Afghan Muslim Male Population During
the Afghanistan War (2003–2012)”
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Participant’s Signature:__________________________ Date:____________
Participant’s Name:______________________________ Date:____________
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent:_____________________________
Date:________________________
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Appendix F. Participant Narratives
Participant One:
Interviewer: Please tell me about your lived experiences from your native homeland
from 2003 until departing – your lived experiences.
Interviewee: I was born and raised in Afghanistan. I was born during the 1980s in
Afghanistan. You asked specifically about 2003 until departing. Until 1991 to 2002, we
were living in refugees in Pakistan – because of the civil war inside of Afghanistan. The
mujahedin – different parties that they were fighting, they started the civil war in
Afghanistan. As like everyone else, we went to Pakistan as a refugee. We lived there until
2002. After the US invasion at the end of 2001, we came back to my home province. In
the beginning, everything was different compared to Pakistan. My life experiences there
and here – the schools that I went to as a kid before going to Pakistan, all those were used
as a military base either by Afghan forces were US coalition forces at the time. Stuff
changed, and it worked out for the Afghan people. There were a lot of improvements
when it comes to education. After that, I got a job working with coalition forces. One of
the main reasons for my job working with coalition forces was to work with them to let
them know that these people are different, specifically about the culture – when it comes
to culture and all that stuff. That’s one of the basic reasons I started working with the
coalition forces. I started with one province, went to another province, two different
provinces. But as you know, I was an Afghan local national, so whenever I would see
people, they might listen – they would not act on whatever I was saying. They would just
sometimes – some people would listen, and some people wouldn’t care at all what I was
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saying. Ultimately this is how it is done in Afghanistan. The culture and everything is
different. But it was overall of the good experience working with the coalition forces
until 2009. 2009 was the year that I got my special migration visa to the United States.
That was the time in March 2009 – that I went to the United States. The state I decided to
go to a Chicago, Illinois. I had a choice where to go and where not to go. One of the
reasons I picked the city of Chicago was I had some military friends that I was working
with, and also some – because from the culture point of view, you see Chicago as a
mixed city. You have people from all different ethnicities, different groups, and different
parts of the world. That was one of the reasons I picked Chicago. I thought I would be
new into those cultures, so I didn’t want to go straight to the US culture. I wanted to
understand culture first. That was one of the reasons I picked Chicago. In Chicago, I went
there because you have Indians, Middle Eastern Arabs, Persian, Iranians, people from
Poland, Asian, Chinese, and Korean – you get people from all over the place. That was
one of the reasons that I wanted to go there and learn the culture before I was exposed to
an American your culture. That was one of the reasons that I went there.
Interviewer:

Going to Chicago, did it provide that environment the ethnic pot that you

described it – a little bit of comfort, as opposed to being exposed to all of the USA and
the West?
Interviewee:

Yes. Growing up in Afghanistan is a totally different environment. It’s

called the Third World country. The cultural, the religions – everything is different, the
belief system. Everything is different compared to the United States. Everything I knew
about America is what I learned from Hollywood movies, but a Hollywood movie is not
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what America is. Sometimes in Hollywood, they put more Hollywood actions and
exaggeration into it. But in general, American community is way better and different than
what is presented in Hollywood. All I had was the concept of Hollywood. But when I
went in there to Chicago, I saw different people. I had Muslims from all over the Muslim
countries. I had the Hindu community there from India and Pakistan – the Christians
from Pakistan and India. The Persians, there were Jewish, Muslims. It was my first time
that I was exposed to multicultural society. It kind of gives you or gives me more
relaxation, and it made me understand every different religion and how to work together
with different people from different ethnic groups different belief systems.
Interviewer:

You stated earlier that in trying to explain about your community or

village or your tribe – you used the term to explain “these people are different.” If you
recall that, can you elaborate a little bit on that? What did you mean by that?
Interviewee: The United States was deeply involved in Afghanistan because of the
Soviet invasion. But after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and Afghanistan
election – United States did not pay more attention to it to know these people, who they
are, where they come from, and what they do. When I say these people are different, in
Afghanistan there people do stuff different. The term Afghan is used for everybody who
lives in Afghanistan, but you see in Afghanistan we have different ethnic groups. They
came from different backgrounds, but the majority – as we call them, Pashtuns – they’re
the majority in Afghanistan. The people who do not understand the Afghan culture so far.
If there are any that have been written about Pashtun people, these are either by British
people who were involved in the [three and five] war that we had back then. Those
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histories are written by those British – whatever they saw. There’s a little bit of hatred
toward the Pashtuns because there was fighting going on. The real history of Pashtun’s
was written by Pashtuns and was recorded by Pashtuns - by the Afghans who have not
been studied or been understood by Americans or Europeans or in general the Western
countries. The Afghans have their own way of life. They have their own culture. That’s
why say they are different. They do stuff differently. Their belief systems and their way
of life totally depends on a non-written code system that came from generation to
generation to generation. A good example that would be if you read the book “Lone
Survivor.” It was a Navy Seal guy who was wounded, and one of the tribal men helped
them out. He didn’t have to help them out, but because of his tribal law he helped them
out. The Navy Seal was there to kill the other Afghans. Either they were bad or good. We
will leave that to the history – who was good or who was bad. Time will judge. The main
point is that we had our own things, our own different belief system, code system – the
rules and laws, how we have this problem, how we solve the problem. We call them
Jirgas. The elders of the village – there that people that take care of the problems. It’s not
like in America, where if you have any problems with the law enforcement – with
anybody, you go to law enforcement. The agency – they come if there’s a trouble. That is
the Pashtun code. Based on the Pashtun code – that guy (Lone Survivor), he thought
“This is the guy I have to protect. It doesn’t matter what it cost me.” So he took him
home. The Taliban came and “This is a bad guy. He’s an infidel. It is against our
religions. It is against our people. He is against our country. He killed other Afghan
civilians and insurgents and militants. He’s against all the things. We want him back.”
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But that – Pashtun is like “No, he needed help and I provided him help. I would provide
him help as long as I’m alive. You cannot take this guy back.” That is one of the tribal
code systems. This guy – when they protected this guy, and finally the search party was
able to go there and locate the guy or send a message to the American, like “Hey, I have
one of the Americans here with me. He’s wounded.” So they went there and found him,
and he was alive. I think he’s still doing good. He’s in Texas somewhere.
Interviewee:

But we see the same thing – almost the same incident when it happened

with Osama bin Laden. When Osama bin Laden – he was involved in the New York
attack or whatever you call it – 9/11. In America, George W. Bush was president then.
They asked Mullah Umar, who was the leader of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan at
that time, to hand him over to America – Osama bin Laden. “Either you provide me hard
evidence that he was involved in that. If he is involved in you provide me evidence, I will
give them to the third neutral country so you can put them on trial. If not, I cannot give
them to you because he is my guest, and he is in my protection.” Even Mullah Omar – he
was a religious leader, and they were opposing strict Islamic laws. But here, he didn’t
care about Islamic laws. He went by the Pashtun code – “He is my guest, I have to protect
him regardless if you think he’s wrong. If you provide me evidence, he is not a bad guy. I
cannot give him to you.” George W. Bush told him “If you don’t give that guy back to
me, get ready for the invasion and everything.” In both incidents, they are the same. The
Navy Seal – to protect the life of the Navy Seal, and they made that Afghan like he’s a
hero. But another case, when it’s Osama Bin Laden, they make that [inaudible] as a bad
guy. What I mean is we need to go not as our Western culture, in order to understand the
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people of this culture. They need to go deep into it. They need to study exactly. They
need to hear this from the people who practice those questions – not from a British guy
who wrote a book 200 years back or 100 years back, who was here for reasons for the
colonization of this land. We need to understand the culture of these people from close
proximity. We need to study and work with these countries in order to understand who
they are and how we can work with them and how we cannot offend them. I know
Americans, they had the right intention to help; but they were helping the people in the
American ways. That here, it needs to be different. You need to understand these people.
You need to not offend them. We need to change some policies and some stuff.
Interviewer:

Thank you. We’re going to move to number two. In terms of your sense of

self, your identity, what does it mean to you to be an Afghan?
Interviewee:

In general, I say no everybody lives in Afghanistan – there a mixed ethnic

group. They’re called Afghans by the new standard. But back then, the term Afghan was
first used by Persians for Pashtun tribes, who were attacking the Persian Empire at that
time. Before even the Pashtuns knew they were given the name Afghans. During the 18th
century, the Pashtun king – he brought all those different ethnic groups from, Tajik,
Hazara, Pashtun, a small Arabic tribes it didn’t speak Arabic, but they were immigrants
from their long time ago. He brought all those tribes together under the name of Afghan.
Right now, everybody here in Afghanistan is called Afghans, but that day – just the
Pashtuns were called Afghans. For me, being an Afghan is to be a person who likes this
country, who loves his country, who works hard for improvement of his country, working
with different ethnic groups together as a unit – like we call it “United Afghan” in
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general. For me, we are proud of who we are. We are proud of our history. I know there’s
not a lot of history written or studied by the Americans or other Westerners. Whatever the
history is present today is, as I said, has come is there from British or somebody else. It’s
not from the Pashtun. If you go deep into the Pashtun history, what we did for this
country, for the land, for the people – you will understand the whole thing about being a
Pashtun or being an Afghan. If I’m among different people, I would say I’m proud of
being a Pashtun because I knew my history. I knew my background and who I am and
what I did for this country. We did military-wise, economically, from these points of
view. The Pashtuns or Afghans did a lot. But throughout this Cold War era and after that,
everything is misrepresented to different things. I was born as a Pashtun. I am Pashtun,
and I will die of a Pashtun – regardless of where I am, regardless of my citizenship, as
I’m an Afghan citizen or US citizen. But I am Afghan. This is something that cannot
change. It is in my blood. The other thing that I would like to say is about being a
Pashtun. Here, I’m proud of being a Pashtun. But in America, the American media
complex – it represents the Pashtun specifically in a different way. In America, if you say
that I am a Pashtun, then you are taken – or if you are an Afghan in general. If you say “I
am Afghan,” you are taken as a terrorist because that’s what the media put it into the
people. What they said – if you can control the media, you control the mind of the people.
The media is controlled by people who represent these people as we are bad people,
people who like to kill, people who are extremists and like that. But here, I’m proud of
being an Afghan. But when in America, I would be careful to say that, or represent
myself. When I was out, people ask “Where do you come from?” I would say from South
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Asia. If you see from the geographic point of view, I am Asian. I would say I’m Asian. I
am proud of being an Afghan, and I would be.
Interviewer:

You get emotional speaking about the subject of Afghanistan and Pashtun

heritage.
Interviewee:

As I said, it’s because people are being represented. It’s sometimes hard –

who you are, and you cannot represent yourself because of the stereotypes – because of
all the other things in Western countries. If you are Muslim, especially Afghan – guess
what. All Americans – they bring 9/11, killing people, beheading people, and everything
like that. But they don’t actually go deep into it to understand these people. The
stereotypes sometimes make me be careful when I talk about myself. I say I’m Pashtun or
I’m an Afghan.
Interviewer:

Did you agree to do this with the thought that your narrative, your story

out there in a true sense can help to address this misperception or misunderstanding?
Quite frankly, maybe it exists not only in the US, but maybe even here in Afghanistan.
Interviewee:

Yes, that’s one of the reasons that I decided to work with the new

[inaudible] head Afghanistan – to change what they had in their mind. Let me tell you,
even right now I had US Army officers. They asked me where I was from. I said I was
from Afghanistan, and he told me [shakumaku]. I told him “Okay, what does that mean?”
He told me “I’ve been to Iraq, and I know that means ‘How are you?’” I told him that
Iraqi people speak Arabic, and we are a totally different system. The only thing that we
have in common is our belief system – the Islam. We speak a different language. We are
totally different people. We don’t do the same stuff that they do. Something that we do,
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we are proud of. They won’t do it. Whatever they do in Iraq that’s, they might be proud
of doing that; but here, we would look at it at with a different point of view. That’s one of
the things that when I had four years of a pretty good job in America. My job’s main
thing was that because I thought I was an immigrant to the United States, as the new
immigrants to the United States. I was born and raised in Afghanistan. I know the culture.
I knew the people. I knew the history. I knew everything about being an Afghan. One of
my things was to get a job – to work with those people who were born in Afghanistan, to
let them know this is how things work. Whatever you guys have is a totally different
thing. What happened was, especially in DLI, Defense Language Institute, there were
people – the linguists or interpreter or specifically the cultural advisors – the Americans
they brought with them to Afghanistan, they were the Afghans who were born and raised
in the United States, and they were away from the Afghan culture for so many years that
they did not know how to read and write the language. They were just able to speak
because of their family background. They had no idea what was going on in here. Or
either the Afghan who went to the United States when they were little kids in the 1980s
during the war, so they grew up there. They went to the American schools. They grew up
in American society in American culture. That was one of the biggest mistakes that
people who listen to those guys. One of the things is I want to change is that. I got the
federal job – even when I was offered a civilian contractor job that was $180,000 a year.
But the federal job that I applied for was around $30,000 the year. This is a huge
difference if you see from the money and the point of view. It’s a huge difference, but I
declined this contractor job. I said “I have a mission. I have to people.” The only simple
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reason for that is not understanding each other, not understanding the culture. That was
one of the things that I went in there and I joined the federal contract to come there and
turn those people – “Hey, this is how this stuff is done.” I was able to avoid a lot of
incidents in general and different areas. Here I sat – or the coalition forces were doing
stuff differently in their own ways – the American ways of the Western ways. But
because I was in a position, I was in the rank in the position that people had to listen to
me. This is a stuff that needs to be done. As I said about that DLI, those people that were
working for DLI – those are people, as I said, Americans. Because of my position, I
couldn’t say anything. I said “Sir, this is my thing to do it, but if you want to do it, we can
do this.” He said he wanted to do it. He knows the culture, and he knows the religion. I
told him okay. He did the class and everything. After the class, I asked him “How do you
know about the religion of Islam? How do you know about the culture?” I asked him if
he was deployed to Afghanistan. He said that, no, he was not deployed to Afghanistan at
all. I said “How do you know about the culture better than I do? You decided to give the
class and teach the class – not me because you thought you knew better than that.” He
said because his wife’s family background is from Afghan. His father-in-law and motherin-law were Afghans. He thought that he knew somehow the culture and everything of
Islam better than I do. That’s one of the things that I try hard to tell the people that –
“This is why. This is what I do. This is my message for you guys. This is how we work.
This is how stuff works there.” In a lot of places, people listen to me, and they change the
stuff. For the most part, they were very successful. Some did not care. But I did my part
to make the change.
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Interviewer:

Before we transition to the second half of the point of the discussion – that

being in the US. The last questions – you may have touched on this somehow. I’ll ask
you to expand just a little bit. Your experiences during the war – you talked about earlier
in Pakistan and coming back. By the way, you describe this area of Khosts.
Geographically, this area – it’s in the news a lot lately. Maybe you can connect it. If you
care to connect that to the war experiences in that region?
Interviewee:

I was born during the war, and I grew up during the war – during the

1980s when I was born. There was a mujahedin and the Afghan local government. The
local government was backed by the Russians, and the mujahedin was backed by the ISI
of Pakistan and the CIA and the United States. Growing up in this area during the war – it
was a really hard experience to go to school and do different stuff. Everything you do in
an environment – you don’t know that you are coming back home alive or not. When you
wake up in the morning and you decide to go to work or school as a kid, you might think
that this is the last day of your life because you see people working with you together or
people who are going to school together with you – you see them today, the next thing
you know there’s a bomb dropped on the school or an explosion or something. It was
really hard during that time. As I said, in 1991 – in the early 1990s when the mujahedin
took over, they started a civil war, so we went to Pakistan. At that time, there was a kind
of peace. We had an experience how to live a normal life. It was relaxed and enjoying
school and doing different stuff. When we came back in 2002 – the beginning of 2002 or
the end of 2001. It was the same experience but from a different perspective and a
different point of view. There was still a war going on, still explosions, still IED’s.
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People were under a lot of stress because you don’t know who’s your enemy and how
you will die and who will kill you and what will be the cause. People are dying. They
don’t know the reason why they’re dying and who is killing them and why they are
getting killed. That is one of the stressors of the people, especially right now. People are
being killed by drones. People are killed by the insurgents or IEDs driving to school are
going place to place in the market or roadside bomb. There’s a lot of stress. If you see the
public and in general when you see the people, they are really stressed. It has a really
huge psychological effect on their life.
Interviewer:

As a young man in this environment, how did you cope? How did you

deal with that daily stress – not knowing you’d be back home that day?
Interviewee:

Until the 1990s, for me there was no life. I had no concept of living in a

different society without war, without bombing, without explosions. I thought the whole
world worked like this. I had not been outside of that situation.
Interviewer:

Okay. Now we transition. Five points left. Now you have immigrated.

However you want to say about – good, bad, indifferent – about how you immigrated,
that process.
Interviewee:

The migration process for me. The immigration process for me was OK –

because I was working for the military here, the military had a process after 2005 or 2006
in Afghanistan in that timeframe. I got selected for the special immigration visa. I was a
special immigrant. I thought it might be some kind of trap that if I go there that I might
get captured by Pakistan officials and get detained in there. The whole process now has
changed. At my time, the hard part was traveling to the country of Pakistan for entry into
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the US Embassy, but now everything is conducted in Kabul. The process is not that long.
Since I started it, within three months I was able to finish everything, get my visa, and go
to the United States. Overall, the migration from Afghanistan to the United States was
like you are reborn as a different person in a different part of the world. Here, as I said,
you just see war.
Interviewee:

Trust is one of the most important components of the society – the best

thing about the Pashtun code system. I will tell you a limitation about the migration
process. There were a lot of promises that were made by coalition forces – either by
Americans or by different countries. “We will do this. We will do this. We will do this
and this and this.” But what happened was all those promises were broken. There was
kind of mistrust between the people and the coalition forces. And, as I said, there are
different ways of doing stuff. Our ways and the Afghan ways or the Pashtun ways and
the American ways of doing stuff. As I said at the beginning, I trusted them what they
said about the whole process. But the only thing that I was concerned about in my safety
was the Pakistan part. I trusted the Americans, but I did not trust the Pakistanis. If you see
throughout the history of the relationship with the Pakistan to the US, the Pakistanis are
always the ones who deceive other people. I think in the beginning that it might be
Pakistan involved in this process – to see who is going to America or what are they doing
in there.
Interviewee:

As I said at the beginning, I had no idea what the American society would

look like. All I knew was based on the few Hollywood movies that I watched. In the
beginning, it was still that I was going to a different part of the world. What I was
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concerned about was my religion, and the most important thing with my culture. I was
going to a different part of the world. Would I be able to keep my religion? Would I be
able to practice what I believe in? Would I be able to do my cultural stuff that I believe is
good for me if I go there? But when I went in there, the most important thing that I met
people from my religion all over the world. I saw Americans. They were white and
Muslim. I saw black Americans that were white and Muslim. I saw people from the
Middle East. I saw people from Canada. You name it. I saw people from Europe. They
were all practicing the same religion that I was practicing. When I saw that, I was real
happy. At the beginning, I thought that here in Afghanistan, I practice my religion with
my own people. But going in there and you are practicing the same religion with the
people that speak different languages, they come from different cultural backgrounds in
countries and different cultural background systems. It’s kind of really the feelings that
make you really happy and be proud of being part of an American society. That’s what
America is about, and that’s what makes me real happy that I am really proud of being.
People in here – in general because there are some stereotypes that Americans have about
Afghans, but Afghans have about Americans. “When you go there, you have to do
whatever Americans do. If you want to practice religion, you have to practice their
religion. Islam is totally out of the concept of America.” That’s what Afghans believe.
When you go there, you see all those things – the freedom of religion, freedom of speech.
All those constitutional rights that you would be able to have in any other part of the
country, but you have in America. Those of the feelings – you are really proud and happy
of being part of such a society and community.
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Interviewer:

You are not asked to violate who you are and give up your religion and

your culture. Your being is nested in those two things.
Interviewee:

That’s right.

Interviewer:

Okay, sir. Speaking of the religious element, that’s a good segue. Talk to

us for a second a little bit more about your religious self, your Islam self, your Muslim
identity.
Interviewee:

99 percent of the people are Muslim, and everybody practices. The 1

percent minority are Hindus that we have there in Afghanistan. The only religion that we
are exposed to with Islam. Everybody is Muslim. I am Muslim, my cousin, my father, my
grandmother – everybody is Muslim. The whole village in the tribe – we practice the
same religion. Going into America, when you see a synagogue, mosque, a church on the
same street – you realize that there are different people in this world and how they could
be together in the same place, worshipping. Everybody is proud of their identity, who
they are. Everybody is proud of their religions and who they are. But at the same time,
they practice their religion, and they have that love to share with each other – not to harm
each other. I was born and raised in a Muslim family. I’m a Muslim, and I practice my
religion. One of the good things about being Muslim – people have a different concept of
it because of 9/11. “All the Muslims, they kill people.” I had one guy who approached
me. He was – I think they call him, if I’m not mistaken – Jehovah’s Witness. They said
“You cannot be a Muslim.” I said “Why? Why can’t I be a Muslim?” “Because you’re so
nice and so good. People just buy one.” I said “What do you understand about Muslim?”
Immediately she said “The 9/11 people.” I said “No, that is not – the whole religion is not
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represented by a few insurgents.” I said “What about the Oklahoma City bomb? It was
done by Christians.” Nobody said that Christians were terrorists. Or the abortion clinic
bombing – that does not represent the whole Christianity. I cannot blame his religion for
that one person, or I cannot blame the whole today is them for what a few Israeli forces
do with the Palestinians or with the Palestinians do to the Jewish people in there. In order
to understand religion or people, you need to study the religion itself. You have to
understand a religion, not a person. There are two different things – being a Muslim or
Islam. You cannot judge the whole faith by judging my actions, what I do. Once you
understand the religion, once you understood everything, you will be able to see the
difference – where the people come from or what that religion actually says.
Interviewer:

If you were talking to another Afghan in America, you would identify

yourself – how would you identify yourself?
Interviewee:

If I was talking to another Afghan in America, I would identify myself

where I come from as being an Afghan, a Pashtun, and a Muslim. As you see, the religion
has a huge impact on the Afghan culture. There’s the culture, and there’s the religion.
Sometimes there’s a huge difference between these two. Religion goes one way, and the
culture goes another way. But still, the Afghans are proud of being Afghans and
Muslims. If they still say “I’m Afghan,” 99 percent would say “I’m a proud Muslim
Afghan.” The religion comes with it. I go by my name, by my tribal last name.
Introducing myself to a different person, and Americans or person who’s never been
outside of America, who doesn’t know about Afghanistan – the only thing that he knows
about Afghanistan and Muslims is about the terrorists. I introduced myself to them that I
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am from south-central Asia. For south-central Asia, they don’t know where I come from.
They have the knowledge of where south-central Asia – all those things in south-central
Asia, like “Afghanistan, what tribe are you?” But they don’t know that. I told that
[inaudible] to them might confuse, but at the same time, I’m not lying to them. At the
same time, based on his stereotypes that has limited knowledge and information about
Afghanistan, I’m not making myself – according to him – a terrorist, like “I’m a terrorist.
I’m a bomber.”
Interviewer:

And the media portrayed it.

Interviewee:

Yes.

Interviewer:

To an Afghan woman, how would you introduce yourself? The same? Is it

different?
Interviewee:

It’s just tribal. It’s the same. Afghans, especially Pashtun, they’re more

protective of their women. In America, it’s totally different than Afghanistan, where men
and women are equal. If a woman is 18 or 21, she goes to get her a job or has certain
independence. She does what she wants. She gets married. She finds her own husband or
boyfriend or whatever. She lives with her boyfriend and does stuff her own way –
whatever she chooses to. But in Afghanistan, it’s different. My sister wants to get
married. As a brother, I have to know who she’s marrying. Is he able to provide for her?
Is he able to protect her? If he is able to provide protection, and all that she needs, would
she be able to bring that happiness in her life? That’s why a kind of man gets control of
her, not control. It’s kind of the charge of being the elder of the family or being the elder
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of our tribe. We are very protective of women, especially with women – they’re able to
be accompanied by a male whenever they go somewhere.
Interviewee:

Yes, tribal law. In general because I see different ethnic groups, everybody

has different standards and everything. But if you go to downtown Kabul, you will see
girls walking in jeans – the same way that they do in America in different towns. You
wouldn’t see the difference. If you go to a Pashtun area, their stuff is different. I won’t
allow my woman to go outside by herself. It’s not because I don’t trust my sister or my
wife. It’s because I don’t want anybody to harm her. I need to be with her. I want to be
the brother. I want to be the cousin who will be able to provide security when she needs
it. That’s why whenever there’s a Pashtun woman going anywhere, she is escorted by a
male. It’s not because we don’t give her the freedom to do whatever she wants.
Interviewer: Can you speak to your cultural sense of self?
Interviewee:

There were different occasions, especially a cultural thing or on the

religious things – in America, we dress differently. You go in dress differently. You dress
like a Western man. Everything is different. One day we had this cultural day, as I said.
The people that I was working with, there were people from all different backgrounds,
from different countries. I was the only one – because we had food and all kinds of stuff
to show to the local community who we are in what we do. I was the one who dressed up
completely based on my culture. I had the turban. I had the white Afghan dress, and I had
the head wear. I had everything from head to toe. I was definitely – I just totally
differently. Everybody was like “Where you from? What you do there?” The whole focus
of the whole community meeting I think was on me and why this guy is different.
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For me, I didn’t see the difference. I didn’t say “He is Pashtun, and he is Tajik.” But in
Chicago, an Afghan that I never met him, he was an Afghan. He was my brother for me.
It was a little bit different in Chicago that – it was a different culture that would bring
together in the Muslim community. You would see people from Pakistan, Punjab, India,
and different places – India, Iran, and the Arab countries. Everybody has their own
culture. There were a lot of Afghans there. The only few Afghans that I knew were
Hazara, but they were good people living in Chicago. I saw a few Tajik people. I did not
meet any people from Pashtun tribes, and the only Pashtuns I saw were from Pakistan.
They were from across the border. Overall, to me they were still part Afghans. I am more
proud of being a Pashtun than being an Afghan. It started with my family. I’m proud to
be who I am, and I brought up my family. To the cousin, to the tribe. In other tribes, I go
by my tribe name. “This is who you are. This is who I am. I go by tribes.” When I was
out of Afghanistan, I didn’t look for Pashtuns. I was being proud of an Afghan identity. I
am Afghan. That was all it meant for me at that time. He had the same thing that he had
to leave Afghanistan because of the war, and they came to Pakistan as a refugee. We
shared all those things. Coming back to my province – because of my father, he has a job
in law enforcement here in Afghanistan. His job – he moved to Kabul.
Interviewee:

In Afghanistan, I see an Islamic society and Islamic community when I

was born, but then when I moved to America I had that kind of fear. Would I be able to
maintain my religion? Would I be able to practice my religion? Being exposed to all
those religions, they are different places in different communities; make me a stronger
believer in my face. It makes me go deeper into my faith. It makes me study my faith. At
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the beginning, the only religion I was exposed to was Hinduism. The Hindu that we had
in Afghanistan, they practice different religions when it comes to religion, but they share
the same exact culture with us – especially within the provinces. They speak my
language. The only thing is a different religion. I had no idea about Buddhism or Judaism
or Christianity or atheist or all those kinds. I was exposed to that. At the beginning, I felt
like I would lose, but when I saw people with different ways, it made me think. It made
me believe and my religion from a different perspective.
Interviewer:

And get deeper in your faith.

Interviewee:

Yes, to see it from a different perspective what other people think and

what my religion says. In Afghanistan, everybody here is a Muslim. My cousin of is a
Muslim. My whole villages in Muslim and everybody around me is Muslim. We didn’t
have the fear of losing it. But going to America, it makes you more protected or makes
you more determined to go deeply into religion to make sure you understand completely
who you are and what you practice and what you do because you have that fear.
Interviewee:

It might be different for other people. I have seen Afghans that they

migrated a long time ago to the United States are different countries. They completely
lost their religious identity, and they were totally lost in who they were and who they are
right now. But there are other people that when they go in there – as I said, based on my
culture, we are very protective of our stuff – our properties, our beliefs, our morals, our
way of life. As a Pashtun, when you go there – because I had a concern that “Let me see
what they think about me and who exactly I am in order to understand myself as a
Muslim. I need to go deeper and deeper and deeper in Islam to understand what they
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think.” There were a lot of stereotypes. Let me tell you – a friend, he was from Morocco.
We were training in one place, South Carolina. Whenever that guy would come, the other
guys – when he was walking toward the group of other people who were Muslim
Americans, they would be like “Beep, beep, beep,” like this guy is going to explode
himself, he’s a suicide bomber that’s coming. It was kind of a joke on that guy, and that
guy was a guy who gave up on everything – like “This is not who I am, but these people
do.” He would introduce himself like a different person. There are a lot of Jewish people
in Morocco – he wouldn’t say “I’m a Muslim.” He would say “I’m Jewish.” In the
beginning, I didn’t have a similar experience like he did. I said “This is who I am. This is
what I practice.” I told him from the beginning “If your source of information is from
Western media, specifically CNN and Fox news, you are wrong. In order to say all those
things, give me the source quote from a book or different point of view – not from the
media industrial complex. One of the things in America, they bring all the people from
different communities and different backgrounds. The most important thing is to
understand each other. That is the most important thing – that you do not listen to what
the media says. As I see for myself today, I am a better Muslim. I am a better Pashtun and
Afghan then I was a few years back before my migration to the United States. It made me
a better person than I was before.
Interviewer: Thank you.
End.
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Participant Two:
Interviewer: Please tell me about your lived from your native homeland in Afghanistan.
Interviewee: In Afghanistan, I actually used to live in there for a long time but since
2003, because my job was with the United States Army back in Kandahar and my family
was in Kabul. Living experience was all right until 2005. At the end of 2005, there was
little bit problem. My family was worrying me about me travelling from home to work
and from work to home. Because of my job, my life was always in danger. Until 2005,
the life and everything was normal. I was just going to work and come back home. Life
was normal but there was always a little bit nervousness because of the security risk in
Afghanistan and I got my SIV visa at the starting of 2006. That changed my life. I had
my junior high school education there. Life experience was good but because of the
security situation in Afghanistan, I was always worrying about what is happening with
my family and me.
Interviewer: May I ask you, please, can you explain what your feelings were as a Muslim
supporting the coalition? Can you elaborate or discuss your feelings at that point of time?
Interviewee: To be honest, I was-- As a Muslim, I felt it was my job to help the people in
Afghanistan. I know it, as an educated guy; at least in high school I learnt how to actually
help my people there and how to help my family. Actually I was working with the
mentors of the Afghan National Army. It was my every day experience. I was
experiencing how the mentors were trying to teach the Afghan people how to take care of
your country. I was feeling really good that I was at least on the right side to help
country. At the same time, I did not feel like I was doing something against my religion
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as a Muslim. First of all, I was a Muslim but I never thought that I was doing something
wrong because I was helping my people, my country and the Afghan army. So I was
feeling good.
Interviewer: In terms of your sense of self, that is to say who you viewed yourself as; can
you please talk a little bit about what it means to be an Afghan?
Interviewee: Being an Afghan is a good feeling but the only problem is what you can do
for your country as an Afghan. It was really important for me. Actually taking this step to
and my goal was to help my people in there and also my family. So being an Afghan
actually feels good but sometimes you feel something is wrong with the community you
are trying to help. I hope it is not going on the different side but as an Afghan the feeling
was good.
Interviewer: Would you take that same question, since you yourself identified in the
questionnaire as a Hazara, what then are the self beliefs in terms of how it feels to be an
Azhara?
Interviewee: When you are born with a tribe you don’t have an option to change that.
First of all, I am proud of being a Hazara in Afghanistan but if you are in such a
community that is among the minority people in Afghanistan - actually seeing the news
back then, especially during the Taliban and all, it was hurting to see how they are
treating you. But, nowadays, everything has changed in there. As an Hazara, now, I am
feeling very good. We do have opportunities to go to the schools. We have a Hazara, like
in, Vice President of Afghanistan. You have a Hazara as a government officer at state,
especially women. We have doctors, we have engineers in there. That actually makes me
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feel much better because we cannot say if there was injustice with us but there was a
situation back then that being a Hazara you had to worry all the time about what is going
on when you were stopped somewhere because it was easy to recognize your face there
to some people. Now I am really happy for my brother Hazaras there. They are living
freely and have more opportunities there. So I am feeling good about being a Hazara
now. Everything has changed now. I am in the States, so my life is different now. When I
go back there, we actually talk about how it is in United States. In United States, you are
American. My life has changed. When I enter United States, I am an American. They are
saying, “You are from Afghanistan.” So they don’t care about who I am but I am
American now.
Interviewer: So you identify yourself as an American or... complete that.
Interviewee: My identity now has changed. I feel more American than Afghan because I
am seeing my future and my family’s future in United States. We are all citizens of
United States. It has changed. We have an Afghan community. We also have our own
culture. We follow up all these Muslim festivals like Eid, New Year and all kind of
festivals but at the same time I am an American. I am thinking more about being an
American now because my life, family, children and everybody is in United States. So
my home is here in the USA.
Interviewer: Within your community, when you meet a fellow Afghan, how do you
identify yourself in that community and in that setting?
Interviewee: When we are seeing, to be honest, we seeing each other as an AfghanAmerican. We have some traditional Afghan culture with us. We greet the family group
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as Afghan but at same time we are Afghan Americans because we are in the United
States. Something has changed. We don’t care about lots of stuff that we do cared about
there like who are you, you are Hazara, you are this and that. We just greet as an Afghan
community. We respect each other as a Afghan-American because only the value, when
you are going outside of Afghanistan, feeling is that there will be separation of who are
you basically. Are you a Hazara? We are greeting all the time as Afghans. If there is
wedding, or if there is a funeral, we don’t care about who or where he is from
Afghanistan. We just respect that family as Afghan and we do Afghan stuff that we are
doing there. Marriage style and everything has changed over there because of the culture.
We are between two cultures. It is getting mixed between two cultures. At my home and
every Afghan’s home, you cannot say you are completely Afghans. I will give you a
small example. When I am talking to family, my kids answer me back in English. So in
that case you feel that you are mixed because your children are going to school where
they are talking in English. With daddy they are not comfortable. They cannot answer
you in the correct way that they want. They are looking for words from like, “Ok dad,
what do you mean?” I just gave you a small example to understand what it is being
Afghan-American. You are already mixed and you are between two cultures, two
languages and two different societies. So it is my life experience being in America. That
is why I mentioned that everything is changed when you move from Afghanistan to
United States. Even if you want to try to keep everything, you can’t because if you are
living in a society you will observe, if not today tomorrow you will see the difference in
your family. You will start to think differently. It is not religion wise. Religion wise, I am
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going to the mosque more freely than when I was in Afghanistan. In United States, you
can go to the mosque whenever you want and nobody can stop you. In United States, it is
freedom of religion. You want to go or you don’t want to go is up to you. So I am not
talking about religion because I feel greater freedom in United States than in Afghanistan.
The mosque doors are open 24 hours and you can go and pray anytime, nobody can stop
you. So that was the religion part.
Interviewer: Can I ask this, since we are on the theme of United States, with regards to
identifying yourself within the Afghan community...? What if you are outside of the
Afghan community? What when you meet an American boss or a friend on a street? How
would you identify yourself?
Interviewee: Actually in the first year, wherever I go, because I was new and there were a
lot of changes in my life that it was a culture shock. In the first six months, you feel like
you are in a new country and you don’t belong here. Then you start feel like you are
American and this is your hometown. Now whatever is happening in this is country is
affecting your life too. Then you start feeling like you are more American. When you see
an American you can feel that he is my neighbor and we are on the same society. While
going to school on seeing the teacher of your kids, you feel like we are same and belong
to the same society. We feel like you are American.
Interviewer: You referenced school with your kids. In your home, is Dari spoken. Is it the
majority language or is it English that is spoken?
Interviewee: Right now, my wife and me are always talking and trying to teach them
Dari. Whenever the kids are around we are not talking in English because we want to
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teach them Dari. Somehow, we still have a link and family in Afghanistan that we want
our kids to communicate with them in Dari because nobody in Afghanistan can speak
English like them. So there will be a language barrier problem. So we want to teach them
Dari. We are talking to them in Dari but their response sometimes is in English. So, we
are like, “In Dari, they call these words this.” They are trying to learn. In the future they
might appreciate us but right now they are not feeling comfortable because in school they
are communicating in English. So they are much comfortable in English. That’s my idea.
Sometimes I tell my family, “Yeah let them talk in English because the society
requirement is.... They can solve their problem with the language. We cannot force them.
We will just try to teach them.”
Interviewer: Do you find or is there a difficulty in trying to maintain that balance? For
example, the kids in the social setting--You brought up language, they speak in English.
Coming home or coming into your home and balancing that, trying to respect honor and
holding onto the heritage.
Interviewee: Actually that’s a good question. I want to explain that a little bit. The
Afghan community, when we have a gathering as a party or when we see my uncles and
their family that helps a lot to keep the culture of Afghanistan. They will know about how
the Afghans are meeting each other. So just we are teaching to our kids what out
background behavior is. What you are seeing is what we do back in Afghanistan. So that
helps a lot. So no, it’s not difficult to maintain that because you have all the opportunities
over there, must be easier but still you have some time to catch everything with the
culture. In every culture there is something good and something bad. Whatever is not
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good, we don’t want to touch that. We want the theme of the culture to be as good
Afghan-American.
Interviewer: In the mid-western community, you mentioned the afghan community, are
there differences?
Interviewee: Basically, we see all around. We have some Hazara families also and we
have also other ethnic groups. Whenever we see each other at the park, like playing
volleyball, there are no differences. Whenever you are going to one community, there is
an Afghan wedding party. There is everybody over there. You will see Afghans. You like
to be there because it is not a big community but a small community of Afghans. So
whenever you are going to a mosque, you will see everybody, all the Afghans.
Interviewer: Now, contrast that in Afghan. Your native community - is it all one tribe or
mixed? Some mixing in the big cities but not in the tribes.
Interviewer: But in the rural areas, you will still see...
Interviewee: It’s still the same there.
Interviewer: Is there anything that we have omitted that you would like to discuss?
Interviewee: I am not saying that there is a bad community in Afghanistan. It is not like
that but the lifestyle is different. It is very different. If your kids are going to school in
Kabul, you will be thinking about what is going to happen. There might be suicide
attacks, there might be a bomb but now, in US, I feel like they are safe in the US. They
are going to school and I am pretty sure they will have good high education. They are
safe. My family is safe. There is nothing that is bothering me regarding their safety. I am
taking good care of them. I drop them to school and talk to the teacher to make sure that
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they are doing. In Afghanistan, if you have one challenge there is another challenge there.
In there, safety is a challenge. You are trying to keep yourself and your family safe from
accidents that happen outside like suicide attacks, kidnaps, etc. In United States there is a
goal – you have to work hard to achieve your goals to provide a good life for your family.
So goals have changed but you are still trying your best to keep your family happy. In
there, there was a lot of tension. If you have a job, it is good but safety is still a big
question for your family and for you because you are travelling and going on. People
worry about feeling safe but in the United States you need to have the higher education to
have a good job. Why at least you have something to do to have a better life or if you
have money to start your own business to make more money and support your family.
Interviewer: You talked about family and the need for education. Those are certainly
values. You talked about Hazara community. Is there enough value that you would add to
that group, higher, lower or anything else?
Interviewee: On that value... I grew up in Kabul. So I had actually seen all of this civil
fight and everything in here in Afghanistan. So when you achieve this goal to actually
move your family from here to United States, you feel you are a strong man as you at
least helped your family. You at least succeeded in providing your family a better life. In
here, as an Afghan, I know that there are not many opportunities to go to schools or be as
a working individual. Even if you can do it, it is limited. In big cities you can have. So
whenever you achieve these goals like getting your visa, going to United States, moving
your family, etc. You will feel good that, at least you helped your family.
Interviewer: Back in your community, does your spouse work?
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Interviewee: No. She stays home as I have 3 kids, all girls. So that’s a full-time job for
her.
Interviewer: Anything else you would like to add.
Interviewee: No. Thank you so much. I hope I answered what you needed.
End.
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Participant Three:
Interviewer: Please tell me sir, about your lived experiences, your experiences
from your native homeland, the time that you were in Afghanistan, your early
experiences.
Interviewee: My military translation duties was for me, it was a great experience
because when I left Afghanistan when I was 20 years old and I came back and see a big
change for me, working with coalition forces on a different part of Afghanistan, different
region of Afghanistan. It was a great experience and the only thing that keeps me doing
it with all trapped and fear and it’s a war zone. It is getting more experience. It’s a good
experience.
Interviewer: With that––the draw of that experience and the experience drawing you in
have to do with your sense of being an Afghan coming back to the country and helping
from that sense or what?
Interviewee: Not really. Not a sense of Afghan. In the sense of human being too
involved, society, to coalition forces, to help our nation, to help US troops, to help NATO
troops. My main thing is to help coalition forces because without translator, without
somebody to explain what’s going on, it’s helped for the tour so actually it is something
like every day when I go out with US troops and work and get something for them,
inform them something, that pleased me.
Interviewer: Okay. You said to help the nation or it may have been “help my nation.”
Which nation were you referring to?
Interviewee: NATO nations.
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Interviewee: US nations. They need us.
Interviewer: And us being––they need us, us being?
Interviewee: They need translators.
Interviewer: Okay, all right. To help understand what’s happening culturally, help
understand how the Afghans are.
Interviewee: Understands culturally, understands how the Afghan are, understands how
the language works, understand body language of some peoples. On the meetings, some
people talk, but language is difference and that’s culture for me.
Interviewer: Shifting slightly, in terms of––I use the term sense of self, who one is, in
terms of your sense of self, can you tell me just a little bit what it means to be an Afghan
something? What it means to be an Afghan to you?
Interviewee: An Afghan, it is a nation. Afghan, it is a culture. Afghan, it is human
beings. Afghan, it is history.
Interviewer: History?
Interviewee: History. So, that’s all as combined of an Afghan. There is a good part of
them. There is a bad part of them. There is a weak part, a strong part, but that’s called
Afghan. You can’t just say Afghan just language.
Interviewer: Yes.
Interviewer: Okay.
Interviewee: If you have western clothes, nobody knows you’re an Afghan unless you tell
them you’re Afghan. To me, the first things, it’s being a human being is more than being
an Afghan, but to show them I’m an Afghan, the way you talk, the way you approach
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people, the way you say “Sala Malecon”, the way you shake hands with people, the way
you grab people’s hand, the way you stand on your side, you stand on your right side, on
the left side, how old is the guy, he’s learning people’s or learn people, it depend how
you choose your Afghans to a different type of people. So, it’s kind of a different
situation too. But to me, if I show myself I’m Afghan, more likely when I introduce
myself, my name, my last names shows Islamic different cultures, all yeah.
Interviewer: Okay. Just elaborate a little bit more on that. Let’s say you were speaking
to another Afghan, okay, another male Afghan? How would you introduce yourself to
him?
Interviewee: To introduce him, I just probably the best things I can do as to tell him my
names and I tell him where I’m from originally and where I grow up, which high school I
went, that’s good enough to introduce yourself and especially in Afghan society, this is
small society and the minute you tell them your last name, the people know where you’re
from.
Interviewer: So, there’s a distinction? I’m hearing and understanding, if I do understand
correctly, there is a distinction in terms of identity in how you introduce yourself to an
Afghan brother as opposed to a non-Afghan or a non-Muslim? There’s a difference.
Interviewee: There is a difference, yes. Mostly likely, when Afghan brothers, we need
Introduce yourself of in the matter of a minute, you will for detail of your background.
Interviewer: Okay.
Interviewee: But for non-Afghan, you just say your names and your last name.
Interviewer: Okay. You start to relate. You start to––
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Interviewee: Start to relate, yes.
Interviewer: Why do you feel––have you ever thought or can you elaborate why you
make a distinction as to introduction to an Afghan vise or versus a non-Afghan?
Interviewee: It’s just the needs to––Afghans know you and your background and where
you come from. Most of non-Afghans, they don’t care what’s your background is.
Afghan culture, it is some kind of question. I’m talking to, I’m probably have lunch with
you and I like to know what’s your background is and this is, it is culture. But non
Afghans, they don’t care. You’re okay here and your name is so and so and I have lunch
with you. But, for Afghans, when they meet each other, the first things they are on their
mind is, who I’m talking with them. Which ethnicity he is? Which part of country he is
from, which school he went? Who is his father? That’s culture. That’s how you connect
to another Afghan. That’s the way you connect to another Afghan. Yeah.
Interviewer: Okay. In the west, in your live experience in the west, you live in an Afghan
or a Muslim community or how would you describe your community?
Interviewee: I lived more likely in a mixed community. I was with Afghans and I was
more with westerns community. On my work area, I was always in a western work
community. On my family area, I was always with Afghans. Yes. It was kind of mixed.
Interviewer: Okay. Initially upon entry into the west, what nature of community was it?
Mixed or singular, unitary, Afghan, Muslim or how––can you describe that?
Interviewee: Yeah, mixed got in. I was directly in the 2 westerns community.
After a while, I find out a small Afghan community. For 6, 7, 9 months, I was in a
westerns community with different peoples. After 6, 7 months, I find out oh, there is an
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Afghan. Yeah. So, then I connect.
Interviewer: So, your assimilation or entry into the west, you didn’t necessarily look for a
community that can, that shared your experiences, your Afghan experience, your Muslim
experience. That wasn’t a consideration?
Interviewee: No. Most of people they are getting into westerns community is because of
the language, or finding a job. More likely, my experience they’re working with
westerns to connect them with non-westerns. With non-westerns, you get less help.
When you connect with westerns, then you get help –– somehow you get a job. You just
start learning the language with them. This is the best way to do it and that was my
experience. Interviewer: So, you found that assimilation, of course, a driver with
economic well-being jobs and caring for the family. I presume that’s what you mean.
Interviewee: Yes.
Interviewee: Economy, finding a job put yourselves in that situation and you can learn
the culture, you learn the language. You learn the area you live and that was my
experience was that. They go away to westerns cultures because you’re there anyway.
Interviewer: We’ve been talking about identity in your sense of self and you talked
powerfully about Afghans sense of self and Afghan identity culture over the ethnicity.
You mentioned about a couple of times. Can you focus a little bit on religious identity or
Muslim identity? Can you talk about that in terms of your being or your Muslim being?
Interviewee: From when you were a child and even if you’re not practicing much, it’s
still with you. Your name, when you have your name, it just shows them from which
ethnicity you are. Which religion do you have? But something to me, religion is always
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for me. It’s not a top priority chosen in this society. Religion is something that’s you.
It’s inside of you. That’s you practice religion for yourself, not for the society, not for
your environment. Religion is something inside you. If you practice it, you practice on
yourself.
Interviewer: On that same theme, is there in yourself, do you sense in you a difference
within, in terms of your Muslim religious identity, difference in the west and the
difference in Afghanistan? Is there a difference for you?
Interviewee: For me, no. There is no difference. Like I said, if you being a Muslim or
you being a Christian, it doesn’t matter where you are. Your belief is what you and your
name is left with you and you are left with your belief and it doesn’t matter where you
are. You don’t need to hide it. You don’t need to destroy it. It’s something inside your
heart and it’s something like you can leave on it and it doesn’t matter where you are. It’s
just with you and there is no difference.
Interviewer: Do you see in the west a different view of Muslim identity?
Interviewee: In terms of the west, it depends where you go, which country you go. Yes,
it’s different countries. I believe France just passed a rule that woman, they cannot wear
veils. Also, I feel totally free what I’m doing and there is no reason that I can see
anybody need to tell me that’s doing this wrong or this is America. It’s the story. It’s an
open country and that’s the reason I live here.
Interviewer: Look, I’d like to shift a little bit as we wind things down, as we’re closing
down. In terms of your belief and feelings toward values, you talked about a number of
values in mind. You just talked about Muslim values and earlier it was an ethnic or
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Afghan values and practices. What would you say, from your perspective, are the guiding
values that you hold dearest?
Interviewee: It’s different, you know, there’s a 2 type of value on what it is. To me,
Afghan is different value. Have religion has a different value. Afghan, being an Afghan
in having value - being an Afghan is like you’re talking about your nation or history of
Afghan. The history of Afghan as done in the past that religion is something doesn’t
count from Afghan. The value of religion it belongs to a Muslim world, the whole world
of Islam.
Interviewer: World?
Interviewee: The whole world of Islam. That’s the value. So, if you call yourself a
Muslim, it is religion and that religion is not only in Afghanistan. It’s all over in the
world. But if you call yourself Afghan, you give yourself a definite value and you
put yourself on a geographic area. So, the value that’s in Afghan, it’s that geographic
area you’re born. You’re raised. You’re growing up. But if you give yourself a
Muslim’s value, then you give yourself a worldwide value.
Interviewer: Universal value.
Interviewee: Universal value. So, that universal value, there is no limit. It’s all up to you
from a good human being you are.
Interviewer: Did you say which one ––is there one that’s more important to you, the
universal value or the Afghan value?
Interviewee: I believe the universal value as a human being, that’s good. And you’re a
human being. It doesn’t matter which religion you have. It doesn’t matter where you’re
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born. That’s all it is, it’s being a human being. That’s all it is.
Interviewer: Do you see a difference then in the western value, okay? You just described
the Afghan value. It’s clear. Ancestral history the boundary. You’re very clear about
the Islam value. Is there a slightly different western value?
Interviewee: Western value as far as Westerns, yes.
Interviewer: It’s very right for yourself sir.
Interviewee: Western value for myself, yes. I can see a different value when I travel with
an American passport. That’s given me a different value. I’m an American. I’m a US
citizen. I can travel free. It’s a high value than I can even imagine it. Yes. Western
value, it’s a totally different than an Afghan value. Western value is totally different.
Interviewer: You have mentioned a number of times the word freedom and I’d like if you
would how that impacts your life. I mean, you went to west. The question I want to
ask, when you left Afghanistan, why did you go to west, but now you
keep bringing the word freedom in relationship to the west in.
Interviewee: No, it is, it’s reality. When it’s reality, we just bring it up, even if you don’t
have any attention. You have more freedom of anything in the West, than East. So, this is
part of the culture. It’s part of the religion. It is part of the way the society is, that what
I’m talking about from even the worst, it is something like I can experience it. I touch it. I
feel it and that was I raised my kids in the west because I know they are guaranteed they
have a better life.
Interviewer: The last question here, Last question and it regards the family. In your
home, in your group, do you practice and share with them the Afghan traditions?

299
The Afghan histories, the Afghan cultures within the house?
Interviewee: Fifty/fifty. It’s kind of hard. It’s very hard. We celebrate more Christmas
than celebrate New Year’s. We celebrate Thanksgiving than different culture in
Afghanistan. It is just because the environment, it’s just because your kids goes to
school. They talk about the things they received, what you got for Christmas? That’s
kind of so, and we, no matter what, what you can do, when you live in a society, you
follow the – you’re going to the flow. It’s just like you’re driving the freeway. When you
drive on the freeway, everybody drives 65 miles. You go 65 miles. You’re following the
flow. So, it doesn’t matter when you go over there, you can’t separate yourself from the
society. You’re going to society and there’s nothing wrong with it. It’s nothing wrong
with it to celebrate certain things that are not on your culture. It’s a good part of culture is
you can capture things on a culture and again, it’s western culture or one of different
other countries culture. But just because of you raising kids and your kids thinks of you
that side. Some parents or most of the parents, they’re following their kids. It’s pretty
tough to show your kids do this one. You are an Afghan. The kid says, dad, I’m born in
the US. I’m an American. How can I be an Afghan? I can’t speak Dari. I can’t speak
Pashtun. I don’t know the language. I never wear the Afghan traditional clothes. How
could I be an Afghan? I’m a US citizen. I’m an American. I’m in New York. But as far as
the cultures, the only things honestly which follow is the food, the Afghan food. Most of
them cook, we cook some rice. It’s the brown rice.
Interviewee: When you go to a different culture, different society, different atmospheres,
you need to adjust yourself. But it depend how much open mind do you have to
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accept it? Some people they accept the change pretty hard. Some people they accept the
change easily. It depend what type of personality you have. I did have some experience,
hard experience. You know, I can adjust myself as far as who I am and where I am right
now. So, it takes time. I remember I had hard times to forget my mother left, but after a
while when you live in society then you leave everything behind and you follow the flow
and of the side.
Interviewer: You found in yourself ways to cope with or mitigate the struggles that you
were dealing with?
Interviewee: Yes.
Interviewer: Okay. Well, sir, I thank you very much for your time.
Interviewee: I know what––
Interviewer: I just want to say if there’s anything more that you’d like to add as we are
done here, anything else you’d like to comment on?
Interviewee: So, it’s a great experience and it’s not that easy to change yourself from well
culture to a definite culture, from one society to another and one man leads to another
language. But, especially get married and we raise kids, but the thing is, if you want to
live somewhere in peace, you want to live somewhere in comfortable, then you have to
accept whether it is the weather, whether is the culture, whether is the rule of know,
whether is the religion, it’s you take the good one. You leave the bad one.
Interviewer: You take certain things from the culture. You have a lot of those. Thank you
very much. Interviewee: Oh, you’re welcome.
End.
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Participant Four:
Interviewer: Please tell me about your lived experiences in Afghanistan at preimmigration.
Interviewee: My immigration to the West – 2004 basically was the last time that I
was in Afghanistan. But before 2004 you know in 2003, I was bound. I was forced
to have a long beard. And I was practicing a long beard. Even though when I was
living in the country, my beard was not long according to the government at
that time, with the Taliban. It was not long enough. Before entering Kabul, at one
checkpoint, they stopped me and told me I was violating law. I told them for what
reason. He says we have received an order to take you up there and sit with for
someone to talk to you. Clearly, I was ordered to that extreme limit – you know
what happened, something will happen. And also my ticket and everything
to fly away from this country was also with me. And that was also afternoon I was
having flight in Kabul airport. When I spoke they took me to – literally, to a
confined area. And I sat there. Some other people were sitting there also. I asked
what is going on here? Who is the person I’m going to talk to? He says, “We are all
detained. And you are also one of us.” And that was a big shock to me. I told them
because I have my ticket with me and my passport with me, I am leaving. This is a
problem for me because I have to leave. This type of voice nobody can hear it
you know, just some person will come and talk to me. I didn’t know what to do, but still,I
was detained. I was not sitting. I was standing. After about one and a half hours,
somebody came and said, “You have to come out and sit in that truck and go to the
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checkpoint detention area” the Taliban – my God. I told them I am leaving. It is
becoming a problem for me. My children are also waiting for me. I called and told
my children because I wanted to prepare for them the things and the children to
come. Unfortunately, there was one person – he was dealing with me very rude.
And they by force took me to the truck. They took me to detention center. But this
was you know at the detention center there was some person. He was from our own
locality. He recognized me. He says, “We know who you are. But this is the
situation. Your beard is small. It is not long enough. And you will be dealt with.
You will stay in detention here three days. And after three days, you will be taken
from here. In future, the next time you come again, you have to have long enough
beard.” Anyway, I told them because of my ticket and these things – I will. But I
want to go. He told me that the situation you are in. But I will try to help you out.
I’ll do what I can. And then, by chance, he disappeared for like 15-20 minutes. He
come back and told me you swear to follow the rules – not swear not talk. Like in
future – in leaving from here, you will keep your beard long enough. I told him I will.
He took me out – not from the main jail because there was some other people that were
complaining – that why helping this person – what is the reason? What’s his name?
From a side door they took me out – walk like one and half hour I was feeling that
someone would hit me because I escaped the jail – that was my fear that somebody
will just shot thinking he escaped from jail. That doesn’t happen – came to the main
road – waiting for a few minutes. Somebody came in. I think that was also the
government official. But he was, to be honest, gentleman. He stopped the car for
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me. He recognized that this person is not a person that came from the desert. Something
And when he look at me, he understood that I had been at the prison. Then they took me
to Kabul. And I came to Kabul. Finally, thanks God, we make it out of the country. That
was the last memory that I was having from this country. At any time you can expect
somebody will stop you for different reason. It could be beard. It could be prayer time
and you are in the car or could be some other reason – just to make it out – insulting or
beating or punishing – detention – these things, all possibility to receive from that time.
It was a hard time. We make it from Kabul out. And we were safe and sound. We say
thanks God because then in our own community – even the Taliban were from our own
community.
Interviewer: So under the Taliban rule, the strict dress demands – beard growth for
me, how the women must dress and who they will or will not be accompanied by –
they were enforcing that strictness not only in Kabul but as far as you know across
all of Afghanistan?
Interviewee: Across all Afghanistan. Basically, it was all Afghanistan. In fact, we
were living under extremist rules like we were knowing the strict regulation they
will have. My wife and my daughters were wearing the black shrewd-type of things.
Their face was not visible, these we were wearing scarves.
Interviewer: Over the head to cover –
Interviewee: Over the head to cover the whole body which we were wearing. For me, I
was also considering because even I was having beard. But the beard cannot make it
lengthen in one month. It requires six or seven months to reach to their standards – as

304
long as out of this much. That was the thing. We were observing, just to make it and not
give some excuse to maybe attack you. But something you can – something you can’t.
But out of here – out of Kabul city – some cultural thing we have to observe as well
because – like women’s mostly are not opening their veil or showing their face. This is
somehow applied – the religion as well, is not applied but is good to have it. Not that
strict when you reach your own village, your own locality, your own people – other
people they live. The women are wearing kind of scarf, covering the hair and kind of
scarf, and the face is open. That’s fine. That is the perfect thing. The women all do it –
the village that they are not wearing that whole long thing – to cover the whole body. If
you are wearing a scarf – like from this point up – the face is open. And the hands are
open. That’s no problem. But in Kabul, things were different.
Interviewer: In which village was this?
Interviewee: This is in Wardak province.
Interviewer: Was the village mixed? You mentioned that some Taliban recognized
you from your village because they were in the village. Was this your village?
Interviewee: The province that I came from also Wardak. And the village Taliban – they
were not like encouraging thing. Somehow because they knew us – we knew each other
so they are somehow helping. They were saying that this is the Taliban from Kandahar.
And we have to listen to, we have to apply it, we have to obey. Because those Taliban
that were living with us, they are looking to the future as well because we are living in
the same area. Today if they are having a stronger hand, they are helping, that is good for
keeping the relation for the future relation. You know – tit-for-tat – if you do something
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good to me, I’ll do something good to you. If you do something bad to me, then this is
always – okay. Time will come – things like this. So this type of relation – that is part of
our tradition.
Interviewer: Let’s talk a little bit about the individual, the self, the sense of who you are,
the sense of person. And if you can just talk a little bit about your view and your sense of
self during this era – pre-immigration, how would you consider or characterize your
sense of identity?
Interviewee: As in a – as a Muslim, love my country, as a Pashtun. I’m proud of that
ethnicity as well – like I’m Pashtun – very much Pashtun and proud of my history and
hoping for the people of Afghanistan and our own tribe and our own people and my own
family to be – as to be country that I am proud of being of one – to be a person having a
family that need to be proud that I’m having and to be economically stable, this is my
sense of to be like – like I always work. I hope that my hand stretch to not other person
to hurt – in fact, if somebody ask me to help, I will be able to. This is expectation from
me myself and this is what I hope from my family and children to be. At the same time, I
expect from the tribe that I am living to be a good tribe, same time I expect my country to
be a country like, our history is expecting a country to be a country that we are proud to
say that I am from Afghanistan and a country with a good name and a good reputation.
Unfortunately, right now, is not what we suppose to.
Interviewer: Can you go back – you mentioned tribe a number of times now – expand just
a little bit about the tribal connection and your tribe – your tribal identity, your tribal
relations?
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Interviewee: Relation – you know – our tribe for example – my tribe, they call it
Wardak.
Interviewee: Wardak tribe is also having three sub-tribe – smaller tribe. A relation
this way – as close as you go to the very sub-tribe and also the village – to the very
village. This where we keep our way. Let me say it this way. Like I’m the protector,
the savior of my family – the little bigger of the village sub-tribe – the bigger tribe,
which is Wardak. And this way goes to Pashtun tribe. Our relation is the closest
start from the very small of the degree, this way go up and up and up. This is
something like traditionally we feel a responsible or oblige to remain committed
to your family, this is obligation. And this is, if you are a person that everybody
look down on, you cannot support your family. Or, if you have a family of children
going in things, you are looked down. And everybody at the little tribe and also the
village and also – is pointing towards you. Why you cannot look after your children
in your family because we look down on you. If you this is my children and my
family, you cannot because we are connecting the smaller family and a bigger and a
bigger things like this – we are connected. If your children are doing bad, God forbid,
bad thing, that is bringing a bad name to our family. People will say this is from that
tribe. So this where our relation goes down – connected like other part of the tree –
everybody’s either talking for himself. But here, is not like this. Here you go to the tribe.
And you are responsible towards the tribe. The tribe is also having a responsibility
towards you. The tribe even protects you. The tribe tries to protect your children. But
then in country and see why you’re not doing this – cannot see it. I don’t want to do –

307
don’t care. You cannot say this because the family, the tribal, the sub-tribal and the tribal
relation – they’re all kind of interconnected with one another.
Interviewer: Respect and honor not only home but also the respect extends to the tribe.
And the tribe extends to the family?
Interviewee: Exactly. For a person doing a good deed, a good job, his family’s proud. His
sub-tribe is proud. And the bigger tribe is proud of because he did a good job; he did a
good thing. So this way is appreciation. We are more important to us is which tribe that
person is from or what tribe that person is from and how we keep our relation. Because
basically, we are connected, we are feeling connected more to a tribal thing than to an
administrative things.
Interviewer: So in Wardak or in your Afghan view, your Afghan national view, it’s
not at all about the individual. It’s much bigger than that. It’s about family. It’s
about tribe and sub-tribe. It’s about who you are in relationship to those things.
Interviewee: Exactly. That is why those things – especially in Pashtun areas,
how things are going. The family, the sub-tribe and the tribe in this way. This is that
connection going up. And this is throughout the whole country it is like this. Let me
say one example. Like Wardak is located in center of Kabul. Mangal, another tribe,
is in Paktia – is too far away. But historically, our written history is connected. But
we assume that Wardak and Mangal were brother, though they are far located to
each other. Mangal feel responsible for Wardak protection and feel proud of Wardak
– Wardak the same thing. I feel proud of Mangal achievement and Mangal protection.
This type of relation we are having, even on that scale. Like right now, this is maybe
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some 900 to 1,000 years before – this immigration of Wardak from Paktia to Wardak
province.
Interviewer: You said stubborn?
Interviewee: Yeah, stubborn. They’re very hard fighting people – not easy. They don’t
like education much. And they are difficult people, very difficult. Some time – mostly the
government in Kabul will get negative answers from these people. They give the support
to the government, the soldier of the people. And they fight government efforts. I’m from
Wardak. You help me out. It is this way. And the Mangal tribe would listen. Even
Karzai, he chose this Juma Khan Hamdar – the Wardak person there. Because this trick –
someone has told him that this tribe is having this relation with this tribe. So you choose a
person because in Wardak, you can find mostly educated people. In the Mangal tribe, you
can’t find many educated people to learn the job for you. So you have to find someone
from Wardak. Of course, if you send someone like Wardak spoken dialect, will not work.
If you send Wardak dialect, it will never work, never ever – or someone from, will never
work. But they choose – even from Kandahar – they don’t choose a Kandahar there
because easy for them is to take someone from Wardak and put there. So this is why I say
– like in a bigger this type of relation we are keeping on a bigger, bigger level and a
higher, higher level.
Interviewer: So the root of the tree – you described this beautiful tree. It’s a very
complicated tree system. And the roots of this tree matter because you talked in terms of
those relationships to Mangal and Wardak that are history – if not decades.
Interviewee: Yeah, of course, more than hundred years.
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Interviewer: And those relationships matter just because of ancestral ties and connections.
Interviewee: Exactly. Still we keep that.
Interviewer: That’s important.
Interviewee: Yeah.
Interviewer: I wanna ask you this clearly. Your pre-immigration self – and you
describe – you’ve mentioned a few things. If you were to meet another Mangal tribal
relative or a Wardak tribal relative, how would you identify yourself to that person?
Interviewee: I will introduce myself Wardak. And the Mangal will assume me as his
brother. As soon as he understand he’s from Wardak – like we know. Is not taught in a
schooling-type of way. But these are things that remain from generation to generation.
Our elders always talk about this. The younger children listen. We have one thing here in
Afghanistan that when the elder talk in a shura in a mosque, anywhere, there is no barrier.
We all participate. And this is – I don’t know what type of special having. When they sit
in a Loya Jirga – in a bigger Jirga – like bigger gathering, everybody sit there, everybody.
Interviewer: Everybody’s at the table.
Interviewee: We don’t have table. We have like an open space. As long as the
accommodation and the space is there – even our children sit there. And nobody’s
stopping them to go – you are bad – you are not of this level – here, they’re all the same.
Interviewer: On the same level.
Interviewee: On the same level. So this somehow is having two positive impacts. One is
that because you feel like a sense of equality. There is no good. You are bad. You are not
of this level. There is no good Pashtun. There is no bad Pashtun. There is no strong
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Pashtun. So this type of equality we are having. And for the children – we are not
segregating children. We want the children go there and sit there. But they have to
behave. If misbehave, a slap is also there. Anyone can give a slap. Do this. Sit down. But
this type of – like if you, for example, a person, a Pashtun for not entering a gathering,
this is a big question – is a big dishonor you have done to someone, whoever, whatever
economic level he is having – he’s being a Pashtun. He’s the same. And this type of
equality we have – democracy we are having.
Interviewer: I wanna shift a little bit to start to look at the post-immigration. We focused
on pre – immigration time. Before we do, you mentioned in terms of Wardak and
Mangal –Interviewee: Mangal.
Interviewer: Mangal, that the tribes kind of separated probably hundreds of years ago
over some issue. The question comes up – in your pre-immigration timeframe, were you
always settled in Wardak? Were you or your family moved around? Or were you always
static in one place?
Interviewee: Well, that is another thing. Again, traditionally, the families, the tribe stays
together. This is our tradition. But it’s not something to say – as far as I’m concerned, I
stay always in Wardak. And I stay connected to the Wardak where I’ve been born, I’ve
been grown up, I have learned there something there like the smaller thing that Afghani
people are having.
We are not very rich people. But still all my hopes even now in Wardak in my little
village. Even now what I can support. That is like to Afghans, especially to the Pashtun
tribe, migration is not easy decision to make it. We are not immigrants – Pashtuns are
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staying together. We believe that God is provider. Stay with your family. Stay with your
tribe. Stay with your people. You are safe. You are protected. Immigration is not a
welcome state for someone to take it. But that doesn’t mean migration hasn’t happened.
Basically, Pashtuns – this is our habit – like to stay with your people. That is to stay with
your people, close with your people. Stay with your family. Stay with your sub-tribe. And
stay with your tribe. Something wrong we are having and that is if someone like a smaller
number of tribe is living in a bigger tribe area, they feel kind of marginalized. These
things are there because those who are having a closer tribal relation – and not easy to
mingle with them or disintegrate with them. Like this that is not easy. So in Pashtun,
if you are moving from one place to another, you assume yourself – you are still drop
down. Traditionally, anyone can have a hardship, you accept it– stay with your family
because of social status and remain equal.
Interviewer: Your body language changes greatly. Your facial contortion changes. The
big, broad smiles on your face are evident when you talk about Wardak and when you
talk about your tribe. In that context, in that context you were just talking about the
difficulty in moving and you didn’t use this word maybe the anxiety of migrating. How
did you deal with that anxiety from here now into post-immigration – you face with
immigration to the West?
Interviewee: To ask me, immigration – the hardest decision to make it in my life – the
hardest and the hardest job to do it. That is immigration. I started immigration because
how I got the courage to immigrate. That probably was my education. That give me the
courage that you can. To immigrate to west, it was really a different part of the world.
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Based on my education – all that thing – immigration to the west. It was not an easy to
make it and also not easy to settle here. I make it through my all hard work. When I saw
that the hardship here in Afghanistan – finally, my family was also – they were very strict
towards me that you cannot make it back. You can’t go back Afghanistan – you will face
further problem. Because they saw me that the first time when I returned to Wardak to
visit family. I told you at the beginning how difficult it was for me. I couldn’t explain all
to you. But because I told you very short, but I was really having a hard time in
Afghanistan. And we were not thinking that Afghanistan will to stability. We say these
people came here. Difficulty was I cannot accept my wife to go and work. She was not
good at English also. I have to take this entire burden on my shoulder and my children
and all those things. Job opportunities were headaches. But always hard work pays off.
You can go sit in there. I did not know many people. I don’t know much people here.
And nobody’s waiting for me outside, – to accompany me. Where I go now? The
immigration told me the whole country is yours. You can go anywhere you want to. And
then I just lost all, I just cried – what to do now. But finally, thanks, God – because I was
having so many emotions with me that was one support – the language skill I was having
– another thing. And then the confidence that I will make it somehow. It will be difficult.
Then finally, thanks God, we make it. We settle down here. Now after 08 years, my
family feels as they are from that society. It was not easy for my wife. It was not easy for
my children. But we continue life. We suffer a lot. But finally, we got our space in the
society. And that is all good.
Interviewer: You mentioned the west specifically as being multicultural. Were you aware
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of their multicultural state? And how did that make you feel knowing that you were about
to go to amulticultural environment?
Interviewee: By multicultural, part of that word I mean – you know – we find cities and
towns to accommodate us – can give us a space to live according to what we want to
live. As a Muslim, my wife is a Muslim. And we are practicing that. Mosque was there
for us. Nobody stop us while praying at mosques. The way the dressing – my wife cannot
wear the mostly European-type of dress – we were not used to. So, we were using half
veils – yeah, half scarf’s.
Interviewer: Was this dress in accordance to your Wardak dress or modification of that
dress?
Interviewee: A modification of that dress – grand modification of that dress. So just to
convince my wife – because it’s easy, those changes all of a sudden. And for my
children, it doesn’t matter. For my wife, it was not easy. But modification worked. You
will find some people wearing Pakistani Punjabi dress. It’s not our tradition. We have our
different things. Even the blue, huge type of things they are wearing – the whole burkas
they are wearing – mostly in the villages we are not wearing it.
Interviewer: That being the burqa.
Interviewee: Not burqa, the other thing, which is having a kind of holes to the eyes – the
whole thing – in the villages you cannot find it. The villages – moving, doing work and
back, they are just wearing a little scarf – scarf is part of our tradition. But those things
are not part of our Pashtun tradition. We wear the same thing, the man may be – he is
talking, but the women wear long hair in our area. Some people wearing the European
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things cover the whole – but away from Kabul city, things are totally different. We are
having much easier life.
Interviewer: So in this multicultural environment you’re now in, post-immigration, the
nature of the community that you found yourself in – talk about the nature of the
community.
Interviewee: Well, not much – everyone was just looking after his own life, not much
concern about us. As for the other, we find people very friendly. They were always
talking with us. They wanted to help us because everyone not knowing what to do – how
to – you know – sort out our things. They help us. There were some people that dislike us
– not because they dislike us we were not knowing how the people lived there. I had one
experience. For example, once we came out of the building that we were living – like
here in Afghanistan, we are very much sympathetic to younger children. The parent or
someone having him in his lap – you go there and talk with the – that is not my thing.
You say your sympathy, your endearment. I was with my family. We came out of the
building and going to the market, I think. We wanted to purchase like the weekly things.
There was a little slope area – a little child. He pulled his hand from the mother hand and
start running downhill area. He lost his control. I wanted to help this little child not to let
him fall. The mother yelled – “Don’t touch my child. Don’t touch my child.” I quickly
fall back. What is wrong? I understand that the people live here are different than those. I
must not approach the child of someone because you are not in your village. You are not
in your tribe. People don’t know you. People are afraid of their family, of their children.
You have to be in very much reserved in this – things like – my elder son, he says,
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“Daddy, in this country, you don’t think you’re in Afghanistan. You’re in a different
country. Keep away from these things. The children falling down is not your
responsibility.” I said, “This was a child. I want to help.” “It’s not your responsibility.”
Do what you are responsible for. And just keep away from other family or you will be in
trouble.” Many things like this – many times we have some – like cultural shock was
there for us more. And difficulties were there. But with the time we work on. Now is all
good.
Interviewer: So you quickly learned through that episode and maybe a few others that no
longer the code of the tribe where everybody was responsible. You’re not responsible.
You said you’re responsible for everybody. Everybody’s responsible for you.
Interviewee: Exactly.
Interviewer: That means in childrearing with children out in the West, in this community?
Interviewee: You are for yourself.
Interviewer: You said, sir, that you were helped by people. You mentioned the negative
things that – but you were helped by some people. And they helped you because why?
Interviewee: Just like human being – when we ask them some information or something
how to do, they help us very honestly – lead us, guide us. I can’t forget the help of these
people. There were people like us. There were people that would just ignore us. There
were ones not much concern about us. They were looking at us – these people – he can’t
speak English. They are okay. They will find out their way. Like at the beginning, the
first few months when I arrived I was totally blind. I was feeling I’m just – and many
time I decided let’s go back. We cannot make it. But my little children were saying,
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“Daddy, stay. We will go to school here.” Basically, the schooling stopped me from
returning. I cannot make it. I think very difficult life here. But my children were insisting
I listen to them. And finally, they were okay. They were correct. I was wrong.
Interviewer: They were correct, did you say?
Interviewee: They were correct. I was wrong.
Interviewer: If in the post-environment it was less about Afghan or even Pashtun
connectedness, what other sustained you in terms of who you are that – you described
before I’m the tribal relative. I’m a Muslim. I’m an Afghan, a Wardak. What sustained
you now in the West in terms of your earlier conditions or characteristics to your
identity? Can you talk to that?
Interviewee: Honestly, right now, those things that we are of one religion. We are
Muslim. That two things – we are Pashtun. We are the three things Afghan – Pashtun,
Afghan – the three things we have. And people know us by this also that they are Afghan.
They are Muslim. And they are Pashtuns. We obey the law. We are obedient people.
Interviewer: So that’s your identity. Your community experience – we talk just a few
minutes about that post-immigration, your community experiences. Do you find a sense
of community? You obviously came from an environment where there was a strong
sense of community based mainly on Wardakism and Pashtunism.
Interviewee: Yes, exactly.
Interviewer: Did you find those things at all in your new community?
Interviewee: The Afghan is there in those area – somehow we have to keep our
connection with them. And we have to provide the support to one another somehow –
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very limited. In the west, mostly everybody on his own. But for a community – keeping
relation for like the – we are having for someone deceased or some wedding or
something – that is basically – mostly not on Pashtun basis, Afghan basis – we have a
community – that there is a funeral ceremony participating – condolences something –
we always continue to keep – and the other with the neighbor – keeping a good relation.
We promote it. Interviewer: Well, the last question I have is about omission. You hadn’t
mentioned this in this timeframe about non-Pashtun tribes or ethnicity groups whether
post or pre. And I wonder if you could just talk a little bit about your feelings on the nonPashtun tribes?
Interviewee: Yeah, exactly. One is – you know – something that traditionally – that is we
how to – like for example, from the family – from the bigger family and from the bigger
and from the bigger and the tribe – things like this – we are committed to have kind of
responsibility to family. Then finally, we are reaching to the Afghan side. By law, all the
people who live inside this country are all Afghan. Afghan means Pashtun. They call
Pashtun Afghan. That is basically – Afghan is also – the name started from Pashtun. So
the bigger scale, we are having – you know – good relation with all those other nonPashtun people as well. Like when the [inaudible] situation was there in our country, the
people who work in our agricultural land. The working – people that were there in our
land. So we respect them. We respect their religion. We respect their honor and
everything – that we kept. At the same time, we give more privilege to those people who
are working in our area – you know – for them to get satisfaction – some neighbor of our
tribe.
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Interviewer: I thank you, sir. It’s been a lot of data. Your narrative’s so strong and so
rich. Is there anything last you’d like to say in closing?
Interviewee: I thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to open up myself to
you. I gave what information came in my mind. I what came in my mind I share with you
very honestly. I hope it help you in your research.
End.
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Participant Five:
Interviewer: Can you please talk a little bit, about your live experiences in your
native homeland before ’03 or 2004?
Interviewee: I was in Afghanistan in 2005, before that I was a high school student,
so the Mujahideen came in and the government collapsed and insurgent blood and bath
every day. So, everything burned the hospital, our schools and everything. We were
running around the city every night, like from this place to that place, with my mom and
2 small brothers and my sister, so my father was away at that time. So, we have to move
to different districts. Once the fight starts there, the war, we moved to another state or to
another district. We’d been displaced for one year. So, after that we left Afghanistan to
Pakistan for two years. We were in Pakistan. I was studying English out of the west in the
little schools. Then we tried to move to Germany. We had some land. We came back to
Afghanistan. So, we sold that land and made some money and paid to leave to Germany.
So, before that, it was a good living style, lifestyle in Afghanistan for us because we’ve
been a middle class family and respected family. My father was a Pashtun, you know,
Pashtun was like a little bit respected in those times. But I went to foreign countries like
Germany and Pakistan. Nobody knows you. No identity, nothing. I was missing my land
always until now. So, was big difference when I left Afghanistan, I went to the west. I
was very bored. As a teenage boy, always I was, I was not paying attention to the studies
and everything. I couldn’t learn anything because my soul was away. My mind was in
Afghanistan. I was like I lost a good life over there.
Interviewer: Thank you, so much there. In moving from, you described you and your
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mother and siblings as moving from place to place, district to district, because of
Mujahideen and activities.
Interviewee: Yeah. There were different groups and they came in the area of the
face to face, the tribes or the Mujahideen groups. They fight each other, so in this
fighting, like civilians were in the middle of the war. They use rockets and everything
and civilian houses. So, we had to move the area, by walk or anything. It’s different
there. Then the war moves to that area. Then we came back. So I remembered the days,
like 3 days or 2 days, we didn’t eat. We didn’t drink because everything was closed.
There was no market, no bizarre. So that’s why we were moving around.
Interviewer: Which area of Afghanistan are you referring to?
Interviewee: My father was from west of Carbo.
Interviewee: They call it Harmon. So, I was raised in Carbo. I was born and raised in
Carbo.
Interviewer: And the school there ––
Interviewee: School, yeah. High school and after high school, it was destroyed.
Interviewer: Is it correct to say that when you’re in Carbo, within this time frame, were
you a part of your tribal community or no? Were you a part of your tribe community in
Carbo, living within the tribe or––
Interviewee: Before there were no tribe issues in Afghanistan. There were
plenty of educated people. If you see right now, it’s a big difference. When I see now,
there’s a lot of precision that people are uneducated too. Everything is changed. They
went like hundred years behind.
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Interviewer: Yeah. Let’s talk a little bit about the individual or I refer to it as a
sense of self, who you are your sense of identity and I’d like to hear you speak, what does
it mean to you, your sense of identity? Who you are as a person in pre-immigration
context?
Interviewee: Yes. I’m, as I told you, as a Pashtun family, respect this family in
Afghanistan. Respect the family always and my part of life was to keep this identity. My
father and grandfather made it. Don’t destroy it. Follow being respectful to people –
always avoid bad things. Always walk straight, respect people because that was the
identity. I left my family in Pakistan. I was the first go to Germany. Always I was
helping them. Still I’m helping my family, my sisters and my brothers because this is our
Pashtun identity. I didn’t want to lose that. So, which is self-respected in your family
safe, you know? Keep your brothers safe, get an education. Give education to my sister,
that’s why I didn’t study always. I was working for them.
Interviewee: And still I have a family and 2 kids.
Interviewer: Sense of self in that term is clear with regards to family orientation, what
family means to you?
Interviewer: You’ve talked to the fact of tribal respect and honor. Are there any
other points, characters or characteristics in terms of identity––who one is? Maybe it
could be, maybe it is religion, Muslim faith.
Interviewer: And those meant what to you?
Interviewee: Those meant a lot to me. That’s why I’ve been raised to keep the
value, Islamic values, which and my family, yeah.
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Interviewer: Okay, all right. So––
Interviewee: Since start of Afghanistan, there have been two tribes. Durrani and
Oranzi. I’m from the Organzi part. If you do anything bad, a shameful act so it loses all
your tribe or your family. That’s why you have to be careful.
Interviewer: It’s reflective of the tribe?
Interviewee: Yeah. Not just on you. So, who you are reflects on the tribe. The
tribe reflects on you also?
Interviewer: Can you give examples or talk about how the war and you’ve
talked about the war in the Mujahideen time frame, post occupation of the Soviets. The
Soviets were moving out. The Mujahideen came in. Can you give examples of how your
identity issues surfaced during the Mujahideen period, during that period of time?
Interviewee: Yeah. I was too young. First of all, my father was displaced
because he was a government worker. He didn’t want to work under the Soviet Union.
He left the job. He moved to Darshan. After that, so we were living with my mother and
he was taken off apparently from there until they killed him over there. My father was
killed in Nagi Ibrahim before Mujahideen. In Mazar. They killed bunch of people over
there, so one of them was my father. He was a high-ranking civilian.
Interviewee: The Mujahideen came in so there were different rules. We thought
that’s got to better situation, you know - a free country. Maybe it’s an illusion the
Russian legend that Mujahideen collapsed. My mother was so happy. But it wasn’t that.
So, before Mujahideen come in, somebody like Prince Hazzara tried to target different
countries. They support them to beat each other. At that time, everybody wants to
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destroy, you know? Anyway, they can, you know? They kill you. They take your wives
away. These things, you know? They torture you. So you lose your identity. That’s why I
left the country. My mother didn’t want to be disrespected by some other tribe or some
other people. You know strangers to come to your house to rape them or something like
that. And it was happening every day. That’s why we moved to Pakistan and after there,
we moved to west - Germany.
Interviewer: How long were you in Pakistan?
Interviewee: For almost 2 years.
Interviewer: How was the experience there?
Interviewee: That was a new thing over there also. You lose their respect.
Everybody calling you different names. Somebody call you Communists. I was just
ignoring them, you know? When you go to the market to buy something, everybody call
you oh, Russian is here. Because they knew you from your face, from your skin, you
know? So, we are talking. They call us different names. But a lot take it, you know?
But it was different. We have to live, you know? I was going to school with them with
the Pakistani kids. I would listen to a lot of bad things about me, about our families, all
that stuff.
Interviewer: What type of community was this in? Was it a Muslim community or what
type?
Interviewee: Yeah, because we had some money, you know, to live. Yeah.
Interviewer: Your time spent to the west, your immigration to the US, what were your
feelings about the immigration process? Specifically, your feelings if they were stress or
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anxiety about leaving Afghanistan and going to the west?
Interviewee: So, there is a lot of stress.
Interviewee: Yeah. So, one you miss your land and secondly, it’s a long
process, maybe takes one year or two years or maybe more than five years. Always
you’re waiting for good news. You never hear good news, mostly bad. It’s mixed.
Actually, that waiting in the US and Germany, it destroyed my life. My age is not that
much, but I look, I’m 37 years old, but I look like maybe 45 or 50, something like that.
So, always I was waiting. Always I lived with stress.
Interviewer: You talked about the land, your connection with the land and your actions
based upon your family, caring for your mother, doing, making sure that there was honor
in your sisters and everything.
Interviewer: But the time came to move when you go to the west. How did you
deal with that conflict with family and yet you’re going to the west? How did that, how
did you deal with that type of stress?
Interviewee: It was very hard, yeah, because my sister was with me, my mother
and my little brothers because they were three when they left the country. So, for two,
three years, each of them they went to school and they came back and they were different
and still my mother and me, we were trying to keep them away from those bad cultures.
Like they
learned, like as much as you try, they learned it in the school because most of them
they’re there in the school and you’re at work. You don’t see them. It was bothering me.
Like a couple of times, I saw my brother walking with wild kids, you know? They’re
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doing bad things and the high school call me sometimes. Their school called me and I
went to the dean office. He was there and doing some bad thing, just hard time. Always
show respect, but they don’t listen because they were grown up there.
Interviewer: And you’re exposed to a different––
Interviewee: Yeah. Especially I work a lot on my sister. So, what you do is
always explain your culture and your religion. That’s the only way you can use it. But I
didn’t go so deep. I knew that it’s not good for teenagers because if you take them too
deep in the religion, the next day you don’t know if they are coming here, what’s facing
them. I mean, extremist.
Interviewer: While it was tough and you described the anxiety and the stress
going through to the west, did your family support this move? Did your mother support
this move going to the west or she did not like it?
Interviewee: No, she liked it. She had a decision before we moved. She said
I’m going to take you there after you got your paperwork and citizenship and after a few
years and then I come back and that’s what she did. Because she want our future, but she
choose a brighter future for her kids which is me and my brothers and sisters. After I
finished high school. Then, I worked a lot.
Interviewee: My brothers and my sister, she got married. My mother decided
to move back to Afghanistan. She felt her job was done. She got to be safe and to get
education. That’s why she went with us all the way there and she spent like 15 or 16
years. Finally, she decides to come back. I ask her one day, why are you going to go
back? Here you have free doctor, you have everything free. Living aside, this and that
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and she explained to me, I don’t have respect here. Over there in Afghanistan, if I go out,
the shops, the drivers, everybody respecting me as an old lady. Over here is nothing like
that. Over there I have like neighbors. The country is different. When she returned to
Afghanistan after six months, she passed away and that’s what she wanted. She knew that
and everybody was so absent and my brothers and my little sister. I said no. That she
knew that. She is very happy right now.
Interviewer: If we can continue just a few, I thank you very much for sharing
that you even took, in the west and in your community, can you talk about your
community in which you live in terms of your Afghans or its multi-cultural with other
ethnicities or permanently Afghan? Can you describe your western community a bit to
us?
Interviewee: The community I lived for a long time it was a multi-national community
called Friends in New York City.
Interviewer: Oh yes.
Interviewee: Nobody cares.
Interviewer: No one cares who you are?
Interviewee: Who we are, yeah, as long as you’re working and you be a nice person to
live with.
Interviewer: Yeah.
Interviewee: Yeah. For two years, we moved to New York because I got married
and my wife didn’t like to stay in Queens. She said let’s go to Maryland. It’s close to
New York. Anytime you can come back. That time I didn’t have any kids so we went
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there. For 2two years, we lived there. You know why I left Maryland? Everybody was
looking at me as a terrorist, as a bad guy. Whatever happens in the world, I felt like I did
it and actually I didn’t do anything wrong. Even my neighborhood, every morning I was
going to work and I left the apartment, everybody looked like they slammed their doors
like and I decided to come back. I bought a house over there. I paid $25,000.
Interviewer: Was it in Maryland or––
Interviewee: In Maryland.
Interviewer: Maryland, okay.
Interviewee: In Maryland and they called it Columbia District over there. So,
after two years, I decided to move back, so nobody bought my house in that time, 2008,
the market was very bad.
Interviewer: Yeah.
Interviewee: So, I just left it for the bank. I said I’m not going to live over there.
I came back to New York. That’s why I love New York. We have our own culture over
there. It is Chinese culture, Mexican.
Interviewer: Let me ask you, probe a little bit more your time in Maryland. Post
immigration and you settled there with your new wife or your wife.
Interviewer: And when you meet someone on the street, you identify yourself as how?
I am so and so names. I am a, how would you identify yourself?
Interviewee: I identify myself as a foreigner here.
Interviewer: Oh yes.
Interviewee: As a definitely like, if you see in the movies somebody that look at
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the aliens somehow. I felt like that. Nobody talks to you like respectfully, you know?
Even the police stop you for no reason because my car was a little bit new and he saw
that the immigrant he has a new car. He stopped me in Maryland. This nowhere in
America I know that.
Interviewer: Yeah.
Interviewee: Because later on I studied a little bit. They said Maryland is like
that. The books, you know, I read Islam. Even the police tell me what you do for your
life, this and that. Whose car is this? It’s my car and they saw the paperwork, they let me
go. I felt very bad on that day. Why? Because of my skin or my face, you fly in the deep.
I didn’t tell them, but that’s how you feel. And always you feel stranger in front of
foreigners, you know? They talk to different ways.
Interviewer: Did you feel this burden because of your Muslim identity or your
Afghan identity? What was going through your mind?
Interviewee: The Afghan identity.
Interviewer: Afghan identity. And so you started to associate yourself as an
Afghan American or an Afghan or how would you associate yourself in that city? To not
come under those types of scrutiny’s, how would you associate yourself?
Interviewee: Still Afghan.
Interviewer: Oh really?
Interviewee: That was their problem. And so anywhere I go, I have an American
pass and everything, you know? If they ask me that, my answer is Afghan American. In
New York, most of – they think I’m Mexican. You know? But up to now, I have
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problems.
Interviewer: Okay. You talked about your identity in a post immigration setting
- Afghan, Afghan American. Would you ever identify yourself in terms of your tribal
relationship and affiliation?
Interviewee: Yeah, that’s among the Afghans. Here, we have an Afghan
community because everybody’s [inaudible]. This was big and this is from that family.
Everybody call you on your family’s name. We have a mosque over here that people
come together, you know, sometime and everybody knew you, whose son you are. So,
my advice even to my kids and my brother, don’t do anything on the streets to some other
Afghan see and they say Participant 5’s brother did that or participant 5’s sons did that.
That’s why they’re too careful not doing anywhere like in the Afghan society. So, be in
control because you have to keep your tribal identity. You’re a Pashtun, you’re an
Afghan you know?
Interviewer: That honor and respect and not do anything that will bring dishonor
and disrespect to the tribes.
Interviewee: That’s right, yeah.
Interviewer: I thank you for sharing that. Just a couple more points here.
In your assimilation or your settlement in the west, do you maintain an affiliation with
your family in Afghanistan, in your travel family in Afghanistan? Or if you do, how is
that done, by what means?
Interviewee: Watching the news all night. Especially me, we were watching news.
Interviewer: Okay.

330
Interviewee: So, of course, they don’t have a problem, but still they are looking
for each other what they are doing. They’re watching each other if they kept their identity
or not.
Interviewer: Yeah.
Interviewee: So, right now I have two daughters; 8 years old and 4 years old. If
somebody come to my house on special occasions like holidays and that, and they see
my daughters, they were born in America and they raised here and they are talking to me
Pashtun and to them also, they are surprised. You keep your identity.
Interviewer: And your issues you had in Maryland, you felt because you could not
maintain an identity or the conflict itself drove you away from Maryland?
Interviewee: I couldn’t, everybody if you talk to in different ways like a stranger or
something like that, of course. Particular to yourself, I was a Pashtun. I had a restricted
family, you know? And right now people are talking to me in this way so it bothers me
from inside.
Interviewer: Can I ask in 10 years if you can think about 10 years from now, where do
you see yourself?
Interviewee: Back in Afghanistan.
Interviewer: And why is that?
Interviewee:

Because your soul or your mind is relaxed over there.

Interviewer:

You could be at home?

Interviewee:

Yeah. It’s not for my kids because I took her one time. Not me.

My wife came to Afghanistan and she was telling her let’s go home and my wife was,
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like this is your home. No, it’s not my home.
Interviewer:

Yeah, generational differences.

Interviewee:

But I’m not someone to live in the west for the rest of my life. It

was like I was forced to live here. I have no drive to be honest with you, sir.
Interviewee:

Anytime, my pleasure.

Interviewer:

Thank you.

End.
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Abbreviations

ANA

Afghan National Army

ANP

Afghan National Police

COIN

Counterinsurgency

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

IED

Improvised Explosive Device

ISAF

International Security Assistance Forces

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS

National Directorate for Security (Afghanistan)

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

PRT

Provincial Reconstruction Team

UN

United Nations

UNAMA

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USAID

U.S. Agency for International Development

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

